BY
3rd September witnessed the current
head of the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU), Vasyl Hrycak, attend the oath
swearing ceremony at the National Academy of the SBU. 165 would-be
counterintelligence officers, interpreters, analysts et al begin a journey that not all will finish – or want to
finish.
CI it has to be said is very difficult to do well.
It is far easier to engage in espionage, subversion etc., than
it is to defend against it – especially in Ukraine where infiltration by those
hostile to the State interests within its institutions remain – and will remain
– despite several reported sweeps through the ranks, and yet more sweeps that
will inevitably come.
It is important to recognise the probability that those who survive
numerous sweeps for infiltrators are normally the ones that matter – not those
easily/relatively easily identified. Indeed if necessary why not
theatrically sacrifice a few lesser spooks to divert attention from those that
really matter?
That said, despite the reactive perception the CI label projects, not all
CI work is reactive or defensive.
The point of the entry however is not to dwell upon counterintelligence and
the underestimated difficulties thereof, but to consider the SBU and its
personnel limitations compared to the task with which it is faced.
Starting from the premise that historically any “known” Ukrainian secret
services personnel numbers were inaccurate – there being those on the payroll
that didn’t exist but whose wages were pocketed, plus the long-term sick, lame
and lazy and the unfilled vacancies where the “paper strength” failed to
match the real numbers. Then there are the administrative and logistical
staff that were/are otherwise not operational, and sadly it is required to
minus those souls KIA and WIA since the events of 2014 to the present day.
Then it is necessary to take into account those that betrayed their oath
and are now overtly on the other side.
The class of 2016, all 165 of them (and not all will come out the other
end) may still be filling paper gaps rather than actually increasing the number
of counterintelligence personnel. This despite the formidable efforts of
The Kremlin that would stretch even the most expansive counterintelligence
agencies on the planet – and those considerable Kremlin efforts are not going
to end in the next decade or two.
The question therefore is whether there should be more intakes per year at
the SBU Academy, obviously producing more trained (if inexperienced)
officers – and a continuance of such a policy until the SBU is in a far better
position to do what it is currently asked, and perhaps unreasonably expected of
it when considering its personnel limitations.
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