Michael Weiss
Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite was blunt about her neighbor’s
aggression after it
took over Crimea—and in an interview, she sounds the alarm
about her nation’s vulnerability.
Not many people call Russia a “terrorist state” and
get away with it.
But Lithuanian President #Dalia_Grybauskaite refused to
resort to diplomatic euphemism in describing Vladimir Putin’s aggression in
Ukraine. “If a terrorist state that is engaged in open aggression against its
neighbor is not stopped,” she declared in November 2014, about eight months
after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, “then that aggression might spread further
into Europe.”
Sometimes referred to as the Baltic Iron Lady,
Grybauskaite is outspoken about NATO’s responsibility to fortify its eastern
periphery and forestall any future acts of Russian military adventurism into
Europe. Lithuania, she has said, is “already under attack” from Kremlin propaganda and
disinformation, a targeted campaign she considers the possible curtain-raiser
to an invasion of her country.
The
Daily Beast got in touch with Grybauskaite via email to discuss the ongoing
conflict in Ukraine, Article V’s relevance in the 21st century, the Mideast
refugee crisis, and Lithuania’s vulnerability as the smallish neighbor of
re-militarized and revanchist Russia.
You
were one of the few European heads of state to boycott the Sochi Olympics over the Kremlin’s crackdown on human rights, particularly LGBT rights.
This was, of course, before the invasion of Ukraine and what many consider to
be the West’s “waking up” to Putin’s Russia. What has Lithuania experienced
during your presidency that made you an outspoken critic of Putin and his
policies?
We
are not critics, we simply call Russia’s actions by their real names. The
Kremlin conducts confrontational policy, violates international law, destroys
the global and regional security architecture, and seeks to divide Europe and
weaken trans-Atlantic structures.
For
the Kremlin, silence signifies consent. We cannot be complicit or create a
climate of impunity that encourages dangerous behavior. That is why speaking
the truth is our obligation.
Along
with Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, you used the word “terrorism” to
describe the actions taken by Russian-backed separatists (and Russian soldiers)
in Donbas. Obviously this is the word used by Kiev to describe its military
response to these activities, but doesn’t accusing a major power of terrorism
suggest that something more than sanctions is in order to confront it? What
should NATO and the EU and United States be doing that they aren’t?
It’s
evident that having a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council that
occupies and annexes territories of its neighbors poses a serious threat to the
international security system. This is the goal pursued by the Kremlin. Divide
and rule is the name of the game.
We
cannot accept any “new normal” in our relationship with Russia. With the war
continuing in eastern Ukraine, Crimea occupied, and the Kremlin directly
helping the murderous Assad regime to stay in power in Syria, cooperation
cannot be built on blackmail and menace. The EU and NATO should see beyond
Kremlin propaganda. The EU and NATO must have their own agenda with Russia, not
be part of the Kremlin’s puppet show. That means expanding our influence in the
neighborhood, strengthening our defenses, breaking barriers for trade, and
protecting the rule-based international order.
Kremlin
information warfare is particularly acute in the Baltic states. What is the
Russian government trying to achieve in Lithuania? Is it seeking regime change
by appealing to the Russian diaspora or fringe political movements here?
Propaganda
and information attacks are part of hybrid warfare. They seek to provoke social
and ethnic tensions, promote mistrust in government, discredit our history,
independence, and statehood, and demonstrate that Western democracy is
functioning on dual standards.
But
the most dangerous goal of information warfare is to break the people’s will to
resist and defend their state, and to create a favorable environment for
possible military intervention. And the example of Ukraine is proof that
conventional war in Europe is no longer theoretical.
Many
Americans don’t count the trans-Atlantic relationship among their top foreign
policy priorities. What does the fate of Europe, much less the fate of the
postwar liberal democratic order, mean for the United States? Do we have to
fear another world war? Do you see that as a proximate or remote possibility?
Perhaps
there is less debate about the trans-Atlantic relationship because everyone agrees
that it remains strong and must only be getting stronger. We all have the same
perceptions of existing threats. What we should do now is take the necessary
defense measures against those threats through NATO’s defense planning, updated
defense scenarios, sufficient and credible deterrence, rapid reaction, and
smooth decision-making process. We shouldn’t just fear war but do everything
possible to make sure it doesn’t happen.
Lithuania
has not been too directly affected by the Middle Eastern refugee crisis. There are only six Syrians living here, although members of your
government have said they would welcome more. What policies should European
countries be adopting with respect to this crisis? Do you agree with Gen.
Breedlove that Putin is “weaponizing” refugees to try to undermine democratic
societies and governments, namely Germany?
Migration
routes can change very quickly, and all of us have to be prepared. We already
see migrants coming through Russia to Norway and Finland.
Helping
refugees is our duty. But it is also important to try to solve the problem at
its source, use all diplomatic tools to find a peaceful solution, provide
humanitarian support, engage more with Turkey and other countries in the region
to fight smuggling networks, and give people support closer to home so they are
not forced to choose a dangerous trip by sea.
Regarding
Russia’s involvement, no one can deny that Russia’s support of Assad as well as
airstrikes only contributed to the destabilization of the situation in Syria
and made many more people flee their homes.
EU
sanctions have not deterred Russia from continuing to arm and escalate in
Ukraine. Just this last week we saw an uptick in violence in Donbas. Also, both
the separatists and Kiev seem to be underreporting the violations of the
ceasefire; the OSCE Monitoring Mission typically carries many more violations
(by orders of magnitude) in its weekly reports. Are new sanctions a
possibility? There seems to be more of a willingness by other countries in
Europe to roll back the existing sanctions regime and return to business as
usual with Russia.
The
European Council agreed that the duration of sanctions against Russia is linked
to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. We are nowhere near
that. Russia continues to send its troops and military equipment to Donbas in
direct violation of the Minsk agreements. Therefore I do not see a reason to
discuss lifting sanctions or rolling them back. On the contrary, sanctions are
the only thing that could force Russia to take its Minsk commitments seriously.
And if the situation in Ukraine deteriorates, all options should be on the
table for the EU to consider how to increase the cost of Russian involvement.
Russian
corruption has been described as one of the country’s chief exports, alongside
oil and gas. All of the Baltic states have suffered, since their independence,
from gangsterism, issues with money-laundering, and so on. How bad is it the
situation in Lithuania?
While
the culture of corruption has its roots in the Soviet system, it is something
that we have to fight ourselves. Lithuania is ranked 32nd in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index. That’s 15 places up from five
years ago. But there’s another 31 to go…We are focusing on fighting
impunity, ensuring that responsibility is both unavoidable and sufficiently
severe.
Ensuring
competition and transparency in the energy sector is another area where there
has been substantial progress, including by limiting Russia’s influence.
Lithuania has successfully built the LNG terminal, which ensured the security
of supply and fair competition in the gas market. We also unbundled energy
supply from ownership, which helped us to create more transparent relations in
our energy sector.
Similarly,
Russian espionage in the Baltic states continues to be a major national
security issue. One recalls the Hermann Simm case in Estonia and annual arrests
of Chekists in the state security services. And the problem is just as bad, if
not worse, in other former occupied states. Just today, it was announced that a
military adviser to your Czech counterpart had his security clearance taken
away because of his perceived closeness to Russia. Are you concerned about the
infiltration of Lithuania’s security and intelligence establishment? Is counterintelligence
in general something that NATO and the EU should place a greater emphasis on?
No
one can be 100 percent sure that there won’t be such attempts. But we take all
the national security threats very seriously. Our and NATO security services
are vigilant and on high alert.
Are
we in another Cold War, as Dmitry Medvedev said at the Munich Security
Conference? If so, what does that mean for Western defense policy? Do we need a
strategy of containment with respect to Russia?
With
over 9,000 dead in Ukraine since the conflict started two years ago, the war is
far from being cold. And Russia’s aggressive actions did not start with
Ukraine. We should not forget its role in frozen conflicts throughout Eastern
Europe or the 2008 war in Georgia.
The
only containment strategy is not to underestimate the nature of the threat and
be prepared to act in our own defense.
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