(FILES) Ukrainian activists hold a placard reading "Crimea = Ukraine" during a rally in front of Crimean parliament in Simferopol on February 26, 2014. Photo by AFP
Back on March 5, 2014, 11 days
before the so-called “referendum” in the Crimea, Henry Kissinger, the U.S.
secretary of state in 1973-77 and the world’s No. 1 balance-of-power thinker,
put forward a set of guidelines for settling the crisis in Ukraine. The key
points envisaged Ukraine’s freedom to associate closer with Europe in exchange
for a non-NATO status; and preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea
together with providing a greater autonomy for the republic.
In a nutshell, Kissinger’s
plan was about “Finlandization” of Ukraine and saving the global balance of
power for that price. In 11 days Crimea’s annexation was formalized, which made
the plan obsolete.
A new world order had arrived.
Almost three years have
passed. The world is experiencing a dramatic rise of violence. Europe doesn’t
seem safe and secure any more. Destabilization has reached far beyond Ukraine’s
borders and is likely to grow. Ukraine and Russia are in a deadlock over
Donbas, Crimea and Ukraine’s sovereignty overall. Hostilities are increasing
between Russia and Europe. Military budgets are rising, while mutual trust is
at record-low levels. All that combined does not sum up to a safer world. Can
it be fixed through a calculated, 19th century-style, deal of great powers over
spheres of influence?
Recent ideas, attributed to
Henry Kissinger by Bild, presume a positive answer.
A possible compromise
between Donald Trump’s administration and the Kremlin could be the jackpot that
Russian President Vladimir Putin has waited so long for and desired so much. It
presumes lifting anti-Russian sanctions, recognizing Moscow’s influence in
Eastern Europe and Kazakhstan, and de facto accepting annexation of the Crimea.
Russia, in its turn, should guarantee security in Eastern Ukraine. Looks like a
plan, doesn’t it?
There is a powerful logic of
political realism behind such an approach, be it Kissinger’s or not. There’s
also a high probability it would fit Trump’s pragmatic stance of foreign policy
and security issues. However, even within the framework of political realism
the plan carries some fundamental drawbacks.
For sure, the critical problem
would be Russia’s security guarantees. Kissinger’s warning in March 2014 was
not accidental: ruining a world order implies denouncing any mutual trust and
institutions. Bringing the world back to anarchy and principles of self-help
would result in a policymaking based on a simple realist rule: trust nothing,
but power. There are no credible security guarantees Russia can provide, which
would be acceptable and enough for Ukraine in any meaningful sense. From now on
it is only balance of power in bilateral relations which would shape Ukraine’s
policy in dealing with the Kremlin.
The same holds for Ukraine’s
“Finlandization.” Finland’s security and relative freedom in foreign policy
after World War II have been secured by great powers, which enabled its
non-membership in NATO. Without annexation of the Crimea, that option could be
theoretically possible, but a new world order has arrived in March 2014.
Taking it further, a deal on
Ukraine would not be a great power concerto, orchestrated for a common good.
Russia is hardly a great power with an economy accounting for a single percent
of the gross world product. It is currently struggling for a regional power
status, having significantly worsened its perspectives to regain strategic
grasp over remnants of post-Soviet space. A geopolitical deal with a weakened
regional power would not bring more security, but result in a more bold and
risky foreign policy of a revisionist state.
Realist theory holds that
measuring balance of power and shaping geopolitical interests accordingly is
the best way to ensure peace. But Russia is not powerful enough to control
Ukraine. It can influence Ukraine, however in a much less favorable way than it
enjoyed only several years ago. It can also considerably slow down’s Ukraine
progress and generate a host of challenges in almost every sphere. But it is
incapable of effectively controlling Ukraine, and – arguably – even incapable
of effectively controlling its own vast territories.
Russia ranks 65th and is
in a high warning group of the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index of 2016.
It wasn’t able to manage its sphere of influence even in far better times of a
decade ago. Further forceful attempts to establish control over Ukraine would
bring only more violence and insecurity to the region.
Furthermore, Russia is getting
weaker. Expanding a weakening state’s sphere of influence does not bring about
stability. Instead, risks will be rising, as Russia will be approaching a verge
of collapse.
Reconciliation with Russia at
Ukraine’s expense may only have sense for a new American Administration as a
part of a strategic deal against China. But Russia will hardly become a
valuable asset. It is more likely to repeat Ukraine’s ill-fated experience of a
multi-vectoral bargaining in an attempt to compensate for strategic weaknesses
of its highly ineffective social, economic, and political models.
Europe is already experiencing
consequences of a security paradigm shift from neoliberal to realist
foundations. Suspicion is growing, rivalry has been slowly restored, and
negative-scenario thinking is a common place. Appeasing Russia would be too
risky for a well-calculated security strategy.
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