Thomas
Graham
Moscow is not a rising
revolutionary force but one seeking to restore power, writes Thomas Graham
The west
acts as if it had a Vladimir Putin problem. In fact it has a Russia
problem. The Russian president stands within a long tradition of
Russian thinking. His departure would fix nothing. Any plausible successor would
pursue a similar course, if perhaps with a little less machismo.
The
Russia problem is not new. It emerged 200 years ago, at the end of the
Napoleonic period, with the opening up of what we would today call a values
gap. In the 19th century Russia maintained an autocratic regime as Europe moved
towards liberal democracy.
Yet
Russia remained a great power, essential to European security. How to protect
Europe in the presence of a powerful state that is alien in worldview? That
was the problem then, as now.
European
states seek security in balance; Russia seeks it in
strategic depth. That view grows out of its location on the vast, nearly
featureless great Eurasian plain, across which armies have moved with ease.
Historically,
Russia has pushed its borders outward, as far away as possible from its
heartland. It did not stop when it reached defensible physical borders, but
only when it ran into powerful countervailing states. Where the west saw
imperialism, Moscow saw the erection of defences.
Over
time, resistance from the Germanic powers in the west, Great Britain and then
the US in the south, and China and Japan in the east, came to define Russia’s
zone of security as north central Eurasia, the former Soviet space.
For
Moscow, states there face a choice not between independence and Russian
domination, but between domination by Russia or a rival. That struggle, Moscow believes, is playing out in Ukraine.
Also
out of security concerns, Russia has opposed the domination of Europe by a
single power and remains uncomfortable with greater European unity. The
reason is easy to grasp: Russia can be the equal of Great Britain, France,
or Germany, but it can never be the equal of a united Europe, which in
population, wealth, and power would dwarf it as the US does today. Driving
wedges between European states, and between Europe and the US, might forestall
the emergence of a serious threat.
Russia’s
fears are amplified by a sense of vulnerability. Its economy is stagnating, its
technology is no longer cutting-edge, and outside forces — China, the west and
radical Islam — are challenging it in the former Soviet space. The temptation
is to act tough to cover up the doubts by, for example, flaunting nuclear
capabilities.
After
more than 20 years of hope that Russia could be brought into the west-led
international order, the re-emergence of the Russia problem has shocked the
west. But the threat is limited. This is not a rising revolutionary force but a
declining state seeking to restore its power.
It
can be managed. One way is to revitalise the European project. That means
dealing vigorously with the issues fuelling anti-EU forces — the democratic
deficit, immigration and inequality.
To
be sure, steps such as a Nato presence in the Baltics and robust planning for
hybrid-war contingencies are necessary, but the west needs to avoid
over-militarising its response to what is largely a political challenge.
At
the same time, more should be done to help Ukraine repair its economy and build
a competent state as a barrier to Russia’s assault on European norms and unity.
Yet
containment will not work in our globalised, increasingly multipolar world ,
as it did during the cold war. The west cannot contain one of the world’s
largest economies, and it is geopolitical malfeasance to weaken unduly a power
critical to the equilibrium we hope to create out of today’s turbulence,
particularly in Asia.
The
hard truth is that Ukraine cannot be rebuilt without Russia. It is simply too
reliant on Russia economically, and Russia has too many levers of influence
inside Ukraine, for it to be otherwise. Containment has to be leavened with
accommodation. Finding the right balance is the challenge.
The writer is a former senior director for Russia on the US National Security
Council staff
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