By Keith B. Payne
Putin’s endorsement of a limited first-use policy require an allied
response
Russian President Putin has said that the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. He views
the West as the culprit and a threat to Moscow’s vision of reestablishing Russian dominance over the former lands of the
Soviet Union, by force if necessary. Russia’s 2008 military operation against Georgia, 2014 occupation of Crimea and
continuing military actions in Ukraine all reflect this vision.
Russia apparently put its nuclear forces on alert
during its military operations against Georgia, and President Putin considered doing so again in 2014.
Russia has been modernizing its conventional military forces for almost a
decade and seeks to prevent any significant collective Western defensive
opposition by threatening limited nuclear first-use in response. Russian
military officials speak openly of the preemptive employment of nuclear weapons
in a conventional war, and Moscow frequently makes direct nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners.
Russian first-use nuclear
threats essentially provide cover for Moscow’s military actions that destroy the post-Cold War settlement and
established European boarders. Russia’s coercive use of nuclear weapons is a new reality more dangerous than the
Cold War. If Russian planning follows this declared nuclear first-use strategy,
then U.S. and NATO deterrence policy already is failing in a
fundamental way, and the consequences of that failure could be catastrophic.
Russia reportedly is pursuing specialized, low-yield nuclear weapons to make
its first-use threats credible. In December 2002, then-director ofRussia’s Sarov nuclear weapons laboratory, Viktor
Mikhailov, reported that considerable work was being done to develop a “nuclear
scalpel” capable of “surgically” destroying local military targets. Very
low-yield weapons, Mr. Mikhailov argued, can be used in the event of
large-scale conventional conflict. Such capabilities are destabilizing when
developed to support territorial expansion and a strategy of nuclear coercion.
Moscow’s sophisticated propaganda complements this strategy. It vilifies the
United States and NATO with what can only be described as a
repetition of big lies. Russian defense expert Alexi Arbatov has observed that
Russian defense and foreign policies are now based on consensus beliefs in Moscow, including the notion that the United States is
using the pro-democracy opposition inside Russia to subvert the Putin regime, and that the U.S. with its allies may
invade any time to seize Russia’s natural riches. Noted Russian journalist Alexander Golts rightly calls
such views dangerous and self-induced “paranoia.”
Russia’s grand strategy also includes across-the-board nuclear modernization
programs and defensive preparations for nuclear war, most of which appear to
predate the Obama administration’s fledgling nuclear modernization programs.
Again, such capabilities are destabilizing when developed to destroy the
established international order via a strategy of nuclear coercion.
Nevertheless, U.S. perceptions
remain divided regarding Russia and the appropriate Western policies at this point. Some claim that Russia poses no serious threat and that a robust
U.S. response will serve only to provoke Russia. Senior U.S. civilian and military leaders, however, now have no doubt Russia is an “antagonist” that poses a “very,
very, significant threat,” and that the absence of a robust U.S. response will
provoke further Russian aggression. The key question is, what should be that
response?
First, we must recognize that
the optimistic post-Cold War expectations about Russia do not reflect reality and adjust U.S.
policies accordingly. The numerous confident claims that serious military
crises and possible conflict with Russia were a thing of the past have proven to be false, as has the U.S.
planning assumption that Russia would comply with arms control treaties.
Second, we must reinvest in
intelligence capabilities to better understand contemporary Russia, including its nuclear developments. Gen.
Philip Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said recently that after
nearly two decades of treating Russia as a potential ally, the intelligence community needs to adjust
because,
“Now we see that, possibly, we didn’t have the partner we thought we
had.” The U.S. intelligence community reportedly has largely divested itself of
the capacity to understand Russian nuclear-weapons policy, programs and
war-planning. This is a dangerous and even destabilizing deficiency. If we hope
to deter effectively, the intellectual resources necessary to understand
adversaries must be reconstituted.
Third, Western declaratory
policies must be clear and coordinated to help ensure that Mr. Putin understands that any use
of nuclear weapons against us or our allies always would be the worst of all Moscow’s possible options.
Fourth, we need to
re-establish the credibility of U.S. deterrence threats and red lines,
particularly against Russian nuclear first use. U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities must help to deny Moscow’s apparent confidence that the West would be
compelled to concede following Russian nuclear first use. That gap in U.S.
deterrence capabilities must be closed.
Modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent
will likely help in this regard, which is why the Obama administration’s
announced programs to rebuild U.S. nuclear forces after decades of coasting and
reductions are critical. Every Republican and Democratic administration for
five decades ultimately has rejected the ever-smaller and narrower U.S. nuclear
deterrent advocated by anti-nuclear activists in favor of a more credible U.S.
deterrent with diverse capabilities.
Finally, to assure nervous
allies, NATO’s will and conventional capabilities must be
sufficiently united and robust to deny Mr. Putin’s claim that Russian troops could be in five NATO capitals within two days. That is a tall
order, but given Moscow’s revisionist foreign policy and nuclear threats, perceptions of NATO disunity and conventional weaknesses are
highly provocative and destabilizing.
We may not, metaphorically, be
at 1938 again. But many current similarities to that perilous time are
troubling. U.S. nuclear policies and NATO capabilities now must counter contemporary
realities, particularly including Moscow’s destabilizing nuclear strategy.
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