By ADRIAN KARATNYCKY
Russia, not Ukraine, stands to benefit from escalating violence on the
peninsula.
Pro-Russia rebels sappers stand on a tank as they search for explosive
devices in destroyed Donetsk
international airport on October 13, 2015 | Aleksey Filippov/AFP via Getty Images
Curiously, it took Russia four full days after an
alleged attack by Ukrainian special forces in Crimea to make a public statement
about the event.
On August 10, Russian President Vladimir Putin took to
the airwaves to denounce “tactics of terrorism.” He stated the alleged killings
of a soldier and an FSB security agency operative “will not pass idly by,”
intimating a Russian military response, and he called on the United States and
the European Union to rein in Kiev.
Russian news sources report that a unit of 20
Ukrainian soldiers engaged in the attack on August 6 after their plot to
sabotage a Crimean highway was foiled; seven “saboteurs” are reported to have been
apprehended. But the delay in reporting the event raises the question of why
authorities did not make an effort to inform Crimeans of the potential danger
or urge them to be on the lookout for a large number of armed men on the run.
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has called the
accusations a “fantasy that serves as a pretext for the latest round of
military threats against Ukraine.” Logic suggests that he is being truthful.
To begin with, it would be foolish for Ukraine to
launch a violent attack, given the vast superiority of Russian military power.
It would be even more foolish to provoke Russia at a time when its forces are
mobilizing for massive military maneuvers along Ukraine’s eastern border and in
Crimea.
Indeed, Ukraine is already on edge over signs of
increased Russian military deployments near its eastern border and increased
attacks on Ukrainian positions by fighters from the breakaway enclaves of the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Last week, Ukraine placed its armed forces on a
state of heightened readiness. On Thursday, President Poroshenko ordered these forces to be on
“combat alert.”
Second, Ukraine has shied away from military
operations in Russian-annexed Crimea for 2-1/2 years. Crimea is a peninsula
with narrow and well-patrolled access points — far harder for fighters to slip
across than the porous borders of the Russian-occupied areas of eastern Ukraine
(where there has also been an absence of clandestine operations).
Third, Poroshenko understands that military action by
Ukraine would erode Western support and solidarity regarding sanctions on
Russia, which are up for renewal in several months. Any escalation would also
act as a disincentive for foreign direct investment, which the Ukrainian
economy badly needs.
But while
Ukraine has no strategic or economic interests in baiting the bear, there are
numerous reasons why allegations of terrorism by Ukraine might serve Russia
well.
The charges
are useful for domestic Russian propaganda purposes. Putin’s political party,
United Russia, faces elections in September amid increasing discontent in both
Crimea and Russia over a deteriorating economy, which has seen the ruble lose
half its value against the dollar. Opposition parties might be hopelessly divided,
but public unhappiness over the economy could nonetheless erode support for the
ruling party. Claims that Russian forces are under attack can be used to rally
Russians around the president’s political team.
Additionally,
Russia is in the midst of a major military expansion. Its forces are engaged in
combat in Syria and Ukraine and are present in Moldova’s breakaway
Transnistria enclave, as well as in North Ossetia and Abkhazia (as
self-declared “peacekeepers”). Vast investments in military power could come
under pressure as Russians are told they will have to tighten their belts. A
dangerous new threat in Crimea can be used to justify sacrifice in the name of
greater preparedness.
Russia’s fighting forces, now clandestinely deployed
in eastern Ukraine, also need motivation. Their military service is being
concealed from the Russian public; those who die in combat are being buried in
secrecy. Russian soldiers were initially told that they were being deployed to
prevent massive atrocities again civilians in the Donbas. But the credibility
of these claims has been shattered by the on-the-ground reality. The emergence
of a new “terrorist” threat could conveniently be used to mobilize anger and
raise morale.
Putin can also use the charges of “terrorism” and
“sabotage” to argue before the international community that Russia faces an
irresponsible Ukrainian government uninterested in seeking peace. These
arguments are unlikely to sway most Western leaders, but they can give cover to
those looking to bolster their case for lifting sanctions on the Kremlin.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Putin considers
Ukraine to be a failed state. A concocted terrorist threat can justify large
troop deployments near Ukraine’s border, requiring even larger Ukrainian military
expenditures and stoking fears of an all-out Russian invasion in a society that
had started to become more relaxed.
All this points to a Kremlin disinformation effort
designed to achieve a broad range of aims. Russia could use its accusations to
justify a surgical strike at the Ukrainian military.
But most likely, this is not the start of a major new
Russian offensive, and any escalation is likely to be limited. Ukraine’s
military has significantly improved its effectiveness and increased its
military budget. A Russian attack would lead to massive casualties, something
Putin has shown great reluctance to risk.
A major attack would also undermine Russia’s
diplomatic efforts to weaken Western sanctions, which are looming large as
Russia’s hard currency surplus declines and the government is failing meet the
expectations of its large segment of state sector workers.
Similarly, Putin is unlikely to do anything to weaken
Republican U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump’s chances at being elected
in November. A major Russian offensive would become a central issue in the U.S.
election debate, re-emphasizing the dangers of Putin’s links to Trump.
Moreover, Trump has expressed a willingness to
consider recognizing Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and has broadly
signaled a desire to normalize relations with Russia at the expense of Eastern
Europe. He also has cast doubts on U.S.
commitments to NATO.
Russia’s accusations should not be regarded as a new
stage in its war of attrition against Ukraine. They are more likely part of the
long-running disinformation campaign that has accompanied the country’s military
aggression.
Adrian Karatnycky is a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic
Council and co-director of its “Ukraine in Europe” program.
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