BY
The Verkhovna Rada has apparently registered a
draft resolution on the termination of diplomatic relations with the Russian
Federation.
The draft Resolution authors are Oksana Korchynska,
Yuriy Shukhevych-Bogdan, Oleg Petrenko and Vladimir Parasyuk – a politically
mixed bag.
Unfortunately at the time of writing, this draft
Resolution is not published on the Verkhovna Rada website, so it is unclear
whether the proposed breaking of diplomatic ties also includes consular ties
too. After the Russian actions in Georgia of 2008 diplomatic ties were
cut – but consular offices were maintained in both nations.
This draft Resolution comes more than two years
after the illegal annexation of Crimea, continuing war, and almost daily death
in the Donbas, economic sanctions, tens of billions of US$ claims and
counterclaims pending various international courts, cyber attacks, active
measures etc., etc.
Some readers will naturally question why the breaking
of #diplomatic_relations between #Russia and #Ukraine has not occurred long ago
considering the numerous and continuing ways The Kremlin has violated Ukraine.
After all, to break diplomatic relations between
nations, technically, is a discretionary (or arbitrary) sovereign choice that
requires no legal grounds, and Ukraine has plenty of legal grounds if such
grounds were necessary – which they are not. In breaking diplomatic
relations, the Vienna Convention does still place a few obligations upon States
to which Ukraine would have to adhere:
Article 45 – If diplomatic relations are broken
off between two States, or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:
(a) The receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, respect and
protect the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives;
(b) The sending State may entrust the custody of the premises of the mission,
together with its property and archives, to a third State acceptable to the
receiving State; (c) The sending State may entrust the protection of its
interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the
receiving State.
It also provides a way for officially
recognised, yet indirect communication channels to continue.
Article 46 – A sending State may with the prior
consent of a receiving State, and at the request of a third State not
represented in the receiving State, undertake the temporary protection of the
interests of the third State and of its nationals.
However, there are those who would consider
Ukraine breaking diplomatic ties now an action retarded (to put it mildly) when
conversation between the two States clearly have to continue one way or
another.
Is there any benefit to doing this now?
What serious political and/or diplomatic
negotiations occur between Ukraine and Russia that do not already involve third
parties/States, whether it be the “Contact Group” with the OSCE, the “Normandy
Four”, or Gazprom and Naftogaz with the EU etc?
Does Ukraine benefit more from having third
parties at the table, or third parties acting as a messenger service with
nobody sat at the table? Perhaps that depends upon the third party/States
or third party messenger.
A question arises as to who Ukraine would
nominate and who Russia would accept as a suitable “third State”. The UK
has a liking for nominating Sweden, whereas perhaps the most longstanding
“third State” agreements were the US use of Swiss and Czechoslovakian
diplomatic missions in Cuba.
How would the Ukrainian constituency react to
such a decision? Would they perceive it as an unwillingness to look The
Kremlin in the eye across the table, and thus a sign of weakness, or a
righteous and belated public shunning of official contact with The Kremlin?
How would the Ukraine’s international supporters
view such a move? Understandable but nevertheless stupid and untimely, or
long overdue but perhaps now with greatly diminished perception and outcome
benefits?
Would such an action now help or hinder those
that are working on Ukraine’s behalf behind the curtain?
Considering the calibre of the average Ukrainian
parliamentarian and the predisposition for populism over cognitive thought,
have those that have drafted this Resolution asked themselves any of these
questions and arrived at this position after careful consideration?
Have
they tested the internal and external political and diplomatic water? Is
it yet another case of drafting a Resolution (or Bill) knowing it will not be
adopted – A case of being seen (if anybody actually notices a draft Resolution
as yet unpublished) to have drafted such a Resolution – even if it necessarily
wastes parliamentary committee time and never sees the inside of the voting
chamber? If it is just a case of being seen, why not make media
statements (that at least some people would notice) preparatory to even
drafting such a Resolution?
It perhaps seems a little late in the day to be
submitting such a Resolution – but then again, is there that much difference
between active Kremlin hostilities toward Ukraine today than that of 2 years
ago?
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