BY
CyberJunta, one of the Ukrainian hacking
groups has apparently (and unsurprisingly) targeted Vladislav Surkov and an
email address v14691@yandex.ru purported to be used by him under the pseudonym
Nikolay Pavlov.
Also compromised was an email
address of a Surkov associate/underling pabnik@yandex.ru used by Pavel Karpov.
Within the documents thus far
released in two pdf files file-1 and file-2 – 17.4 MB in total (with
more to come undoubtedly) it has to be said there are absolutely no surprises
when it comes to the tactics and instruments to be used in undermining Ukraine
beyond the occupied Donbas.
Neither would the suggested
time frame between November 2016 to March 2017 for implementation of
destabilisation within Ukraine come as a surprise to many. Events both
external and internal of Ukraine would dictate this period as being optimal.
Clearly fermenting social
unrest during the heating season when tariffs have risen so sharply requires
little tactical thinking within the Kremlin when Ms Tymoshenko long-since
grasped that opportunity – and she has been banging the social unrest drum for
several months over the issue.
Forcing/encouraging new
Verkhovna Rada elections in Spring 2017, something long anticipated, is another
goal that would fit the Opposition Block, Batkivshchyna/Tymoshenko, and
possibly Radical Party design. As all are populist, if they cannot force
early elections following the hardship many will face during a heating season
of high tariffs then they will probably never manage to force early elections.
Plans attempting to bring
about calls for a “federal Transcarpathia” are an obvious alternative to the
failed Novorossiya project. (Although not specifically mentioned, how
great a role Viktor Orban would/could play in agitating the Hungarian diaspora
is unknown.)
What is perhaps most
informative about the documents is that Mr Surkov aka Pavlov (if the email
address is genuinely one of Surkov’s pseudo-email addresses) is that it is not
the most Kremlin friendly Opposition Block that is identified as the critical
political machinery to push the Kremlin active measures within the Ukrainian
constituency. Neither is it the
Radicals.
The main focus was/is to
concentrate upon the Batshchivyna (Ms Tymoshenko’s) Party. This because
it has the best outreach/network throughout Ukraine of the 3 political parties
identified that would/could dance to the Kremlin tune – wittingly or
unwittingly. It is indeed true that of the Oppo Block, Radicals and
Batkivshchyna, the latter has by far the widest regional networks.
The obvious question is
whether Ms Tymoshenko would willingly allow her (and it is hers and nobody
else’s) party to be used to further Kremlin active measures?
If so, wittingly or
unwittingly? (And would it matter either way when it comes to issues of
implementation?)
A reader is left to ponder the
morality (or not) of Ms Tymoshenko and the integrity (or not) of Batkivshchyna
in pursuit of its vision for Ukraine even if it meant becoming a covertly
willing accomplice of Mr Surkov/The Kremlin.
To be blunt, that
Batkivshchyna vision probably goes no further than Ms Tymoshenko ruling
Ukraine, for there is nothing whatsoever offered by way of detailed policy (as
a reader would expect from a populist) and to be frank during her nearly 20
years in Ukrainian politics, meaningful and credible policy is not something
that Ms Tymoshenko has ever actually offered (let alone delivered). Her
political judgement is also somewhat suspect, for despite many years involved
in grubby deals with The Kremlin/Gazprom whilst in control of UESU and Somoli
Ent, she still managed to hand Ukraine the most punitive gas deal in its
history in 2009.
Whatever the case, how does Ms
Tymoshenko and Batkivshchyna, (notwithstanding the Radicals and to a lesser
extent the Opposition Block of whom such cooperation would be expected)
mitigate the revelations within the apparently hacked emails detailing Kremlin
plans as authored by Mr Surkov/Pavlov?
If denying (perhaps rightly)
any political activity coordinated, or even useful to The Kremlin, the fact of
having been identified as the political parties most likely to further Kremlin
active measures to undermine Ukraine is a rather damning frame to be placed
within.
Ms Tymoshenko/Bakivshchyna
(and the others) may try to label CyberJunta a presidential provocation, but
that carries risks – particularly if it is not, for hacker retribution is
unlikely to be kind. Batkivshchyna (or other named parties) emails
becoming public is probably not a something that would be appreciated (unless
you are employed within the Presidential Administration or are a Deputy of the
People’s Front), nor is it likely to contain nothing but wholesome morally
upstanding text and thoughtful policy alternatives. Scams and scheming
may well dominate any correspondence, be it party or personal in nature.
To be effectively labeled The
Kremlin’s best ally/option in destabilising Ukraine, wittingly or unwittingly,
within allegedly Kremlin designed active measures takes some explaining even if
the entire incident is a fake – for unfortunately for Ms Tymoshenko and
Batkivshchyna (and more or less the entirety of the political class more
broadly), anonymous pro-Ukrainian hackers probably have as much, if not more
credibility with the constituency than she does.
How to respond with the minimum
of political damage sustained?
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