Meetings between heads of government have become commonplace. But
Monday's between Presidents
Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin is something special.
They have not met formally for nearly two and a half
years. The last encounter, planned, for August 2013, was brusquely cancelled by
Obama because “there was nothing to talk about”. The main undiscussable issue
was Syria. The United States wanted President Assad instantly out; Russia
feared chaos without him. The Ukraine crisis pushed the relationship further
downhill. Russia, seeing a Western attack on its interests, responded by
seizing Crimea and supporting separatist war in eastern Ukraine. The West
retaliated with tough sanctions. Even co-operation to achieve this year’s Iran
agreement (which needed Russian Security Council assent) did not lift the
Obama/Putin chill.
So tomorrow’s meeting is a dramatic reversal. Already
the two sides are spinning it differently. The Americans say the Russians were
“desperate” for it, while the Russians say it was by mutual consent. And the
Americans say it will be all about Obama taking Putin to task over Ukraine,
while the Russians say the main item of business will be Syria.
In fact, behind the misleading briefings, it is plainly the build-up of
Russian troops in Syria that has precipitated the meeting. Western commentators
have offered the normal range of fanciful explanations for this: to replace the
fading US presence in the region, or to put pressure on the Saudis over oil prices.
The reality is simpler. As Putin says (and on this is to be believed), Russia’s
overriding aim is to block the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which is a direct
domestic threat to them in the Caucasus and elsewhere. They have seen the West
bungle this, notably by the chaos left behind in Iraq and Libya. The West’s
support for a moderate opposition in Syria is a delusion (didn’t the
responsible US general tell Congress a few days ago that that opposition had
“four or five” US-trained soldiers in the field?). The only choice in Syria is
between the nasty (Assad) and the nasty and dangerous (Islamic State).
Unconstrained by public opinion or any concern for human rights, this is a
no-brainer for Putin. He is bolstering the faltering Assad to prevent IS inheriting
Syria. And, he adds, the West, which is as threatened by IS as Russia, should
join him.
Western policy does seem to be moving the way Putin
wants. The US and (as of Friday) the UK, having spent years demanding Assad’s
instant departure, now concede that he might stay on in an “interim” capacity.
The US Defence Secretary, after a year of refusing contact with his Russian
opposite number, opened such contact last week in order to “deconflict” the two
countries’ actions on the ground. Whatever the obfuscations around
tomorrow’s meeting, Syria will be a key part of the agenda.
Obama will
also tackle Putin on Ukraine. But here, too, it looks as though the debate is
moving in Russia’s direction. In February this year, when the Minsk II Peace
Agreement was signed as the basis for a ceasefire and political settlement,
both the US and the UK were dismissive. The agreement, we quietly said, would
rapidly collapse. Our policy remained to “change Putin’s calculus”, meaning to
use sanctions to compel Russia to back down. But this has not worked. With all
its imperfections, Minsk has in fact helped to end the fighting, and is still
very much in play. And, while the sanctions have done some economic damage,
they have not changed one jot Putin’s determination to retain Crimea and the
whip hand in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, they have cemented Russian
public opinion firmly behind him. The avowed aim of sanctions has therefore
quietly shifted to ensuring Russian observance of Minsk. When Obama says this
to him tomorrow, Putin can only agree. He wants Minsk to work, too. He has got
roughly what he wants in Ukraine and hopes now to get back to a more normal
relationship with the West.
The
Ukrainian crisis is not over. We are in for some rough moments this autumn. The
political provisions of Minsk will begin to fray as the two Ukrainian sides
continue to refuse to talk to each other. The official report on the downing of
the Malaysian airliner, due next month, will almost certainly blame the rebels,
and provoke a storm of further criticism of Russia. And the end-of-year
deadline for closing the Russian/Ukrainian border will certainly not be met.
But the major players are now talking rather than shooting. While we are not
yet out of the tunnel, we may well be approaching the exit ramp.
So is Russia
on a roll? Sensible Russians will welcome their country’s foreign policy
successes, but also have real worries. The danger of the Putin regime,
unconstrained by public opinion or parliament, overconfidently blundering into
some further foreign adventure is high. And Russia’s core problem, its
underperforming domestic economy, remains acute. There is no sign of any will
to tackle the corrupt clientelism that keeps Russia poor and earns public
detestation. Politically sensitive public benefits, such as pensions, are under
pressure. Next year brings parliamentary elections whose outcome can be
massaged but not entirely fixed. Putin’s real nightmare is not Western
sanctions but Goldman Sachs’ prediction that the oil price could fall to $20 a
barrel. The support of his people is at the moment overwhelming, but how long
can it last if living standards collapse?
Nevertheless,
Vladimir Putin may recall Madeleine Albright’s description in 1998 of the US as
the “indispensable nation”, vital to tackling the world’s problems. And he may
take some pleasure in his discussion with Barack Obama in noting that, for some
of those problems – Iran, Syria, Ukraine – Russia, too, is indispensable.
Sir Tony
Brenton is a former British ambassador to Moscow
No comments:
Post a Comment