James
Sherr
From the outset of the Ukraine crisis, the West has acted on the premise
that economic sanctions would induce Russia to modify its actions. But while
sanctions do constrain capacity, they do not constrain behaviour. Their
immediate impact is bearable. Moreover, they do nothing to diminish Russia’s
most usable and effective form of power: military force. Given the stakes, the
case for strengthening Ukraine’s defences is compelling.
The Russian military offensive of August 2014 secured diplomatic
concessions in Minsk that would not have been granted otherwise. An even more
devastating offensive of January-February 2015, in blatant violation of the
first Minsk agreement, produced a second Minsk accord even more flawed than the
first. According to its terms, future election conditions, constitutional
reform and the restoration of border control are subject to the agreement of
the separatists, who have licence to withhold their consent indefinitely.
It is blindingly obvious to the Kremlin that the separatist enclaves are
neither absorbable by Russia nor sustainable in the long term. They are useful
solely as a bridgehead for securing Russia’s wider objectives in Ukraine: its
‘federalization’ (loss of sovereignty), ‘non-bloc status’ (enforced neutrality)
and the abandonment of its European course. So far, military force has been the
arbiter of this process.
But if Russia’s military card is devalued, so is the
bridgehead. And there are good reasons to believe strengthening Kyiv’s military
muscle would be effective.
Russia has underestimated Ukraine’s resilience. Ukrainian national
sentiment and civil society have been strengthened by the war, especially in
the east. It also has
underestimated the capacity of Ukraine’s fighting forces. Despite 16
months of armed insurgency and two military offensives backed by regular
Russian troops, Russia’s separatist allies control less than five percent of
Ukraine’s mainland territory.
Russia’s military system is potent but under strain.
Its battle groups are not occupation forces. They strike hard and withdraw. The
maintenance of 40-50,000 troops in theatre have placed demands on ground forces
units as far away as Kazakhstan and Vladivostok. There is reluctance to risk
prolonged exposure of ethnic Russian servicemen to hostile Russian-speaking
populations in eastern Ukraine.
Nevertheless, Ukraine’s armed forces lack the means to prevail in
high-intensity combat against well-armed Russian troops. They are burdened by
the hangover of a largely unreformed defence system, by distrust between
volunteer units and higher command echelons, and by a deficit of competent
command and staff officers above unit level. Yet they are also dangerously
outmatched in hard capability. In the Debaltseve offensive, Russia brought into
the field advanced weapons systems against which Ukraine had no
countermeasures.
Kyiv needs capabilities that will protect its forces and slow down the
battlefield. If opposition forces are likely to face effective resistance
and protracted combat, they will be less likely to attack. And the equipment
needed to achieve this — secure communications, electronic counter-measures and
long-range passive counter-battery radar — are neither ‘lethal’ weapons nor
politically high-profile. Yet, in their absence, even a well-trained and highly
motivated force risks evisceration in battle.
Much has changed since President Obama first declined Ukraine’s request
for non-lethal assistance, and NATO allies are now contributing to Ukraine’s
defence in a variety of ways. The problem is that the contribution is
unsystematic, uncoordinated and unevenly matched to Ukraine’s needs.
In many quarters, it is now axiomatic that a refocusing and enhancement
of Western assistance will ‘provoke’ Putin into a dramatic escalation of the
conflict. The risk exists. Yet there is nothing in Putin’s record
to support this assumption. What has repeatedly provoked him however is
weakness and bluff.
In a contest with high-risk players, there is no such
thing as a risk-free policy. Failure to modify an ineffective policy
invites at least as much danger as a more robust course. Today’s dangers are
created by Russia’s political aims, its military actions and its increasingly
febrile and conspiratorial view of the world. So far, within these ominous
parameters, the Kremlin has behaved according to a rational calculus. In this
calculus, no respect is shown to opponents who are stronger, but unwilling to
use their strength.
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