BY
A few days
ago an
entry appeared outlining
just how difficult it will be to raise the 300 (plus) votes among the
parliamentarians of the Verkhovna Rada when it comes to the proposed
constitutional amendments that allow for “Decentralisation” of powers from the
centre to the regions – Amendments that contain a single line that would then
allow for a standard statutory law to create special conditions for the
occupied Donbas.
The final
paragraphs read – “Nevertheless, bribery, coercion, effective
legitimate party “whipping”/discipline across all (willing/supportive)
political parties will not necessarily reach the required number of 300 (plus).
Even with such an enormous amount of political energy spent, and no doubt
significant external diplomatic weight applied, the math would suggest it will
be necessary to insure the maximum attendance of MPs – be they sick, lame, (or
as too many parliamentarians appear to be part-time), lazy.
Only those
recently deceased or currently in jail can be discounted (for obvious reasons)
if the constitution majority is to be successfully assured – that or a major U
turn by any previously unsupportive political party changing its view en masse.
Can the Verkhovna Rada gather 300 votes? Yes. Will it gather
300 votes? Probably. Is it a done deal? Far, far from it at
the time of writing.”
Almost a week
later, obtaining the required 300 votes still appears far from certain, and may
indeed rest with the indiscipline of certain parties that are against the
amendments, and individuals therein voting with the government to see it over
the line. Who and how many will defy the Samapomich party line may prove
to be critical.
The above-linked
entry however, did not outline what happens should the vote fail – So what
happens if the 300 (plus) votes are not reached?
As
“decentralisation” of power to local governance has been a key national reform
for President Poroshenko (and the government) since assuming office(s) it will
be a significant political policy blow when Ukrainian society has been
conditioned to expect it.
Specifically
with regard to the occupied Donbas, it seems assurances have been given within
the “Normandy Four”, that the constitutional amendments relating to
decentralisation – and the single line within those amendments that then
enables a statutory (and not constitutional) avenue to create specific
conditions for the occupied Donbas – would be adopted by the end of January
2016. A very brave assurance to have given.
So what if the
Verkhovna Rada fails to find the 300 (plus) votes to get the constitutional
amendments over the line?
The answer is
(constitutionally) clear.
There will be no
long expected decentralisation of powers to local governance across Ukraine.
Likewise there
will be no prospect of any further progress by Ukraine toward the Minsk II
agreement – for without the constitutional amendments containing the single
line that provides a statutory “Special Law” avenue for the occupied Donbas
territories, any such statutory “enabling” actions would remain (as they
currently are) unconstitutional.
Not only does
national “decentralisation” and Minsk II stall – both stall for a long time.
Article 158 of
the Constitution of Ukraine states – “The draft law on introducing
amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, considered by the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine and not adopted, may be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine no
sooner than one year from the day of the adoption of the decision on this draft
law.”
There is no
ambiguity in “no sooner than one year”. If not 28th January
2016, then constitutionally, it can not be revisited until 28th January 2017 –
at the earliest.
Any attempt to try again
before then is simply unconstitutional.
Ukrainian society is used to
the failure of the political class to deliver – so a delay in
“decentralisation” for at least one year, and in all probability longer than
that, for the re-submission of the amendments, and the entire slow moving
bureaucracy will have to be repeated, in all likelihood taking closer to two
years, is not going to come as any great surprise if that be the outcome.
The consequences for the
Donbas, and the Ukraine, if an unwillingness to adhere to its obligations
(regardless of the other side) to Minsk II will swiftly see EU disunity
manifest in further extending Donbas related sanctions on Russia. Ukraine
will be seen as responsible for delaying Minsk II, and for a significant length
of time.
The only sanctions that could
be excepted to continue would be those sanctions specific to the illegal
annexation of Crimea – those Crimean sanctions are going to last for many
years.
It now seems almost certain
that these constitutional amendments will go before Verkhovna Rada
parliamentarians on 28th January – a huge day for the future governance of Ukraine
and with an outcome that is far, far, from certain.
The dilemma then, to go ahead
and hope 300 (or more) votes are found and risk a delay of 1 year or more if
not, or try and explain why assurances given cannot be delivered by the end of
January as stated and provide a credible reason why there is any hope of
reaching that 300 (plus) at some time in the near future (if ever).
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