Putin: fully loaded and highly dangerous

Edward Lucas

The Kremlin knows the US is heading for two months when it will be at its least decisive

Russian servicemen at the Victory Day parade in Red Square this summer. Vladimir Putin is gearing up for a “hot war”, according to a former British ambassador to Moscow

KIRIL DUDRYAVTSEV/GETTY IMAGES

European security has not looked as perilous since the early 1980s. Russia does not believe that the West is serious about defending its frontline states, especially in the Baltic region. Many in the West do not believe that Russia is serious in its intention to divide and dominate Europe — and in its willingness to use force to do so. The great danger is that this combination of complacency and recklessness will provoke an accidental conflict.

Sir Anthony Brenton, Britain’s former ambassador to Moscow, warned yesterday that President Putin was gearing up for a “hot war”. It is certainly true that Russia’s hectic pace of military and naval exercises and deployments suggest that the Kremlin sees a great opportunity in the coming months: the two-month political gap between an outgoing and incoming administration means that Washington is at its least decisive during these weeks. Whatever Russia can do in Europe will be a fait accompli by the time the new administration is fully in the saddle.

What stunt Russia might be planning is causing much head-scratching among military planners. It could involve something in Ukraine (again), in Belarus or Georgia. But the most high-stakes gambit would be in the Baltic: not a straightforward invasion, but something ambiguous and messy, surrounded by a confusing propaganda blizzard and easily denied if it went wrong. The aim would be to expose Nato’s weakness at its most vulnerable point, damaging the alliance’s credibility.

The Baltic states are the most militarily exposed parts of the alliance: a small, thinly populated strip of land with no natural defences. Nato has only the flimsiest of tripwires there, though a more serious presence is planned for next year. Real defence for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania still depends too heavily on US willingness to act speedily and decisively in the event of a crisis.

Even with American involvement, defending the Baltic states would be difficult. For the first time since the Korean War, the US Air Force could not assume it had air superiority. Russian air defences are among the most sophisticated parts of the Kremlin armoury. The first great danger is of Russia establishing an air-defence “bubble” over the Baltic states: in effect, a no-fly zone for American and allied military aviators. Western troops on the ground would be sitting ducks.

The question for Nato then would be whether to challenge Russia head on. Would we send our warplanes into this bubble and dare the Russians to shoot them down? Would we try to take out the air-defence installations inside Russia? Would we attack other parts of Russia? None of the military options looks appealing.

With our dilemmas in mind, Russia is brandishing its second trump card: nuclear weapons. Unlike Nato, Russia has lots (about 700, analysts reckon) of sub-strategic warheads, often known as “battlefield” or “tactical” nuclear weapons. These are not the world-ending monsters used to obliterate (and deter) an adversary in an all-out nuclear war. They are designed to be used, on torpedoes, depth charges and short-range missiles.

Perhaps the most alarming development has been the use of these weapons to intimidate. Russian officials refer to them boastfully in public (and even more bluntly in private). Russian military exercises regularly feature their deployment and rehearse their use.

Russia talks of this as “escalate to de-escalate”: in other words, to scare the West into backing down.

Part of the point here is to scare us into thinking that we cannot defend ourselves. Western public opinion grudgingly accepted nuclear weapons in the old Cold War. It flinches against any talk of their use now. If defending the frontline states means we risk nuclear war, then surely it would be better to do a deal with Russia, at almost any price?

That sort of thinking delights the Kremlin. The best war is one you win by breaking the adversary’s will, rather than by actually fighting. And the West’s willpower is already weak. On paper, we have little to fear from Russia. The West’s GDP is roughly $40 trillion. Russia’s is $1.6 trillion. We are not losing because Russia is strong, but because Mr Putin is ruthless and decisive and we are not.

Sabre rattling is just one of his weapons. Others include the targeted use of money (for corrupting western elites and buying influence), politicised energy exports, propaganda and espionage. Combined, they help to create division and mistrust, promoting extremism and exploiting ethnic, social, linguistic, political or regional tensions. A spectacular example of Russia’s “hybrid war” tactics is the recent intelligence operation in America, which combined computer hacking and leaking to embarrass the Clinton campaign.

The aim is simple: the weaker the West is, the less able it is to stand up to Russia. Yet we have been startlingly slow to understand this. I wrote a book in 2008 called The New Cold War, warning that Russia posed a serious threat to the West. It was widely mocked as inflammatory scaremongering. After the wars in Georgia and Ukraine, the Kremlin’s successful campaign in Syria and worries about Russia’s threat to the frontline states, people are laughing less. The “new cold war” has become a statement of fact.

Of course there are differences. Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is not trying to conquer western Europe; it is not a global superpower; it does not have a messianic totalitarian ideology. But we are still failing to understand how the Kremlin’s aims challenge the safety and freedom that we take for granted in Europe. Mr Putin does not operate according to our rules. He thinks they are unfair and ineffective. He loathes what he sees as American arrogance. He dislikes the idea of rule-based multilateral organisations in which small countries can constrain the actions of big ones. He believes that Russia as a great European power has the right to a say in its neighbours’ affairs.

He thinks the West is trying to topple his regime, to isolate Russia and eventually to dismember it.

Russia, in short, wants to re-set European security on 19th-century imperial lines. The grand bargain would involve the creation of a buffer zone on its borders. The West would abandon Ukraine and Georgia and pull forces out of the Baltic states. America’s role in Europe would end, as would sanctions and other pressure on Russia. This would abolish pipsqueak countries such as Lithuania telling Russia how it may sell its gas to Germany. As a big country, Russia would be fine in a world of bilateral bargaining. It is only when it is confronted with economic and military behemoths such as the EU and Nato that it feels weak.

This outcome would be a dreadful betrayal of our allies, and store up far greater problems for the future. It is also entirely avoidable. Nato should be beefing up military defences in the Baltics. It can deal with Russian propaganda, reviving the skills and tactics which helped it to win the Cold War. It can be tougher on Russian spies and with judicious counter-measures. I suspect that the leaking by Ukrainian intelligence of a trove of emails belonging to Vladislav Surkov, a Putin crony, may be a US response to the hacking of Mrs Clinton’s emails.

But the most effective deterrent would be the message: “We’ve got your money — if you want to see it again, back off.” We need to take on Mr Putin’s accomplices: the bankers, lawyers and accountants who have helped him and his cronies to stash their cash in the West.

This will be painful but profits must not come before security and freedom. If you believe that only money matters, then you are defenceless when people attack you using money. Mr Putin’s weapons work chiefly because we are greedy, gullible and timid.

Edward Lucas writes for The Economist. An updated edition of the The New Cold War is available from Bloomsbury.

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