A few days ago in an interview
with TRT World (Turkey), President Poroshenko claimed that the
occupied #Donbas would be returned to Ukraine within a year. At the time
of writing that seems to be somewhat “hopeful” – or perhaps “potentially
catastrophic” should a reader be of the opinion Ukraine is simply not
politically, institutionally or financially strong enough to receive such a
devastated infrastructure and poisoned atmosphere.
Indeed only the foolish (or perhaps The Kremlin)
would expect Ukraine to fully implement its Minsk obligations in the current
circumstances within the occupied Donbas. “The West” would be far better
off publicly stating that it understands that is the situation and thus
publicly lean less on Ukraine to fulfill such obligations while the
circumstances remain significantly unchanged, and lean far harder on Ukraine to
reform instead.
Perhaps such a shift in “Western” messaging
would change the Kremlin calculus somewhat. The entirety of “western”
political and diplomatic energy pushing a reformed Ukraine, with less pressure
regarding Minsk would at the very least raise eyebrows in Moscow. Unless
the situation changes dramatically regarding ceasefires and the ability to hold
elections that in current circumstances would forever sully the reputation of
the OSCE, it is policy folly.
Such a messaging shift would inevitably
mean Kyiv actually moving “westward” slightly faster than it is doing. As
The Kremlin cares far more about the Ukrainian shift “westward”, and cares
nothing about the occupied Donbas should it fail be to an effective lever over
Kyiv, it is possible such a change in messaging could have an effect – or not.
Should circumstances in the occupied Donbas
change sufficiently, naturally Messrs Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky have no political future – those political futures exist
only for as long as The Kremlin decides to retain control and heavily subsidise
the occupied Donbas territories.
How long can the illicit revenue streams in the
occupied territories remain controlled/directed to avoid internal (and
external) schisms? Despite claims to the contrary, it seems highly
unlikely that Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders when
expelled from the occupied territories for espionage were actually engaged in
any meaningful espionage – if any whatsoever. Espionage would seem to be
an excuse, when the real issues are far more likely to have been control of
revenue flows from medicines. Médecins Sans Frontières handing out free
medicines is hardly conducive to the lucrative medicine racketeering within the
occupied territories.
As has been stated here before, anything
approaching a successful reintegration will rely upon Rinat Akhmetov to quite a
degree. He remains the major employer of the region. He has
continued paying wages despite his workers not working. His aid convoys
regularly get through (and to be clear, contain aid). There is no need to
go on, suffice to say his influence of all those who remained on the Ukrainian
side of the “contact line” will remain the greatest and have the most resonance
among the local population.
Thus if the recovery and reintegration of the
currently occupied Donbas is truly an immovable policy in Kyiv (which it is),
then Mr Akhmetov for all his faults, nefarious historical dealings and
oligarchy status, will be a necessity and play a major role in the process.
The question is what role? Formal or
informal? Transparently political as well as clearly economic?
Would he be the ideal (for however long a period) official head of the
Donbas region that gathers enough trust from Kyiv, the people of Donbas, and
The Kremlin to direct events there smoothly?
The Kremlin, if it is to shuffle quietly out of
the strategic Donbas disaster it began, will desire to do so under an occupied
Donbas management that is seen to be “acceptable”. Yet for all that has
been written about Rinat Akhmetov, one has to suspect that it will be The
Kremlin, of all parties, that has the least trust in Mr Akhmetov.
If not he, then who?
Yuri Boiko? He is a man with far less
influence in the Donbas than Rinat Akhmetov, albeit he is officially the
talking head of the Opposition Block (Party of Regions remnants). He may
well have much more trust within The Kremlin than Rinat Akhmetov – in fact he
probably has. He may also have enough trust from Kyiv too. What he
fails to have is the on-going influence of Rinat Akhmetov, and being seen no
more favourably by the majority of the Ukrainian public than Mr Akhmetov is, if
Kyiv is going to irk the Ukrainian constituency, it may as well be with an
overtly political Rinat Akhmetov in Donetsk.
History may yet look back and view Mr Akhmetov’s
only major error during the entire Donbas disaster, as being that he dallied
far too long in protecting his interests in the Donbas after the illegal
actions in Crimea. Had he flooded the streets of Donetsk with his people
and thousands of employees robustly pooh-poohing any thoughts of following that
line, then perhaps outcomes would be different today. Certainly when his
people and workers took to the streets of Mariupol, that city stayed with
Ukraine.
Perhaps one day somebody will ask him that very
question.
There is perhaps a role for both of these men.
After any “Minsk Agreement elections” there will
be two regions requiring “acceptable” leaders to all concerned. Maybe Mr
Akhmetov to Donetsk and Mr Boiko to Luhansk?
It is certainly an idea that Viktor Medvedchuk
is pushing – albeit Ukrainians probably trust Viktor Medvedchuk even less than
Messrs Akhmetov and Boiko. Yet as Mr Medvedchuk is personally close with
President Putin, some would infer that there may be a degree of tacit approval,
or at the very least the names have not been dismissed out of hand, as
acceptable managers of the reintegration and its immediate aftermath from a
Kremlin perspective.
Perhaps there is simply no traction for such an
idea (at least for now) in Kyiv or Moscow, and it is a mere speculative roll of
the Medvedchuk dice. Perhaps there is no intention within The Kremlin to
change the circumstances within the occupied Donbas whatsoever. Maybe “The
West” will dismiss the opportunity to change the calculus of both Kyiv and The
Kremlin by toning down public Minsk demands/rhetoric/expectations on Kyiv, and
ramping up reform demands/expectations/rhetoric instead – at least whilst the
current circumstances continue, and it is only within the occupied territories
that circumstances can change sufficiently to facilitate further Minsk
progress.
However unlikely it currently appears that
President Poroshenko’s claims on TRT will be realised in the time fame he gave,
it remains prudent to ponder how, and under whom, any reintegration would occur
at the regional level.
There are clearly no good personnel choices – so
the choices are those of “acceptability”. To be blunt, the list is short
and distinctly odious at a time when Ukrainian progress requires the
diminishing role of the oligarchy, rather than an increasing role.
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