Nineteen years ago, on May 27,
1997, Russian Federation and NATO signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security in Paris. It is the document the Kremlin and its
diplomats keep quoting as containing the NATO obligation not to permanently
deploy NATO troops in the countries that were not NATO members.
One can easily see the value
of the Founding Act for Russia as it puts restriction on NATO’s freedom to
deploy its forces east of the old border between East and West Germany. It
helps, therefore, the Kremlin to maintain comparative military superiority in
the areas adjacent to the former Eastern Bloc countries and the former Soviet
Baltic republics.
But does Russia really value
the Act? Surprisingly, the answer is negative: it was the Russian Federation
who de-facto nullified the document, and did so long ago.
The above-mentioned restriction
on NATO’s deployments is established by the Section IV of the Act, which
states, among others, that: “NATO reiterates that in the current
and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its
collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary
interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by
additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” (Emphasis added.)
Section IV, while entitled
“Political-Military Matters,” deals almost exclusively with the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. It is not surprising—it was that treaty, of
which both NATO and Russia were participants, which laid down the framework of
the security environment allowing the Founding Act’s main provisions. It was
envisaged, that the CFE Treaty would remain the cornerstone of the European
security for the foreseeable future, thus defining the “foreseeable
security environment”. Three other important pre-conditions of the Act were
listed in the Preamble and the Section I “Principles”.
First of all: “NATO and Russia
do not consider each other as adversaries.” Mutual shared commitment to,
secondly, “refraining from the threat or use of force against each other, as
well as against any other state” and, thirdly, “respect for sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of all states” were considered the
fundamental principle making the goodwill deal between NATO and Russia
possible.
Russia made certain
obligations regarding its troops deployment, parallel to those of NATO under
the Act, too: “Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force
deployments in Europe.”
It is easy to see that none of
the four conditions have survived to the present day. Russia officially
suspended the CFE Treaty on November 29, 2007 when Russian President Vladimir
Putin signed the Law № 276-FZ on that matter. On March 10, 2015, the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announced that starting the next day
Russia would completely withdraw from the CFE Treaty. At that point, the most
important security consideration behind the Founding Act ceased to exist.
Russian military operation
against Georgia in August 2008 and, most importantly, the forced separation of
20 percent of Georgian territory to come under the de-facto Russian control was
the first act that displayed Russia’s disregard for the principles of “refrain
of use of force against other states” and “respect for territorial integrity of
all states”.
Russian intervention in
Crimea, followed by its annexation, as well as irregular military actions, and
the direct military intervention of Russian troops to the east of Ukraine
have provided plenty of evidence of the same Russian disregard of the
principles underlying the Founding Act.
Threats to use nuclear weapons
against Denmark, Romania and Poland by Russian politicians and diplomats have
become common in the Russian discourse since 2007-2008, vividly demonstrating
the violation of the UN principle and Russia’s own obligation to refrain from
threat of use of force against the members of the Alliance.
The notion that NATO is
Russia’s main adversary is also so common in the Russian agenda that it is
easier to list those who do not say so than to name all
Russian politicians and newsmakers who openly call NATO an enemy (hardly the
best example of due fulfilment of obligations under the Founding Act, is it?).
And the most recent
announcement of re-establishment of the 1 st Guards Tank Army, the highly
visible offensively-oriented formation that is openly against NATO, just
draw the line under Russia’s full and final rejection of its obligations under
the Founding Act.
It is quite obvious,
therefore, that the Kremlin does not really value the Act—it would not make it
void by its actions otherwise, trying not to provide the other side with
excuses for not to sticking to its provisions.
It is quite reasonable then to
ask oneself here in the West: why should NATO insist on preservation of the
Russia-NATO Founding Act if Russia itself so clearly demonstrates a lack of any
interest in the document?
It might be just as productive
to launch a public discussion in the NATO member states on the real need for
NATO to follow the restrictions, and stick to this agreement that has been made
dead by the opposite side long, long ago.
Dr. Igor Sutyagin is Senior
Research Fellow, Russian Studies, Royal United Services Institute
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