The NYT Editorial Board
Since it began operations in
2002, the International Criminal Court has secured just four convictions,
fueling the perception that it has been largely ineffectual as a tribunal of
last resort for the world’s worst criminals. Making matters worse, Gambia,
Burundi and South Africa have announced their intention to leave the court,
which some African leaders see as a vestige of colonialism because it has so
far tried cases only from their continent.
At a time when President
Bashar al-Assad of Syria and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan are
eluding accountability for a litany of war crimes, these defections have called
into question the long-term viability of the court and the world’s commitment
to the principles it was created to uphold. Instead of allowing it to wither,
the international community should redouble efforts to strengthen the court’s
mandate and its mission — no easy task given its complex history.
World leaders explored the
possibility of establishing an international criminal court after War World I.
But it became diplomatically feasible only when the Cold War ended and the
United Nations saw the need to establish special tribunals to bring to justice
the perpetrators of atrocities in the Balkans and Rwanda during the 1990s.
The court’s foundational document, adopted in 1998, is
the Rome Statute, which decreed that there should be no statute of limitations
for genocide and crimes against humanity. Its jurisdiction over atrocities
committed in member states applies only when the local judicial system is
unable or unwilling to bring people to justice or with the blessing of the
United Nations Security Council.
There were 120 votes in favor of the statute, seven
against and 21 abstentions. Among the opponents, shamefully, was the United
States, which feared irrationally that the court could become a vehicle for
politicized and arbitrary prosecutions of Americans and Israelis. After much
international and domestic criticism, President Bill Clinton signed the treaty
shortly before leaving office, a largely symbolic step since there was little
support in the Senate to ratify it.
President George W. Bush tried to undermine the court,
lobbying allies to abandon it, and in 2002, Congress passed the deceptively
named American Servicemembers Protection Act, which barred American cooperation
with the court and authorized the use of force to rescue any American on trial
before it. The Bush-era position has angered human rights champions, like
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, who has been among the court’s few defenders
on Capitol Hill. “At a time when some governments are withdrawing from the
I.C.C.,” he said, “we should set an example by joining the court and actively
supporting its work.”
The next administration should make resolute support
for the court one of its foreign policy priorities. The first step is to draw
attention to the actual reasons African nations are defecting. The autocratic
leaders of Gambia and Burundi fear not a resurgence of colonialism but being
held accountable for their abuses. In South Africa, President Jacob Zuma is
motivated by domestic and regional politics at a time when his integrity and
leadership have rightly come under scrutiny. The International Criminal Court
has focused much of its resources on Africa not out of racism, but at the
request of victims’ groups and often governments that recognized they were not
equipped to handle complex prosecutions.
A strong commitment by the next American president to
the tribunal would strengthen it and encourage countries to stay in. Early
during her tenure as secretary of state, Hillary Clinton expressed “great
regret” at Washington’s failure to join the court. If she is elected, she will
have the chance to try to turn that regret into action.
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