Tuesday, March 31, 2015

The Civil Code of Ukraine

The Civil Code of Ukraine - the basic legal act of civil legislation of Ukraine adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 16 January 2003.

Civil legislation shall regulate personal property and non-property relations (civil
relations) founded on the basis of legal equality, goodwill and property independence of
their parties.

The civil legislation shall be not applied to the property relations founded on the
administrative or other power subordination of one party to another as well as to tax and
budgetary relations unless otherwise established by the law.

Natural persons and legal entities represent participants of civil relations.
Participants of civil relations shall include the state of Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea, territorial communities, foreign states and other subjects of the Public Law.
General foundations of the civil legislation include:
1) unacceptability of a self-willed intrusion into a private life of a human;
2) unacceptability of ownership deprivation except as established by the Constitution
of Ukraine and the law;
3) freedom of agreement;
4) freedom of entrepreneurial activity;
5) remedy of a civil right and interest;
6) equity, good faith and reasonability.

The Economic Code of Ukraine

The Economic Code of Ukraine establishes pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine legal fundamentals of economic activity, based on the diversity of business entities of different ownership forms.

The Economic Code of Ukraine has as its purpose to ensure growth of business activity of business entities, development of entrepreneurship, and on this basis increase of efficiency of social production, its social orientation pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution of Ukraine, strengthen social order in the economic system of Ukraine, facilitate harmonization with other economic systems.

Economic activity in this Code shall be understood as the activity of business entities in the area of social production, aimed at manufacturing and sale of products, execution of works or providing services of value character that have price distinction.

Economic activity, carried out to achieve economic and social results and in order to generate profit shall be deemed entrepreneurship, and business entities shall be deemed entrepreneurs. Economic activity may be carried out without the purpose to generate profit (non-profit economic activity).

Activity of non-business entities, aimed at creation and maintaining of the required material and technical conditions of their functioning, conducted with or without involvement of business entities, shall be deemed economic support of non-business entities.
The sphere of business relationships shall be comprised of economic and production, organizational and economic, and internal economic relationships.
Economic and production relationships shall be deemed those, arising between business entities in the course of economic activity.

Organizational and economic relationships in this Code shall be deemed those, established between business entities and subjects of organizational and economic powers in the course of management of business activity.

Internal economic relationships shall be deemed those, established between structural units of a business entity, and relationships of the business entity with its structural units.

Ukraine’s future:President v oligarch

FOR the past year, Ukraine’s government has enlisted the help of the country’s powerful oligarchs in fighting its war against pro-Russian separatists. This week a new war opened up, pitting the government against one of the very oligarchs it had relied upon. On March 25th Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s president, forced Ihor Kolomoisky, a business magnate, to resign from his post as governor of the central region of Dnipropetrovsk. Mr Kolomoisky had financed pro-Kiev battalions and played a vital role in stemming the spread of separatism. Yet after Mr Kolomoisky deployed his personal militia in Kiev to block the government from regulating his business interests, the president had no choice but to sack him.  
The clash was the biggest skirmish yet in an unfolding confrontation between the government and the oligarchy. It may be the single most important front in the struggle for Ukraine’s future. Sergii Leshchenko, a former investigative journalist and now a reformist member of parliament, calls it the second phase of the Maidan revolution: “Maidan removed [the former president, Viktor] Yanukovych, but not the oligarchic system.” But it could mean war with the oligarchs at a time when Ukraine can ill afford instability.
Ukraine’s oligarchs amassed their fortunes through shady privatisation deals in the 1990s. Mr Kolomoisky collected holdings in oil and gas, aviation, banking, and media. Last year he began financing volunteer battalions to supplement the country’s decrepit army. By defending Ukraine, Mr Kolomoisky was also protecting his business empire. His bank, PrivatBank, offered rewards of $10,000 for captured separatists and equipped some of its armoured cars for military use. In March last year Mr Kolomoisky was given his governorship.
Other magnates have had less of a formal role in government than Mr Kolomoisky. But unlike Russia’s oligarchs, whom Vladimir Putin pushed out of politics, Ukraine’s retain unfettered influence over the country’s leadership. Ownership of the media allows them to act as kingmakers. A closed party-list voting system means that their lackeys can slip into parliament unchallenged. Corrupt courts do their bidding. As a result, business and government do not merely coexist, they are often one and the same.
It was a challenge to this nexus that led to the outburst from Mr Kolomoisky. At issue is his stake in a state oil company, UkrNafta. Previously, Ukrainian law required 60% of shares for a quorum at meetings of state-owned firms, giving Mr Kolomoisky, with a 42% stake, de facto control. He milked the company for cash, withholding billions of hryvnias in state dividends. Mr Kolomoisky claims that in the early 2000s he paid $5m a month to Viktor Pinchuk, another oligarch, to protect his stake in the lucrative enterprise. Mr Pinchuk’s representatives deny the claims.
On March 19th reformists in parliament passed a law reducing the quorum requirement at state firms to a simple majority, denying Mr Kolomoisky a veto. Some days later a group of armed men, apparently loyal to Mr Kolomoisky, arrived in a military vehicle without number plates and built metal barricades around UkrNafta’s headquarters. Earlier in the week Mr Kolomoisky had appeared with a phalanx of guards at another state-owned oil company, UkrTransNafta, after the government tried to replace a manager loyal to him. At both companies, Mr Kolomoisky ultimately backed down.
Ukraine’s reformers have wanted to wean the country off the oligarchs ever since the Maidan revolution, with only limited success. The margin of graft on government tenders has fallen from about 40% to 10%, say anti-corruption activists. Some notorious schemes have closed, including, last week, UkrEcoResoursy, a state-owned recycling firm that in reality recycled only cash for its masters.

Ukraine's internal passports to be replaced with cards

The Cabinet of Ministers has approved a special card to replace the internal passport.
This has been announced by deputy head of the Presidential Administration Dmytro Shymkiv at a press briefing after the meeting of the National Council of Reforms.
"The government yesterday approved the card to replace the internal passport," Shymkiv said.
As a reminder, the State Migration Service of Ukraine forecasted that Ukrainian passports would be issued in form of cards by the end of 2015, but the start of the reform would depend on funding.

Fitch Downgrades Ukreximbank to 'C'

Fitch Ratings has downgraded JSC The State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine's (Ukreximbank) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior debt rating to 'C' from 'CC'. The bank's other ratings are unaffected by these rating actions.

The downgrade reflects Fitch's view that default by the bank on its external debt obligations is now inevitable. This follows the public announcement by the bank on 27 March 2015 on initiation of talks with the holders of its USD750m eurobond notes to extend the notes' maturity from 27 April 2015 to 27 July 2015. This short-term extension is necessary to "negotiate a long-term solution with the noteholders in accordance with the targets established in the four-year USD17.5bn extended fund facility for Ukraine approved by the IMF on 11 March 2015".

Apart from the USD750m eurobond due on 27 April 2015, Ukreximbank has a USD600m senior eurobond due in January 2018 and a USD125m subordinated bond due in February 2016. Fitch expects these bonds to also be the subject of negotiations with creditors.

Fitch expects to downgrade Ukrexim's Long-term foreign-currency IDR to 'RD' (Restricted Default) if the bank does not repay its outstanding eurobond on 27 April. The ratings of the three outstanding bonds are now all at the lowest possible levels for instrument ratings, and so would not be subject to further downgrades in case of a restructuring.

The rating actions are as follows:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'C' from 'CC' 
Senior unsecured debt of Biz Finance PLC: downgraded to 'C' from 'CC, Recovery Rating 'RR4' 
Long-term local currency IDR: 'CCC', unaffected
Subordinated debt: 'C'/Recovery Rating 'RR5', unaffected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'C', unaffected
Support Rating: '5', unaffected
Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor', unaffected
Viability Rating: 'ccc', unaffected 
National Long-term rating: 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, unaffected

Monday, March 30, 2015

Moody's downgrades ratings of Kyiv and Kharkiv to Ca from Caa3

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the foreign- and local-currency ratings of the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv to Ca from Caa3, reads a report on the rating agency's website.
"The outlook on the ratings is negative," according to the document.
"The main driver of the downgrades is the likelihood of private creditors incurring substantial losses from debt restructuring and the increase in systemic risk stemming from deterioration of the Ukrainian government's credit profile, as reflected by Moody's recent downgrade of the sovereign's government bond rating to Ca (negative outlook) from Caa3 (negative outlook)," the agency stated.
Ratings rationale
The key driver of Moody's decision to downgrade Kyiv's long-term ratings to Ca is the city's participation in the Ukrainian government's plan to restructure its outstanding eurobonds and the rating agency's expectation that private creditors will incur substantial losses on Kyiv's debt as a result of the restructuring. In Moody's view, the Ca ratings incorporate the expected losses for the creditors, while the negative outlook reflects the uncertainties over the parameters of restructuring, the final terms of which may lead to losses greater than currently expected by Moody's. The impact to the creditors after restructuring will be determined by the terms of the debt exchange which are currently being discussed with the creditors.
The City Council recently filed with Ukraine's Ministry of Finance its intention to restructure its foreign currency bonds ($250 million and $300 million) due in 2015 and 2016. These bonds will be included in the restructuring package together with the sovereign government eurobonds. In addition, there are plans to restructure the local currency public debt, although no decision has yet been taken.
If the city does not restructure its debt, it will face significant refinancing risks, as repayments of public debt due in 2015 represent over 50% of Kyiv's direct debt, a level equivalent to 48% of 2014 operating revenues.
Moody's notes that the rating also reflects the elevated systemic pressures from a deterioration in Ukraine's credit profile. The city has significant institutional, financial and macroeconomic linkages with the central government.
The Ca rating primarily reflects the deterioration in Ukraine's credit profile which has direct implications for the ratings of the city of Kharkiv given its institutional, financial and macroeconomic linkages with the central government. The city is neither sufficiently insulated from national market risks nor has sufficient fiscal autonomy to hold a rating exceeding the sovereign level.

Moody's downgrades Ukraine's sovereign ratings to Ca (March 24, 2015)

Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded Ukraine's long-term issuer and government debt ratings to Ca from Caa3. The outlook remains negative.
The key driver of the downgrade is the likelihood of external private creditors incurring substantial losses as a result of the government's plan to restructure the majority of its outstanding Eurobonds. Also included in the restructuring is the external debt of state-guaranteed entities and selected other state-owned enterprises, and the Eurobonds issued by the capital city of Kiev.
The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Ukraine's government and external debt levels will remain very high, in spite of the debt restructuring and plans to introduce reforms.
In a related rating action, Moody's also downgraded the issuer and debt ratings of the "Financing of Infrastructural Projects" (Fininpro) to Ca/(P)Ca from Caa3/(P)Caa3 and maintained the negative outlook. Fininpro's debt is fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the government of Ukraine.
Moody's also lowered Ukraine's country ceiling for long-term foreign currency debt to Caa3 from Caa2, and its country ceiling for long-term domestic currency debt and deposits to Caa2 from Caa1. Ukraine's country ceiling for foreign-currency bank deposits remains unchanged at Ca. All short-term country ceilings also remain unchanged at Not Prime (NP).
The key driver of Moody's decision to downgrade Ukraine's long-term government debt and issuer ratings to Ca is the government's plan to restructure the majority of its outstanding Eurobonds as well as other public sector external debt and the rating agency's expectation that private creditors will incur substantial economic losses as a result of the restructuring. The debt operation is intended to provide $15.3 billion of the four-year, $40 billion external financing package agreed with the IMF and other multilateral and bilateral creditors. The package was approved by the IMF Executive Board on March 11.
Although negotiations over the specific details of the restructuring are only now getting underway, Moody's believes that the likelihood of a distressed exchange, and hence a default on government debt taking place, is virtually 100%. The bonds' recovery value will be determined by the terms of the debt exchange and is currently being discussed with creditors. The terms could include a grace period on principal repayments during the term of the IMF program, a reduction in the existing bonds' current coupons, which now average 7.1%, and a haircut on the outstanding principal.
The principal objective of the proposed debt exchange is to reduce the government's external debt and debt service to more manageable levels. This effort will be supported by the economic, budget/debt and monetary reforms being pursued by the new government in connection with the IMF program. These comprehensive sectoral, judicial and social reforms aim to stabilize the economy and return it to a positive growth path.
However, Ukraine's government and external debt will remain at very high levels even if these reforms are successful, and despite the lower debt levels achieved by the external debt restructuring. These solvency challenges are the key reason for maintaining a negative outlook on the government's downgraded ratings.
Moody's would consider moving the rating outlook to stable after the debt restructuring if it were to see a sustained normalization of the geopolitical situation in Eastern Ukraine, along with improvements in the country's external liquidity position. An upgrade would likely require several additional factors to be in place, including a positive policy track record of structural reforms, improved growth prospects and positive debt dynamics.
We would downgrade Ukraine's rating if bond holders were to incur higher losses than what is captured by the Ca rating following the planned debt restructuring, or any other default by the government.
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,651 (2013 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): -6.9% (2014 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 24.5% (2014 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -4.6% (2014 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: -9% (2013 Actual) (also known as External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 77.5% (2013 actual)
Level of economic development: Very Low level of economic resilience
Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans) has been recorded since 1983.
On 20 March 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the Ukraine, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event risks. The outlook for post-restructuring recovery has worsened.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in September 2013. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.

Investor presentation - Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (March 13, 2015)

Link for download full Presentation:

Notice to investors: 




Link for download full Presentation:

2015'03'13 - Investor Presentation.pdf 

Lazard, White&Case to be advisors to state banks, Ukrzaliznytsia, Kyiv City if foreign debt is restructured

State Oschadbank, Ukreximbank, Ukrzaliznytsia and Kyiv City Council will attract the same advisors as the Finance Ministry of Ukraine, France's Lazard Frères SAS and Britain's White&Case LLP, if they decide to restructure their foreign debts.
This is stipulated in cabinet resolution No. 132 of March 25, published in the Uriadovy Kurier newspaper on Saturday.
"The Finance Ministry coordinates events on the preparation and realization of the deals… and agrees the deals," reads the resolution.
According to the resolution, the conditions of the cooperation of state banks, Kyiv City and Ukrzaliznytsia with Lazard will be the same as with the Finance Ministry: 0.18% of the sum of the transactions restructuring Ukraine's foreign debt.
The conditions with White&Case will be defined in separate agreements.
The borrowers will pay their own funds and funds from Kyiv's budget for services provided by the advisors, reads the resolution.

Poroshenko signs law in support of volunteers

The President of Ukraine has signed the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine regarding Volunteerism" allowing the development of volunteering in Ukraine and improving the quality of volunteer assistance.

Law № 246-VIII of March 5, 2015 regulates public relations concerning volunteerism in Ukraine. The main task of the law is to ensure efficient regulation of legal relations in volunteer movement in Ukraine, promote volunteering in Ukraine and improve the quality of volunteer assistance.

The law defines areas of volunteering, clarifies terms "volunteerism" and "volunteer", removes restrictions for volunteer organizations and institutions, specifies rights and responsibilities of volunteers, organizations and institutions that engage volunteers in their activities, explains features of reimbursement associated with providing volunteer assistance.

The law also amends voluntary life and health insurance of volunteers for the period of providing volunteer assistance by organizations and institutions that involve volunteers in their activities.

Putin aims to split US, EU and launch new offensive

Today, the main objective of Russian President Vladimir Putin is to undermine the common approach of the European Union and the United States against Russia due to its aggression in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk said this in an interview with Associated Press.
According to him, the Russian leader currently wants "to split the unity among the EU member states, to lift sanctions. And to split the unity among the United States of America and the European Union."
In this regard, Yatseniuk called on the West to stay united in helping Ukraine repel Russian aggression and that achieving this would be the "joint success of the entire free world."
Yatseniuk also said that Putin intends to eliminate Ukraine as an independent state and could spark a new offensive in the east to achieve that aim. The Prime Minister also noted that Russia was uninterested in de-escalating Ukraine's conflict with separatist forces, despite its commitment to maintain a peace deal made in February.
Yatseniuk also told about the reforms introduced by the government, as well as about efforts aimed at elimination of corruption.
"A few years ago we had the territory. Today, we have the country. An independent country that is fighting for freedoms and liberties," he said.

Sunday, March 29, 2015

EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement

As endorsed by the EU-Ukraine Association Council on 16 March 2015 I. STRATEGIC PART The European Union and Ukraine ('the Parties') recognise that their relations have changed in a significant and positive way. Relations between the EU and Ukraine are currently based on those parts of the Association Agreement which are provisionally applied, on the parts of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) remaining in force, as well as on the European Neighborhood Policy framework.

The Parties have also developed and launched a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, the successful implementation of which is a fundamental element underpinning the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the European Union set out in the Association Agreement, namely regarding the substantial enhancement of mobility and people-to-people contacts. The Parties began negotiations of an Association Agreement in 2007, and of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), to form an integral part of that Agreement, in 2008.

The negotiations of the Association Agreement were finalised on 19 December 2011, and the Agreement was initialled on 30 March 2012, followed by the DCFTA-part of the Agreement on 19 July 2012. After signing the political chapters of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement at the EU summit of 21 March 2014, both parties signed the remaining sections of the Agreement - including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) - in the margins of the EU summit of 27 June 2014. On 16 September 2014, the Association Agreement was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament and consent was given by the European Parliament, enabling the provisional application of the relevant provisions of the Association Agreement on 1 November 2014, and the DCFTA-part on 1 January 2016

Action is needed to ensure that the Parties are able to enjoy the full benefits of the Agreement starting with its partial provisional application. The aim of the present Association Agenda is to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement, by creating a practical framework through which the overall objectives of political association and economic integration can be realised and by providing a list of priorities for joint work on sector by sector basis. 

The fact that it focuses on a limited number of priorities should not affect the scope or the mandate of existing dialogues under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, other relevant Agreements or under the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership, as well as scope and mandate of future dialogues under the Association Agreement, in particular should not prejudge implementation of commitments made in the AA/DCFTA once it enters into force or is provisionally applied. 

PRINCIPLES, INSTRUMENTS AND RESOURCES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ASSOCIATION AGENDA The following common principles will guide the implementation of the Association Agenda:
· The Association Agenda is a practical instrument aimed to prepare and facilitate the full implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as well as the achievement of the overall objectives of political association and economic integration;
· The priorities for action of the Association Agenda complement the responsibilities of the Parties to implement the provisionally applied parts of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and to implement all its provisions once it enters into force, as well as to consolidate the Parties’ common understanding of actions needed for further deepening of political association and economic integration;
· The priorities for action of the Association Agenda should be defined taking into account the structure of the institutional framework as set out in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement acknowledging the respective duties and responsibilities of each body, namely as regards Parliamentary Association Committee and Civil Society Platform;
· The Association Agenda should be implemented in full respect of the principles of transparency, accountability and inclusiveness;
· The Association Agenda involves an engagement from both sides in its implementation;
· The Association Agenda aims to achieve tangible and defined results through the progressive implementation of practical measures;
· The Parties recognise the importance of supporting the agreed priorities through appropriate and sufficient political, technical and financial means; and
· This Association Agenda is the principal vehicle for the monitoring and assessment of Ukraine’s progress in the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as well as for the monitoring and assessment of the achievement of the overall objectives of political association and economic integration in general, in particular regarding Ukraine's track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in achieving convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas.
The implementation of the Association Agenda will be subject to and part of annual reporting, monitoring and assessment. Progress made will be reviewed within the structures created under the Association Agreement, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or other relevant Agreements. In this process the Parties will aim to reach, so far as is possible, an overall common assessment of annual progress made.

Ukrainian banks sustain losses of almost UAH 75 billion for two months

In January and February Ukrainian banks sustained losses of UAH 74.5 billion, the press service of the National Bank of Ukraine has reported.
"The losses suffered by the system of banks as of March 1, 2015 was worth UAH 74.5 billion," reads the statement.
Banks' profits for the two months increased by 72.6%, compared with the same period in 2014, and amounted to UAH 57.1 billion; the costs increased by 268.6% and amounted to UAH 131.6 billion.
Unprofitable activities of banks led to a decrease in their regulatory capital by UAH 71.3 billion from the beginning of the year and to the deterioration of the value of other prudential regulations and banks performance index.

Blackmail is not working: Ukraine can do without the Russian market

In early March 2015, European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström, after a meeting with Minister of Economic Development of Russia Alexei Ulyukaev, declared her readiness to restore the tripartite talks between Brussels, Kyiv and Moscow, and again try to find the "flexible application of the Agreement on free trade zone between Ukraine and EU".

According to sources, Ukrainian and European sides reportedly agreed on the impossibility of further delay the implementation of a free trade area (FTA), but still allow for adjustments in this issue.

However, experience shows that concessions to Moscow in matters of implementation of the Association Agreement do give nothing to Kyiv.

It is known, September 12, 2014 in Brussels, was reached an agreement between representatives of Ukraine, the EU and Russia, according to which, in exchange for postponement of entry into force of the Agreement economic until 2016 the Russian Federation to refrain from restrictions on Ukrainian goods.

But customs statistics has not recorded any positive effects of such a "compromise." On the contrary, the export of Ukrainian goods to Russia in the first two months of 2015 ($ 0.6 billion) fell by almost three times compared with July-August 2014 ($ 1.7 billion), two months prior to the Brussels agreements and January - February 2014 ($ 1.6 billion).

From this point of view is given doubtful that in the case of the entry into force of the Association Agreement without delay and, consequently, the abolition of Moscow preferential tariffs for Ukrainian goods, the decline in our exports to Russia would be much larger.

Ukraine ousted from the Russian market due to the action of objective and subjective factors.

The objective are long-term strategy of import substitution and the recent devaluation of the ruble, which has reduced the purchasing power of Russian consumers, as well as disabling a number of enterprises in the Donbass in the fighting.
Subjective - continued undeclared trade war against Ukraine, despite allegedly made in Brussels in September 2014 "compromise", as well as the voluntary departure of a number of Ukrainian suppliers to the Russian market because of its unpredictability and unreliability.

According to the earlier forecast on current trends in bilateral trade, Russia's share in Ukrainian exports until the end of 2015 will drop to 10-12%. However, the reality exceeded these expectations, and Russia's share in the export of goods from Ukraine decreased to 10.1% in the first two months of this year.

 Postponement or adjustments in the implementation of the economic part of the Association Agreement are not able to change this long-term trend in the loss of domestic producers of the Russian market.

Minimum that is needed for this - it is unacceptable for Kiev or total surrender to Europeans as a complete rejection of the economic part of the Agreement and the beginning of the integration of Ukraine to Putin's Eurasian Union.

Any other concessions will not make the Russian Federation to stop discriminating against Ukrainian suppliers.

Thus, attempts to achieve another "compromise" issued only attempt to close their eyes to reality and then evade effective compensation package, which the EU today is really waiting for the Ukrainian economy.

At the same time, Moscow's attempts to blackmail the inertial Kiev and Brussels regime of access of Ukrainian goods to the Russian market after three and a half years of permanent trade war no longer have sufficient grounds. The share of exports in the Russian market our products (10.1%) while the comparable with the Turkish (7.7%), Chinese (7.4%) or the Egyptian (6.7%), but much less promising in terms of full-scale dependence from the political whims of the Kremlin.

Therefore, Ukraine, and partners in the European Union it is time to realize that the widespread stereotype, if the choice between the EU and Russia - it is a choice between values ​​and pragmatism or future and this has nothing to do with reality. Ukraine's dependence on trade and economic relations with Russia - this is not present and the past.


Fragile Cease-Fire in Ukraine Inspires Little Confidence in West

BRUSSELS - No one really expects Ukraine to get better before it gets worse, or for the promises contained in last month's cease-fire agreement to be kept.

Instead, senior Western diplomats and analysts are predicting a further escalation of tensions, including the placing of Russian nuclear weapons in the annexed Crimean Peninsula; efforts to create more unrest in cities like Mariupol and as far west as Odessa; advances by Russian-supported rebels against an undergunned and dispirited Ukrainian Army; and attempts to destabilize the Western-leaning government in Kiev, beginning with President Petro O. Poroshenko himself.

The West, which seems united, is actually divided over Russia's actions in Ukraine and what to do about them.

Having hailed the revolution at the Maidan in Kiev, and the flight of former President Viktor F. Yanukovych in February 2014, as a victory for democracy and a defeat for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, the United States and Europe are united on one matter: their refusal to consider military defense of Ukraine.

But they disagree on much else: whether to give Kiev arms, defensive or lethal; whether Ukraine should receive more economic aid, and in return for what benchmarks or promises; and whether the cease-fire agreed to last month in Minsk, the capital of neighboring Belarus, is being carried out.

Those disagreements were clear this month at the annual Brussels Forum of the German Marshall Fund, which brings together top officials from the United States and Europe.

European nations - led by Germany and France, which negotiated with Mr. Putin and Mr. Poroshenko in Minsk - oppose giving Kiev even defensive arms, arguing that it would inflame the situation and provide justification for Russian escalation.

But Washington is not convinced. Nor is NATO's supreme commander, Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, who said the West must respond to Russia's active supply of advanced weapons and troops to the rebels, which is undermining confidence in European security. "We, I think, in the West should consider all our tools in reply," he said. "Could it be destabilizing? The answer is yes. Also, inaction could be destabilizing. Is inaction an appropriate action?"

General Breedlove's outspokenness and willingness to publicize photographs of continuing Russian intervention in Ukraine have not endeared him to German officials or to some in Washington, who do not want to be pushed into making difficult decisions.

Things and Property by Ukrainian Law

An item of the material world with respect thereto civil rights and obligations may arise shall be recognized as a thing.

Immovable and Movable Things

Immovable things (immovable property, immovables) shall include land parcels and the objects located on them, which cannot be moved without their devaluation and change of their target use. The regime of an immovable thing can be also extended by the law to aircrafts and sea crafts, inland-navigation vessels, space objects and other things the rights thereto shall be subject to state registration.

Things that can be freely moved in space shall be recognized as movable things.

An ownership right and other property rights to immovable things, restrictions thereof, their emergence, transfer and termination shall be subject to state registration.

Divisible and Indivisible Things

A thing that can be divided without loose if its target use shall be recognized as divisible.
A thing that cannot be divided without loose of its target use shall be recognized as

Things Identified by Individual or Generic Characteristics

A thing shall be identified by individual characteristics if it possesses the unique inherent features that distinguish it from other similar things and individualize the thing.
Things identified by individual features shall be irreplaceable.

A thing shall be identified by generic features if it has the features inherent to all other things of the same gender and is measured by a number, weight and measure.

A thing identified by generic features shall be replaceable.

 Consumable and Non-consumable Things

A thing shall be considered consumable if it is destroyed or cease to exist in its initial form as a result of one-time use.

A thing shall be considered non-consumable if it is designed for repeated use and preserves its initial form over a long period of time.

Principal Thing and Accessory

A thing designed for servicing another (principal) thing and related to it by a common designation shall be considered its accessory.

An accessory shall follow a principal thing, unless otherwise established by the agreement or the law.

Война все спишет. Воспоминания офицера-связиста 31 армии. 1941–1945

В начале июня 1941 года я сдал последние экзамены и перешел на второй курс юридического института. Отметки по дисциплинам, кроме теории государства и права и латинского языка, у меня были неважные. Я понимал уже ясно, что юриспруденцией заниматься не буду, и привлекали меня в институте только самый внезапный роман с девочкой, имя которой я забыл, и заседания литературного кружка, руководил которым Осип Максимович Брик. Видимо, я уже не сомневался, что буду писать до конца жизни. Однако на практике все оказалось гораздо сложнее.
      22-го, утром, проезжая на велосипеде мимо одной из соседних дач, я услышал фрагмент из речи Молотова и через пять минут уже был дома. Родители, брат, гости пытались понять, что будет. Все были уверены, что война больше трех недель не протянется и что капитуляция фашистской Германии неизбежна.
      С утра до вечера слушали сводки Информбюро и все более и более удивлялись неожиданному и пугающему развитию событий. В июле немцы начали бомбить Москву.
      Днем мы сидели у репродукторов. Вечером, после первой бомбежки, у входа на Казанский вокзал возникла пробка. Задние нажимали, перед ним некуда было податься, кто-то кричал, что женщину задавили.
      Платформы пригородных станций были набиты людьми с узлами и чемоданами. Москвичи выходили на пристанционные площади, расходились кто куда. Один из них остановился около нашего забора.
      – Разрешите переночевать на вашем участке? У меня жена, двое детей.
      – Заходите. Что происходит в Москве?
      – Красная Пресня полностью уничтожена, бомбят Арбат, говорят. Немцы уже Смоленск взяли.
      А на станции мальчишки окружили старуху в синем клетчатом платке и заграничном пальто. Старуха говорила, что она из Киева приехала к дочери, но мальчишки не верили ей.
      – Тащи ее в участок, там разберутся, – уговаривал товарищей рассудительный двенадцатилетний мальчик.
      Но другой мальчик в коротких штанишках размахивал большой березовой палкой и очень волновался:
      – Это только на вид она женщина, а на самом деле – мужчина! У, ты, – погрозил он, – замаскировался!
      После двенадцати часов ночи над нами начинали кружить немецкие бомбардировщики. Где-то за Люберцами, а может быть, вдоль всей окружной дороги наши зенитчики организовывали заслоны. Трассирующие пулеметные очереди образовывали сплошные световые узоры, в воздухе разрывались снаряды. Самолеты заворачивали и опять оказывались над нами.
      Часа два тянулась эта канитель, и вдруг в воздухе над нами завис светящийся шар.
      Никто не знал, что это такое, с каждой минутой шар увеличивался и спускался прямо на нас.
      На Октябрьской улице на ковриках и одеялах ночевали москвичи. Все они проснулись и, как зачарованные, с ужасом смотрели на небо. Думали, что это большая бомба замедленного действия

Saturday, March 28, 2015

Pechersky court in Kyiv arrests ex-emergency service head Bochkovsky until bail paid

Kyiv's Pechersky District Court has granted the investigation's request on taking former State Emergency Situations Service chief Serhiy Bochkovsky into custody before trial for two months, setting a UAH 1.184 million bail, Judge Ruslan Kozlov said at a court hearing on Saturday.
The amount of bail is equal to the sum of a damage done by Bochkovsky, according to the investigation.
As earlier reported, Bochkovsky and his deputy Vasyl Stoyetsky were arrested at a Cabinet meeting on Wednesday on suspicion of corruption and were immediately fired as head and deputy head of the State Service for Emergency Situations.
The Office of the Prosecutor General has filed an appeal with Kyiv's Pechersky District Court against their release but later asked the court to scrap the appeal. Judge Iryna Lytvynova satisfied the request, arguing there was not enough evidence for the two men to be kept behind bars.
Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said on Friday Prosecutor General's office will seek a court order on Saturday to extend the detention term for two former senior government figures who are suspected of corruption and whose current 72-hour term of custody expires at noon that day.

Civil Legal Capacity

27 reasons you should not ever visit Ukraine (photo)

1. Some people would like to believe that Ukraine - a beautiful country ...

2. But the bitter truth is that it is not so

3. No amount of money can agree to go to Ukraine, you will only lose your time

4. You will not find anything interesting there

5. The dark color of nature ...