BY
Noting the renewed momentum in Minsk II rhetoric, as
the last
entry highlighted,
as well as some notable occurrences both within the Kremlin Contact Group
line-up, and the rising death toll of “problematic prominent individuals” among
the “People’s Republics”, it would seem both necessary and appropriate to
dedicate a few lines to the unreliable Verkhovna Rada and its ability to garner
300 (or more) votes that will see through changes to the Constitution of
Ukraine providing for decentralisation of power throughout the nation – and
enable the “Special Law” for the currently occupied Donbas when it comes to
governance therein.
As stated in a
July 2015 entry,
when the draft constitution amendments passed through the Verkhovna Rada
initially garnering 288 votes, the question would be whether another 12 or more
votes could be found to enable decentralisation – and the “Special Law” for the
occupied Donbas.
The next (and final if successful) vote for the
decentralisation focused constitutional amendments is to occur sometime during
26th – 29th January.
A failure to see the constitutional amendments reach
the required 300 (+) votes will have serious repercussions for a nation now
conditioned to expect decentralistion of power to their local governance
structures – as well as the responsibility and accountability that goes with
it. It will also have serious repercussions as far as Ukraine being seen
to adhere to the Minsk II obligations it was forced to undertake.
Yet there are issues within the constitutional
amendments that do not sit well with many parliamentarians – not simply the
much cited occupied Donbas”Special Law” issue.
Further tinkering with the proposed constitutional
amendments would be exceptionally difficult. Having passed the initial
Verkhovna Rada vote (without reaching a constitutional majority) the amendments
then went to the Constitutional Court to insure they are constitutional – where
they got “the nod”. Thus any tinkering now would indicate further
deliberation by the Constitutional Court to insure that “nod” still applies.
Having managed to garner only 288 votes at the last
reading of the amendments, and with the Verkhovna Rada becoming much more
dysfunctional and unpredictable since the July vote last year, what are the
chances of securing a constitutional majority within the next fortnight before
the vote occurs?
How does the Verkhovna Rada voting math stand up when
no text can be easily changed in any proposed amendment to eek out another vote
in favour? Those who did not vote in favour last time, for whatever
reason, are presented with nothing different. How to persuade them to
take a different view?
It is of course possible to simply buy, through
illicit payment of one form or another, the vote of some Verkhovna Rada
deputies. It is also possible to coerce their vote too – far too many
have something nefarious in their past that the new anti-corruption
institutions could be directed toward.
There are then the “party whips” who will undoubtedly
be required to “whip” furiously. Indeed, President Poroshenko’s
“enforcer” Ihor Kononenko is already very active among the “Solidarity/Block
Poroshenko” ranks.
Nevertheless, bribery, coercion, effective legitimate
party “whipping”/discipline across all (willing/supportive) political parties
will not necessarily reach the required number of 300 (plus). Even with
such an enormous amount of political energy spent, and no doubt significant
external diplomatic weight applied, the math would suggest it will be necessary
to insure the maximum attendance of MPs – be they sick, lame, (or as too many
parliamentarians appear to be part-time), lazy. Only those recently
deceased or currently in jail can be discounted (for obvious reasons) if the
constitution majority is to be successfully assured – that or a major U turn by
any previously unsupportive political party changing its view en masse.
Can the Verkhovna Rada gather 300 votes? Yes.
Will it gather 300 votes? Probably. Is it a done deal?
Far, far from it at the time of writing.
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