There are multiple accounts suggesting that there was actually a
productive meeting among the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia and
Ukraine earlier this week over the conflict in eastern Ukraine. According
to the BBC:
[German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter] Steinmeier
said all parties reaffirmed that the ceasefire, which has held for almost two
weeks, needed to be consolidated.
The warring sides were now “very close” to a deal that
would see the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the frontline, he added.
He also said there was some progress on the legal
groundwork towards holding local elections in eastern Ukraine in October.
If the conflict in Ukraine has stabilized while, at
the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin has deployed more military
force to Syria, what does it mean?
Shockingly, commentators are split on this question.
My colleague Jackson Diehl thinks it’s a sign that Putin is winning:
Some analysts claim that a floundering Putin is
meddling in the Middle East out of desperation because his bid for
Ukraine has failed. But
another way to see it is this: Putin’s use of force succeeded in inducing the
West to accept his Ukraine demands — and he is trying to repeat his triumph in
a second theater….
Well, that’s possible, but as Diehl’s embedded links
suggest, there’s another way of interpreting the emerging cease-fire. For
example, the German Marshall Fund’s Ulrich Speck writes:
Russia will not announce defeat in Ukraine. But
Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian-led attack in Donbas in combination
with support from the West has made it impossible for Moscow to win back
control over Ukraine any time soon without a major war. Instead of falling back
into Russia’s sphere of domination, Ukraine has started along the long and hard
road toward building a liberal-democratic nation state….
[N]either Ukraine nor the West is ready to accept
Russia’s interpretation of Minsk II. Instead of becoming a tool to control
Ukraine, the Donbas region is becoming another “frozen conflict,” a
Russian-controlled enclave, similar to Transnistria. Under economic stress
because of the fall of oil prices and Western sanctions, and without
substantial support from other important players (such as China), the Kremlin
seems to be ready to give up on the goal of reintegrating Ukraine, at least for
the moment.
So it would be safe to say that there are differing
interpretations of what’s happening in Ukraine. And these interpretations
matter greatly. If you agree with Diehl, then a robust response in Syria is
absolutely necessary, because Putin now thinks that he can do whatever he wants
with his military without fear of retaliation. If you agree with Speck and
others, then Putin’s Syria gambit looks like a much more desperate gamble.
So who lost Ukraine? The answer depends crucially on
your starting point. If you ask who lost Ukraine compared to the status
quo in, say, February 2014 after Viktor Yanukovych fled the scene, then you’d
have to answer the West. Ukraine has gone from being a triumphal story of
social movements translating into a pro-Western government in Kiev to a country
dismembered by Russia. Moscow now controls the Crimea and will not be returning
it. Russian forces and Russian proxies control a slice of eastern Ukraine, and
that conflict looks like it’s frozen — and that’s the best-case outcome for the
Ukrainian government. In essence, Vladimir Putin has been able to violate
Westphalian sovereignty with impunity on the European continent, and has more
territory as a result. Putin retains the option of heating up the frozen
conflict whenever he wants. There is no way to paint this as a victory for the
West or Western norms.
On the other hand,
if you ask who lost Ukraine compared to the status quo in, say,
September 2013, then you’d have to answer Russia. It’s worth stressing
that at that point, Russia had a perfectly pliant ally governing its most
strategically vital neighbor. Moscow was about to pull off a feat of economic
statecraft in forcing Ukraine to abandon the European Union’s Eastern
Partnership program. Ukraine looked set to join Putin’s Eurasian Economic
Union. And now, after a significant loss of Russian blood and treasure,
Moscow can claim … control over the least economically viable portions of Ukraine. No matter how
much Russia ratchets up the violence, it will not be able to peaceably
hold much more Ukrainian territory.
The hard truth remains that Putin’s strategic position
now is weaker than it was five years ago. Now he has to deal with a weaker
domestic economy, a hostile Ukrainian government that will create more Russian
casualties, and a
NATO that’s gearing upto more credibly defend Eastern Europe. Putin has
responded in numerous ways, none of them terribly effective. Sure, he’s
embraced the east — but China will be happy to exploit this opportunity for
commercial gains and not much else. And for all the talk about Russia’s
efforts to propagandize its way into the hearts and minds of some European
populations, the fact remains that European leaders are likely to be more
resolute in an escalating crisis, and the European
Union is still way more powerful on the continent than Russia. The only way in which
Putin’s strategy has worked is in bolstering his own domestic standing.
Nothing has changed in Putin’s favor in the months
since. Wait, actually, that’s not true, because the price of Russia’s primary
exports has fallen further, and it looks like China is
going to screw Russia over even more on the gas deals.
So who lost Ukraine? On the one hand, congratulations,
you’re all losers, especially the Ukrainians!! But from a truly realpolitik perspective, however,
Russia is the biggest loser.
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