BY
There will be terabytes of commentary about the
relations with “nation X” and the USA in a President Trump environment between
now and his taking office.
Naturally much
commentary will be regarding US – Russia relations. Clearly some of that
will overlap upon Ukraine. US-Ukraine relations however, are not the same
thing as US-Russia relations. Unless President Trump immediately
surrenders the post Soviet space to The Kremlin within days of taking office –
which he won’t – there will be a period of policy pondering beyond anything
that took place during his campaign .
Nevertheless for Ukraine
there will be no “Uncle Joe (Biden)”. There will be a far more
“pragmatic” and perhaps a far less “values” approach to geopolitical issues.
Where any Trump red lines will be drawn remains very much to be seen – as
will his reactions should they be crossed.
As such, most
importantly it is not what President Trump says. What matters is what
President Trump is heard to say (or understood/interpreted to have said) which
is not the same thing.
In short, what he says
(or thinks he has said) may not be what is heard by either The Kremlin in
Moscow, or The Bankova in Kyiv – or the capital of any other nation. It
is the interpretation of what he says (and does) that will be a factor in any
understanding and/or response by The Kremlin, The Bankova (or any other capital
the world over).
Ergo Kyiv will need to plan contingencies for whatever he
says, and also for the interpretations of those words within The Kremlin.
The worst case scenario
for Ukraine in the immediate future is the removal of sanctions within 6 months
of President Trump taking office and the recognition of Crimea as Russia, which
if his campaign rhetoric is to be believed (and campaign rhetoric very often
fails to match actions when actually in power), he stated he would “consider”.
It then matters
how those actions would be interpreted by The Kremlin – as being given
carte blanche to re-assume control over Ukraine by hook or by crook with no
meaningful US response should it do so, or not? Ukraine should be
prepared for either or both of those eventualities – as should Europe, for
there would be repercussions.
Sanctions upon Russia
will not last forever, and whether it be President Trump or a crumbling
position within the EU that is the catalyst, to visualise sanctions as they
currently exist remaining in effect in 2018 may prove to be a little more than
wishful thinking even if The Kremlin position remains unchanged, and thus the
reasons for their imposition remain unchanged.
Thus far The Kremlin
position has not given any ground over the past few years. A policy of
exhaustion is still one The Kremlin believes it will win, regardless of any
pain it suffers meanwhile. It is particularly difficult to believe such a
policy will be dropped if President Trump turns out to be less than hoped for
within The Kremlin.
The best case scenario is that Ukraine will have to
fight very hard to prevent a US drift from the current US policy position – and
succeeds in doing so. Yet a drift seems much more likely than not unless
Ukraine has a critical mass, (or a very influential mass), within both the
Senate and Congress that will prevent a US policy drift – be that drift
permanent or temporary. Ukraine surely has some supporters of influence
in both US institutions, but are they enough, are they stalwart, and can they manage/manipulate
the unpredictable personality of Donald Trump sufficiently?
What of the
Nuland-Surkov channel – is there to be a similar channel? If so with
whom? A Kremlin dove like General Flynn, or a more hawkish Republican?
What of the behind the scenes liaisons between the US and the nations
within the Normandy Four?
Once sanctions are
undone, they will not replaced even if a Trump led US drift results in The
Kremlin misreading him and crossing whatever lines he may have. The
European unity that has lasted thus far would not see them lifted and then once
again find the unity to reapply them if removal is realised.
Perhaps far more
important is the “consideration” of recognising the Crimean annexation per the
Trump campaign rhetoric – which is hopefully just that.
Ukraine therefore
requires some dependable and predictable partners capable of supporting its
diplomatic and political line within the White House in the event of a very
probable US drift (temporary or otherwise) – for what occurs within the space
left by that drift may prove exceptionally difficult to undo.
2017 will see the UK,
Germany and France internally distracted.
Confrontations over
historical issues with Poland would certainly not be timely, and the political
and/or diplomatic weight of Poland with a Trump White House is as yet unknown
anyway.
Attempting to become a
part of whatever European policy solutions emerge to deal with a President
Trump White House will have to be pursued with the maximum vigour possible by
Ukraine.
Perhaps of all the
current and actively supportive partners Ukraine has, only Canada and the IMF
will see no distracting and/or significant changes in 2017.
Thus unless Ukraine very
rapidly becomes a poster child for swifter, deep and implemented reform from
which no nation would want to disassociate itself regardless of its internal
issues, the Ukrainian position seems set to diminish unless it helps itself.
Whether President
Poroshenko can rein in the appetites of those around him such as Igor Kononenko
to the point where the mere mention of his name no longer makes a diplomat’s
eyes roll remains to be seen – but it would seem prudent to do so quickly.
What meaningful reform can be thoroughly implemented between now and a
probable US drift in relation to Ukraine and/or tempo reduction of US action
within Ukraine remains to be seen. There were only so many fires it could
and would fight within Ukraine under the Obama Administration. It is
likely to be fighting fewer fires under a Trump Administration.
Despite that which has
been achieved with regard to reform, there is much to do. What will get
the attention and support sufficient to insure US policy toward Ukraine both
remains unchanged – making any US policy drift short and swift? Will
anything prevent that drift, or at the very least is a temporary drift
inevitable?
Ukraine requires
contingency plans. It should also perhaps decide upon a carefully
assembled policy regarding just how to influence a personality like President
Trump – who is not lacking in narcissism nor unpredictability (and to be
charitable clearly has some appetites).
Whatever the President
Trump policy toward Ukraine and whatever his policy toward The Kremlin will
ultimately be – good or ill from a Ukrainian perception – there is far too much
rhetoric on his campaign trail that forewarns of at the very least the
likelihood of a period of drift which may be exploited by The Kremlin if
Ukraine does not defend that space.
The immediate challenge
for Ukraine is to prevent as much damage during that period as possible, whilst
preparing contingency plans for a Trump led US policy toward Ukraine that as
yet remains to be seen.
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