Western analysts have failed to understand Russia for many of the same
reasons they failed to understand the Soviet Union: a rejection of normative
criteria.
Editor’s Note: How do
Russia and the West see one another? What are the experts’ views on the
confrontation between Russia and the West? How do the pundits explain the
Russo-Ukrainian war and Russia’s Syrian gambit? What are the roots of the
mythology about Russia in the West, and why has the West failed to predict and
understand Russia’s trajectory? This is the third essay in a series that
seeks to answer these questions. Read part two here.
Pragmatism as an
approach to Russia and to Russia’s relationship with the West is not
monolithic; it contains various strains. A rather common “objective” approach
is attempting to describe events without analyzing their causes, consequences,
and hidden traps. The overwhelming majority of the pragmatic camp subscribes to
this objective approach.
Describing Putin as an invincible leader who dictates
rules of the game to the outside world is an example of such an approach. For
example, the Guardian wrote in November 2015 about “Putin’s
transformation” from “pariah” to “powerbroker” in the span of a single year”
and argued that “the smug American assessment that Putin is an able tactician
and a poor strategist now looks hopelessly wide of the mark. His Syrian
intervention, rather than weakening him, has returned Russia to its place at
the top table. No longer on the menu, Putin is diplomacy’s new maitre
d’.”
Indeed, it looks as if Putin has been amazingly
successful at shocking the outside world and forcing it to accept his terms.
“Already Russia’s foray into Syria archived its first objective,” wrote Nikolas Gvozdev, pointing to the fact that Bashar al-Assad
regime has stabilized and “Russia’s geopolitical position has markedly
improved.”
At that time it looked like improvement. But how
durable could this improvement be if war and militarist legitimacy have become
the Kremlin’s key means of survival? What looks like success is in reality a
sign of an exhausting war that could become for Russia a repeat of the Afghan
disaster. Does anyone see the threat of this scenario unfolding? And why are
such desperate, last-ditch moves viewed as signs of perfectionism?
Having discussed the weaknesses of Western leaders,
Eugene Rumer, director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, in an article
aptly entitled “Putin Has Outplayed
Them All,” concluded,
“Putin is the only one that firmly holds the reins of power; his [approval]
rating is over 80 percent.”
This assessment seems accurate, and no one doubts
that Putin is more successful than other leaders when it comes to maintaining
power. But the Romanian dictator Ceaușescu enjoyed 90 percent approval ratings
right up to the moment he was overthrown.
The Soviet Communist Party was
supported by 99 percent of the population before it lost power. Here is the
question that any Russia hand should raise: If Putin has such a sky-high
approval rating, why is the Kremlin cracking down on everything that moves or
breathes on the political scene and within society? What could explain this
paranoia? Why in December 2015 did the Kremlin suddenly adopt a law allowing
the FSB to shoot at crowds, including children, women, and invalids? This is
hardly a mark of self-confidence.
Let’s also think about what Putin’s approval ratings
mean, given the Kremlin’s control over television. Matthew Dal Santo from
University of Copenhagen arguesthat Puitin’s approval rating is not only “the
result of Russians’ heavy reliance on government-controlled television.” In his
view “government policies reflect the attitudes and opinions of the
conservative majority of Russians.”
Thus, this is about the Russian nature and,
when “Russian democracy arrives, maybe it looks rather like Putin’s Russia.”
Indeed, the conservative segment of the Russian society does exist and has been
relying on the state. But are we talking about majority? Are Russians
genetically anti-liberal and anti-Western? If so, why did they support freedoms
and rule of law before Putin? Even today, 60 percent of Russians
want “rapprochement
with the West” and “expansion of the trade, economic, political and cultural
relationship with the West” and 75 percent say that “authority should be put under
control of the society?” Not a very anti-liberal posture, is it?
One therefore
has to take Russian poll numbers with a grain of salt. In a state of
demoralization and disorientation, people in Russia have returned to the Soviet
habit of adaptation by openly declaring support of the authorities while
concealing what they really think. Fear and anxiety dictate their answers when
they are asked about support of the authorities and their policy.
But Russians
still are frank when asked about their real problems. Thus, they say that
Russia is moving toward crisis and that their life is becoming more
difficult, and they want
Russia to be a normal country just like the West. And 64 percent of respondents think “economic integration with the West is
important for Russia.” How this perception of reality is compatible with the
sky-high approval of the leader responsible for their hardships? Either
Russians are masochists or they prefer to hide what they think—for the time
being.
Let’s ask ourselves how durable these figures of
Putin’s approval might be given the continuing decline in living standards. A
descriptive approach that relies solely on some selected indicators creates a
deceptive impression of Putin’s strength at just the time when numerous signs
point to the regime’s confusion and decay.
If one rejects the normative dimension, one is often
presented with a false picture of reality in which failure can easily be viewed
as a success. Here is how Matthew Rojansky, director of the Kennan Institute, characterizes Vladimir
Putin: “He stands for
Russian resurgence. Ask yourself: When was Peter the Great humble? When was
Catherine humble? That’s not part of the role that they play.” Comparing Putin
to Peter the Great and Catherine needs a lot of imagination! If the head of the
leading U.S. think tank views the President who plunged Russia into crisis as a
leader who “stands for resurgence,” one must have serious concerns about the
state of Western analytical thought.
Another strain of
pragmatists could be called the “Putin Explainers.” These experts speak on
behalf of Putin and the Kremlin, repeating their arguments but without
explaining what they might mean. Here is a sample of such “Putinology”: “To
Putin, the West’s approach to Russia barely respects Moscow’s interests and
views.” This is probably true, but please explain why Putin thinks so, and
where this thought process leads him. “Putin believes that he will successfully
deal with the crisis,” Putinologists say. Please, tell us how you
know what he believes.
And then there are the analysts who, with a great
sense of self-assuredness, proclaim, “Russians agree to be governed this way.”
But what Russians, or what Russia, are we talking about? There are so many
Russias today, given the fragmentation of society. Such descriptive techniques
allow observers to distance themselves from their own statements. But their expert
assessment is missing, leaving the reader with only the Kremlin’s arguments (or
alleged arguments) to consider.
This sort of analytical escapism is one of the
reasons the experts fail to detect trends (and how can trends be detected when
the experts rely on the Kremlin’s logic?) and are surprised by events and their
consequences. Moreover, if we carefully read what the pragmatists who avoid
drawing their own conclusions write, we eventually see that their descriptions
actually justify the Kremlin’s actions.
The usual Western approach (ironically, used by both
pragmatists and normativists) is to explain Russia by addressing tradition.
“From Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin, circumstances have changed, but the
rhythm has remained extraordinary consistent,” wrote Kissinger in World
Order (2014).
True, the legacy of tradition remains huge. But if its role
is crucial and the experts know what these traditions are, why is it that the
world (along with the experts) is constantly shocked by Russia’s unpredictability?
It could mean that post-Communist Russia is influenced by some new features
that provoke constant bafflement. If so, we should seek to understand what
these features are, if we wish to understand contemporary Russia.
One more strain of pragmatism should be mentioned:
those who believe that both Russia and the West are guilty and bear some
responsibility for creating the present global disorder. “Yes, the Kremlin has
broken china, but the West has sinned too!” say the members of this camp. They
believe that both sides should examine their consciences, amend their ways, and
begin anew. This is bizarre logic: each side has erred, of course, but their
transgressions are not equivalent in either kind or seriousness. The West
hasn’t invaded a European state or annexed its territory!
The pragmatists/consultants, who are trying to juggle
their separate roles as both experts and business advisers, are in a league of
their own. This group is apparently quite sizable and has different ways of
working with the business community.
These experts claim to be independent
analysts even as they work as consultants for Western or Russian business, or
both. The question is: how objective can an expert be if, while analyzing
Russian politics, he or she also works to promote business interests in Russia
that ultimately rely on the cooperation of the Russian authorities? Can his or
her conclusions be trusted? Can he or she really be considered an independent
analyst?
The pragmatists are joined by both left and far-right
experts. The left is critical of the US administration (and often the West as a
whole) or the capitalist system (represented in the US by Stephen Cohen and
Noam Chomsky). The far-right (Patrick J. Buchanan is a US member of this camp)
sympathizes with the Kremlin’s defense of “traditional values.” The
increasingly influential European political right views the Kremlin as an ally
in its struggle against the idea of European integration.
Nigel Farage and his
UK Independence Party, Marine Le Pen and her National Front in France, and
Geert Wilders of the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom represent in Europe the
political umbrellas of the far-right movement, which is surrounded by media and
expert circles. “These Westerners aren’t backing Mr. Putin out of pure Russophilia,” writes Doug Saunders. “Rather, they admire his
embrace of a Christian and mono-ethnic identity for greater Russia, and
[Putin’s] aggressive action against what they see as their enemies: European
diversity and open borders, and minority groups—especially homosexuals and
Muslims.”
Both those on the left of the political spectrum and those on its far
right believe that the West (and, of course, Washington) is to blame for the
confrontation with Russia. Both also defend the Kremlin. They believe Putin is
doing an important job in containing the West.
This is not an historically unprecedented phenomenon.
During the Stalin period, Western intellectuals demonstrated support for the
Soviet system and its leaders—among them, the famous European writers George
Bernard Shaw, Romain Rolland, Lion Feuchtwanger, Herbert Wells, and Andre Gide.
To be sure, they were great minds, and they were committed to finding an
antithesis to the capitalism they detested. They also had an excuse: they did
not know the Soviet reality. And when they were afforded at least a glimpse,
they were horrified, like Gide, who, after visiting the USSR in 1936, wrote of
“spirits being subjugated and terrorized.” Today, however, there are fewer
obstacles to surveying the Russian landscape, so naivety and ignorance are less
excusable.
The pragmatists and those joining them usually (but
not always) tend to support a positive scenario. They do their best to convince
themselves and the outside world that everything can be sorted out—that one
must only be willing to start dialogue and come prepared to make concessions.
There are reasons for optimism. One of its sources is the West’s predisposition
for constructive agendas that involve dialogue, which tends to make one look
for arguments in favor of the opponent’s willingness to negotiate.
Until
recently, the pragmatists’ optimism was also fueled by their faith in the
Kremlin’s rhetoric and their inability to distinguish reality from imitation.
In some cases, the pragmatists’ conscious or unconscious involvement in the
Russian System’s lobbying mechanisms may play a role, as well as the fact that
they couldn’t resist the Kremlin’s charm offensive. But I think the key reason
lies in the pragmatists’ preference for working in the post-Cold War
conciliatory mode, which implies a default option of looking for venues of
possible cooperation at any price. This mode by its very nature excludes effective
instruments for normative influence, let alone containment of a hostile
civilization.
However, by the end of 2014 one could observe a shift
among some pragmatists toward an uncharacteristically apocalyptic mood. “The
crescendo has not been reached yet. The world is moving toward more serious
confrontation of nuclear powers”, warned these suddenly chastened pragmatists.
The worst will come, they said, unless the West concedes to the demands of the
country that feels hurt.
Perhaps these “horsemen” of the new apocalypse were
influenced by the historical parallels evoked by the anniversary of the First
World War. Maybe they were really frightened by the growing tensions between
Russia and the West and feared an open clash over Ukraine. Whatever their cause,
these fears were useful for the Kremlin’s policy of escalating the situation in
order to force the West to accept the Kremlin’s agenda.
“Do you want the return of the Cold war?” This is
usually the most persuasive argument of pragmatists when they counsel the West
to stop criticizing the Kremlin. “Are there those in the U.S. national
political elite who desire a new cold war?” asks Paul Starobin, former Moscow bureau chief
of Business Week,complaining that “warnings” on NATO expansion “went
unheeded” and this provoked Moscow’s assertiveness.
I would ask Starobin why
the Kremlin started to complain so loudly about NATO when NATO lost its
mission? Any idea what this cause-effect relationship means? Meanwhile, the
stark choice between “accommodation or Cold War” justifies the acquiescence
approach to Russia.
When pragmatists exhaust their rationalizations of
Russia’s personalized system, they usually turn toward expressions of their
love for Russian culture, appeals to the historic ties between Russia and
Europe, and calls “to understand Russia.” These “Russlandversteher,” as they
are called in Germany, refuse to differentiate between Russian society and the
Russian System. Thus they treat every criticism of Russian rule and the Kremlin
as evidence of “Russophobia.”
Sometimes, the pro-Russian stance serves as a cover
for other positions. As the German expert Hannes Adomeit reminds
us, describing
moods in German society, “the pro-Russian attitudes have less to do with Russia
but are simply an extension of anti-American reflexes.” Pro-Russian views can
be also the reflection of anti-EU positions.
The pragmatist approach to Russia has a lot to do with
the sorry state of Russian studies since the Soviet collapse. “After Sept. 11
there was a focus, rightly, on trying to increase focus on the Middle East and
it’s had consequences,” said Michael McFaul, former Ambassador to Russia and a former
senior adviser to President Obama on Russian and Eurasian affairs. Compared to
15 years ago, he noted, the government’s bench of experts and the quality of
Eurasia analysis is “shallower.
Trying to figure out decision-making in Russia
on foreign policy requires a great deal of qualitative depth…and that requires
new investment and knowledge. We’re going to disagree with the Kremlin and with
the Russians on certain issues over time, but what we can’t have is
disagreements based on misperception and bad information,” admitted McFaul.
Thomas Graham said, “The fundamental problem is that there is a
lack of expertise in the US about Russia, and you see that within the broader
public as well…and that lack of expertise is reflective in some of the trouble
we have in understanding what Russia is doing, why it approaches Ukraine in the
way it does, why it has certain attitudes toward the US, and so forth.”
The breakup of the Soviet Union and Russia’s
marginalization have led to a loss of expert interest in Russian developments
and diminished analytical support for Western politics.
The Russia-area expert
community has lost its vitality and its young blood. At least
partially this was the result of cutting down or eliminating of the
governments’ funding of the Russian studies. Thus, in October 2013, the U.S.
administration eliminated its funding program for advanced language and
cultural training on Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Early 2015 the program
was resuscitated, but at less than half of its previous funding level. Charles
King, describing situation with funding, admitted that “ given the mounting challenges that
Washington faces in Russia and eastern Europe, now seems to be an especially
odd time to reduce federal support for educating the next cohort of experts.”
Angela Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian,
Russian, and East European Studies (Georgetown University), wrote, “Instead of embracing a deep understanding of
the culture and history of Russia and its neighbors, political science has been
taken over by number-crunching and abstract models that bear little
relationship to real-world politics and foreign policy. Only a very brave or
dedicated doctoral student would today become a Russia expert if she or he
wants to find academic employment.”
Ruth Wedgwood, an international law scholar at Johns
Hopkins-SAIS, has also been concerned: “American universities that purport to teach
international relations have often abandoned area studies about real countries
and regions, in favor of the simpler game of ‘international relations theory.’…
One wag has chided that the rather mechanical manipulations preached by each of
these analytic “schools” is perfect for American students, because one doesn’t
need to have traveled anywhere or learned any languages or know any history in
order to move the pieces around.”
Few pundits are willing to study a system in decay and
to plumb the depths of a nation’s neuroses. One can understand the shift of
analytical attention to a rising (or seemingly rising) China, or even to the
turbulence of the Middle East, which at least presents more vibrant scenery.
The decline of Russian studies has contributed, at least partially, to the
West’s unpreparedness for Russia’s arrival as the main spoiler on the
international scene.
But the key reason behind the Western inability to
understand Russia has been rejection of normative criteria in the analytical
process. This is the same mistake as the Sovietologists made: Russia experts
looked for policy that stabilized institutions and society, while neglecting to
look at those features that made them dysfunctional—an examination, of course,
which could only be done on the basis of principles.
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