Their army’s equipment and strategy was “outmoded”; their air force’s bombs
and missiles were “more dumb than smart”; their navy was “more rust than
ready”. For decades, this was Western military leaders’ view, steeped in
condescension, of their Russian counterparts. What they have seen in Syria and
Ukraine has come as a shock.
Russian military jets have, at times, been carrying out more sorties in a
day in Syria than the US-led coalition has done in a month. The Russian navy
has launched ballistic missiles from the Caspian Sea 900 miles way, and kept
supply lines going to Syria. The air defences installed by the Russians in
Syria and eastern Ukraine would make it extremely hazardous for the West to
carry out strikes against the Assad regime or Ukrainian separatists.
Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the commander of the US army in Europe, has
described Russian advances in electronic warfare in Syria and Ukraine – a field
in which they were typically supposed to be backward – as “eye watering”.
The chief of US Air Force operations in Europe and Africa, Lieutenant
General Frank Gorenc, has disclosed that Moscow is now deploying anti-aircraft
systems in Crimea, which the Kremlin annexed from Ukraine last year, and in
Kaliningrad, an enclave between Lithuania and Poland. It is doing so, he says,
in a way that makes it “very, very difficult” for Nato planes to gain access
safely to areas including parts of Poland.
It is not just Nato member states watching the Russians with concern.
Israel, too, sees the build-up of Russian weaponry across its northern border
in Syria and wonders where it will all end. Their apprehension is that the
advanced equipment already in situ in the Middle East will end up with Iran,
viewed as an existential threat to the Jewish state, or with other Arab
countries, thus eroding the air superiority that is Israel’s primary advantage
over its neighbours.
It is this military might that is underpinning President Vladimir Putin’s
strategic triumphs. His intervention in Syria has been a game changer and what
happens there now lies, to a large extent, in his hands. The Ukraine conflict
is semi-frozen, on his terms. The Russians are allying with the Kurds, unfazed
by the Turkish anger this has provoked. And, crucially, they are now returning
to Egypt to an extent not seen for 44 years, since they were kicked out by
President Anwar Sadat.
One of the most senior analysts in Israeli military intelligence toldThe
Independent in Tel Aviv last week: “Anyone who wants anything done in
this region is beating a path to Moscow.”
Mr Putin has relished pointing out the significance of the West seeing “for
the first time that these weapons do exist, that they are of high quality, and
that we have well-trained people who can put them to effective use. They have
now seen, too, that Russia is ready to use them if this is in the interest of
our country and our people.”
In Syria the Russians have been conducting as many air strikes a day, up to
96, as the US-led coalition has carried out in a month. This is in marked contrast,
Western military planners have noted, to how quickly Nato began to feel the
strain when bombing Libya and Kosovo.
One reason for the dearth of coalition sorties is that its Sunni state
members are carrying out scarcely any missions, focusing instead on
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Operations by Turkey, meanwhile, have
been overwhelmingly against the Kurds rather than Isis.
Western defence officials also contend that the Russians are hitting other
rebel groups in the guise of attacking Isis and that they are more
indiscriminate in their targeting because they are less sensitive to any
evidence of civilian casualties and because of their lack of precision-guided
weaponry.
But Russia had never promised it was going to attack only Isis. Instead, it
declared that “all terrorists” would be targeted. This, conveniently for Mr
Putin and President Bashar al-Assad, has included more moderate rebel groups.
Experience of the Chechen wars show that the Kremlin is, indeed, more prepared
to shrug off “collateral damage” than the West. It is also true that there were
not enough Russian guided bombs and missiles in the first stage of the Syrian
mission: Moscow’s claim that it has used precision weapons alone does not stand
up to scrutiny.
The aircraft, missiles and bombs used at first were a mix of old, dating
from the Soviet era, and relatively new. There are 34 fixed-wing aircraft based
at Latakia: 12 Su-25s and four Su-30SM fighter-bombers; 12 ageing Su-24M2s and
six Su-34s. There are also helicopters and an unspecified number of drones.
However, more of the most advanced of these, the Su-34, codenamed Fullback
by Nato, have been replacing older aircraft. One reason for this is that
aircraft such as the Su-25, a veteran of the wars in Chechnya and Georgia, are
vulnerable to Manpads – shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles – which Moscow
suspects the Turks and the Saudis have been supplying to Sunni rebels.
The introduction by the Kremlin of advanced air-defence systems has gained
impetus since the shooting down of a Russian jet by the Turks. The S-400
Triumph system is a source of great Israeli worry should it fall into “wrong
hands”. This has an array radar that continuously monitors the skies, and a
missile battery which can shoot down targets 250 miles away. One such array is
positioned at the Russian base at Latakia and covers half of Israeli airspace.
The deployment of Russian electronic warfare equipment in Ukraine and
Syria, such as the Krasukha-4 which can jam Awacs and satellite radar systems,
has been another sobering experience for Nato. Ronald Pontius, deputy to the US
Army head of cyber command, stated: “You cannot but come to the conclusion that
we are not making progress at the pace the threat demands.”
Gen Gorenc, while bemoaning the proliferation by Russia and worrying about
Nato’s capabilities, acknowledged that Russia was not breaking any
international agreements and “has every right” to deploy these systems. In
Syria, he said, the Russians were using “cruise missiles, they are using
bombers. It is clear that they are desiring to show the ability they have to
affect not just regional events, but worldwide events.”
That, indeed, is the point. The question for the West is whether to react
to this by initiating a new chapter of confrontation with Moscow, or one of
greater accommodation.
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