BY
On the evening of 9th March, as the police
tear gas was dispersing
outside of the Russian Consulate in Odessa, in the city centre the blog was
spending 2 hours with two “State” human rights policy wonks – one from within
the “Beltway” and another from US Embassy Kyiv.
No specific cases of human rights wrongs were discussed – as is to be
expected when bouncing policy around.
Policy options/ideas/suggestions and some creative thinking resulted –
none of which can or will be repeated here. As always the Chatham House
Rule applies when meeting such people, notwithstanding the blog’s own
discretion as to what appears here – or not.
However, with such an erudite readership, some (although not all) of the
policy issues will appear and readers can ponder how they would deal with some
of the issues discussed – and the causal effects of any decisions they reach.
Among the issues raised were the post-Soviet institutional disregard for
human rights within prisons, orphanages, mental institutions etc that have not
disappeared simply because other headline grabbing human rights issues are
currently at the fore. Human trafficking to, through and from Odessa
remains and issue too, as does unlawful detention by the police and SBU etc.
All legacy issues simply ignored since Ukrainian independence in 1991 by
consecutive political leaderships.
How to gather any constituency faith in any due process results
regarding the tragedy of 2nd May in Odessa? All official investigations
are already discredited. The ICC? A mixed domestic/international
court? The constitutional issues with either? Other alternatives?
How to deal with such issues effectively, and not simply throw money at
the problem with no return, when rule of law in Ukraine has yet to be
effectively addressed by the current national leaders?
The Crimea issue, and the human rights issues therein will not be
ignored – indeed for reasons that cannot be stated here but in time will become
apparent, the Crimean issues will robustly remain on the US radar and a major
issue within the US Embassy Kyiv for several years to come (at least).
How to enhance monitoring, recording (both individual and systematic)
incidents, and ease suffering of targeted individuals and groups? How to
preempt the outcomes of Kremlin policy failures and is there anything than can
be done to deal with those consequences when they occur?
What of the occupied Donbas?
How to reach the best possible outcomes from the inevitable on-going
clash between national security and human rights?
Through a wider aperture, should sanctions relating to Crimea and the occupied
Donbas be coupled or decoupled? Further, should sanctions toward the
“DNR” and “LNR” be decoupled from each other? What would any such
additional degree of flexibility provide? How would such decoupling be
perceived by the numerous internal and external actors?
What about the Human Rights Commissioner (and her office) in Ukraine?
As “good” as the new civil service law may be (if it enters into force
on 1st May without prior political sabotage), it is by no means “very good” and
there is a worrisome attempt to “politicise” the Human Rights office – an
office that necessarily requires to be independent and a-political.
Why does the Human Rights Commissioner get no publicity? The
institution has nothing to say despite on-going legacy issues, over 1.5 million
internally displaced persons that clearly have issues that the State has
obligations to meet? It would be naive to believe that there is nothing
to comment upon regarding events on the front line either.
Such comments and any recommendations will of course be politically
irksome for the leadership, yet the Commissioner is obliged by office, and the
Ukrainian State obligated under international law, notwithstanding the
constitution, to face the issues raised.
If the Commissioner is deliberately being kept out of the media, how to
get them into the media? Regular public discussions with the high profile
diplomatic corps (The Pyatt’s, Waschuck’s, Gough’s and Tombinski’s) to which
the media flock? Should the human rights attachés within the embassies be
doing more to push the Commissioner and/or the issues in the media?
Why is the Commissioner for #Human_Rights (or rather the office) not
actively involved in the legislative process where certain laws being drafted
will assuredly have impact upon human rights? Should that office not be
actively involved at the Verkhovna Rada committee stage, rather than allowing
poor legislation to pass? It may be civil society is actively involved in
such a process, so why not the official domestic human rights body?
How to garner meaningful support for the human rights body from a
President, Prime Minister and Cabinet of Ministers that have been far from
supportive? How to strengthen and promote the human rights body if that
support remains absent? Should specific aid components be conditional
upon not only defending, but enhancing the role of the official domestic human
rights body?
How many Ukrainians know what their human rights actually are (rather
than what they may think they are)? How many know the name of their
Commissioner for Human Rights (Ms. Valeriya Lutkovska) and what powers the
office holds?
Why are there no regional offices for the Commissioner of Human Rights?
What about education programmes, summer camps? Should
international agencies be more outspoken and/or more supportive of the
Commissioner and office? How feasible the entry of an external human
rights “big hitter/name” being brought into the Ukrainian domestic body, and if
so, what impact can be expected?
Should the officer of Commissioner for Human Rights hold more powers?
In tinkering with the legislation to grant more powers, can the certain
inevitable attempts to politicise that power be roundly defeated?
The circumstances Ukraine has endured for the past few years, and which
see no real end in sight, will see a tsunami of human rights issues that the
post-Soviet capabilities of the institutions simply will not be able to ignore
(as much as that policy has historically been the case) – or cope with – far
beyond current events, unless a weak institution (which is in no way a
reflection on the capable Valeriya Lutkovska) is made robust enough to not
only cope in a reactionary manner, but act preemptively too.
How to frame any or all of this? Further “failings” of the current
Ukrainian leadership, or simply as “institutional strengthening” continuing
along the rule of law path upon which external supporters have already invested
significant political and diplomatic time and energy (and money)?
These and other policy questions were raised and answered, often with
several possible answers. Some of those answers will be the same as those
reached by the erudite readership of the blog – and some perhaps won’t.
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