The Putin-Erdogan Meeting, and Shifting Middle East Alliances

By AARON DAVID MILLER

The meeting between Russian President Vladimir  Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Tuesday, and the rapprochement it appears to illustrate, may eventually prove to be more tactical maneuver than strategic partnership. But Washington’s policies and, sometimes, its mere presence as a useful foil have helped to trigger a number of previously unlikely alliances in the region. Russian and Turkish leaders have a common interest in stoking anti-American sentiment, and they want the benefits that such opposition tends to bring.

Mr. Putin is always looking for opportunities to expand Russian influence, particularly at the expense of the U.S. Repairing ties with Turkey in the wake of the July 15 coup attempt gives him a chance to sow dissension in NATO, play on Mr. Erdogan’s suspicions of Washington, and build his network of allies to counter the U.S. Turkey is a big catch: the eighth-largest economy in Europe, with a population the size of Germany. Turkey’s position and influence make it indispensable on Syria–a critical issue for Russia.

Mr. Erdogan has been miffed at the U.S. for years, largely over differences on Syria. This anger has intensified over the Obama administration’s refusal to support his post-coup crackdown–after also resisting his pre-coup crackdown–and its refusal to extraditeFethullah Gulen, the cleric and former-Erdogan-ally-turned-foe whom Turkish officials have blamed for the putsch. The anti-American card offers Mr. Erdogan a convenient foreign bogeyman that can be useful in consolidating his power and aiding his efforts to strengthen Turkey’s presidency.

The Obama administration has also played an indirect role in facilitating closer Egyptian-Israeli ties. Cairo and Jerusalem are more closely linked than at perhaps any time since the signing of 1979 peace treaty. They have common interests, such as blocking the rise of jihadis in Sinai and constraining Hamas. And both are displeased with Washington–among Egyptians, over U.S. officials’ initial support for the government of President Mohammed Morsi after the military ousted him in 2013, criticism of Egypt’s human rights record, and differing views on military assistance; among Israelis, over settlement building and the peace process. Despite deep and sustained U.S. efforts to broker a deal on the Palestinian issue, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu both prefer a regional focus. See: Egypt’s recent offer to host bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians.

A Saudi delegation visited Jerusalem last month and met with Israeli members of parliament and other officials. This gesture reflects a warming in Israeli-Saudi relations–another result of U.S. policies that haven’t gone over well with regional powers, such as Washington’s support for the removal of longtime Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak in 2011, its calls for reform in Bahrain, and the nuclear deal with Iran (which shook Israeli and Saudi faith in Washington’s judgment and commitment to their security). Most of theenhanced Saudi-Israeli cooperation probably occurs behind the scenes, such as on intelligence matters concerning efforts to constrain their two principal  enemies: Iran and the Sunni jihadis. Abdullah al Shammari, an academic and former senior Saudi diplomat, told The Journal last year: “Israel is an enemy because of its origin, but isn’t an enemy because of its actions—while Iran is an enemy because of its actions, not because of its origin.”

The public manifestation of that relationship is significant. No Saudi delegation would have visited Israel without high-level approval–a sign of how much the kingdom, and the region, have changed.

It’s also a sign of how much perceptions of Washington’s role in the region have changed. As the U.S. carries on amid accusations of abdicating its leadership role, allies and adversaries are making the best of things: Mr. Putin is exploiting the U.S. reluctance to become deeply involved in Syria. Traditional allies such as Turkey are using the U.S. as a foil for their own purposes. Israel and the Gulf states are trying to increase their leverage and protect their interests by developing closer ties with one another. They are also pursuing their objectives despite U.S. concerns, such as with Saudi actions in Yemen. 

Mr. Putin’s involvement in Syria has broadened the basis for Israeli-Russian dialogue, and Israel and Turkey have found ways to settle their differences over the flotilla incident in Gaza. Amid turmoil, Middle East alignments are shifting.

For all the criticism of U.S. withdrawal, Washington’s lower profile in the Middle East is forcing regional actors to take steps–and to acknowledge that the United States is neither the sole source of their problems, nor their redemption.

Aaron David Miller is a vice president at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and most recently the author of “The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President.” He is on Twitter: @AaronDMiller2.

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