The latest in medical technology is powerless to cure the creeping Ukraine
Fatigue besetting some Western capitals. Only Kyiv can do something about it.
Ukraine muddled
through 2015, meeting neither the exalted expectations of the country’s
boosters nor the malevolent hopes of its detractors. Its major
accomplishment for the year sounds rather minimalist, but is important
nonetheless: the country survived. Since the retreat from Debaltseve in
early 2015, Ukrainian forces have managed to stabilize the front in the Donbas,
and the military situation looks much better for Kyiv at the start of 2016 than
it had a year ago.
The rest of southern and eastern Ukraine has been
spared the destruction and depopulation that have befallen Donetsk and
Luhansk.
Mariupol, Kharkiv and Kherson may have been battered
figuratively by Ukraine’s severe economic downturn, but not physically by
Russian artillery. Even on the economic front, macroeconomic
stabilization augurs a return to growth, albeit weak, in 2016, following years
of contraction. The steep, protracted drop in energy prices has been a
boon to Ukraine even as it has hobbled the country’s Russian adversary.
Russia’s Syrian campaign has not only given Ukraine a
respite from military pressure, but has also confounded predictions of a
Russian-Western understanding on Syria at Kyiv’s expense. A wide range of
observers postulated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm or unease, that the
desire to form a common front to combat ISIS would induce the West to weaken or
drop sanctions against Russia—and perhaps even quietly consign Ukraine to the
sphere of privileged interests of its mighty neighbor. Curiously, no one seems
to have suggested another equally plausible option: that the need to secure
Western cooperation against ISIS would cause Russia—arguably more vulnerable
than the West to Islamic terrorism—to abandon its failed Novorossiya venture
and leave its Donbas proxies to twist in the wind.
In any event, none of this has come to pass. The
reason is probably not even so much a question of Western scruples regarding
Ukraine (although they would ultimately have played a role) as the fact that
there is simply no lasting deal to be had on Syria right now between Russia and
the West. Russia’s overriding goal is the preservation of the Assad regime
against all challengers, with the rout of ISIS a logical consequence, but
decidedly a secondary consideration, of this goal. The West, on the other
hand, is intent on Assad’s removal as well as the defeat of ISIS, and it is
difficult to say, on any given day or for any particular Western capital, which
of these two goals takes precedence.
So, on the three-dimensional chessboard of the Syrian
civil war, Russia and the West are likely to continue striking largely
uncoordinated blows against ISIS while working completely at cross-purposes
with regard to Assad. Recent gains by Syrian government forces and a looming siege
of the rebel-held parts of Aleppo, both heavily supported by Russian air power,
belie facile predictions about Russia and the West finding common ground on
Syria.
A notional Russian-Western alliance against ISIS is undercut by
the reality of Russian military actions that largely bypass ISIS and instead
appear to deliberately create further spikes in the number of Syrian refugees
desperate to reach Europe. It is difficult to imagine any logical way for
Ukraine even to factor into this equation. (However, any Ukrainian relief
over the vanishing likelihood of a Syria-related sellout must be tempered by a
recognition that a victorious Russian campaign in Syria would probably embolden
the Kremlin to revisit unfinished business closer to home.)
Analysts have speculated whether the recent
short-notice Russian military drill, held in the country’s southwestern areas
at the start of February was aimed at Ukraine or Turkey. In fact, the two are
hardly mutually exclusive. For Moscow, the beauty of snap military
readiness exercises is that they provide the chance to rehearse mobilization
for numerous contingencies. It is truly a target-rich environment,
encompassing not only Ukraine and Turkey, but also Georgia, an operation in
support of Armenia or Transnistria, or even a deployment to Russia’s own
restive North Caucasus. So many enemies, so little time…
In a rather different vein, pundits have seized on
another data point as a possible portent of a resolution at least to the war in
the Donbas: the appointment of Putin insider Boris Gryzlov to replace a Foreign
Ministry functionary as the Russian representative to the Contact Group on
Ukraine. Putin, the theory goes, picked Gryzlov as a signal that he means
business and wants to get down to serious negotiations. Another straw in the
wind has been the series of assassinations of Donbas separatist commanders
supposedly viewed by Moscow as too independent or uncompromising. Once
again, the idea seems to be that the Kremlin is laying the groundwork for concessions.
Of course, while it cannot be ruled out that Gryzlov
was chosen to wind up Russia’s Donbas debacle and salvage the best possible
terms for Moscow, neither can it be assumed. It could be a case of reculer
pour mieux sauter. Gryzlov could be going in precisely to play hardball
and send the signal that his boss is tired of being Mr. Nice Guy. Likewise,
Moscow’s assertion of stricter control over its Donbas proxies is not
necessarily the precursor to a sell-out of the rebels.
One need only
recall the invective that Russian chauvinists hurled in 2014 at Vladislav
Surkov, the Kremlin’s gray eminence on Ukraine policy, for his supposed
readiness to abandon Novorossiya and the rebels to the tender mercies of the
“fascist junta” in Kyiv. At bottom, it was a ferocious and highly public
battle between those Russians who wanted to swallow Ukraine whole and those who
wanted to consume it one bite at a time—a distinction largely without a
difference, except that the latter approach was less likely to cause indigestion.
All the same, the violent demise of key Donbas
commanders does drive home an important lesson. If any commentators
should suggest that Moscow does not and cannot control the rebellion in the
Donbas, one need only direct them to the widows of Aleksandr Bednov, Pavel
Dremov, Aleksey Mozgovoy or Dmitry Utkin for an authoritative rebuttal.
If the military reprieve has been the good-news story
of 2015 for Ukraine, perhaps the most ominous development has been the return
of Ukraine Fatigue, an enervating and ultimately debilitating condition
characterized by mental and emotional symptoms ranging from anger, annoyance,
outrage and disgust to cynicism, ironic amusement, despair and feelings of
utter helplessness.
A devastating outbreak of Ukraine Fatigue in 2007-10
crippled Western interest in, and support for, the very notion of a
post-Communist transformation of the country. The pathological history of
the condition suggests that virtually the entire Ukrainian political class are
carriers of Ukraine Fatigue, showing no symptoms themselves of the dread
malady, but contaminating practically every Westerner with whom they come in
contact. Clinically, the condition can be intensely irritating but is never
fatal for the sufferer—although it could ultimately prove deadly for Ukraine
itself.
Ukraine Fatigue matters because Western support for
Kyiv over the past few difficult years has stood firmly on two legs. The first
has been the realpolitikconcern to preserve/restore the post-Cold War
security of central and eastern Europe. The second, however, has been
more aspirational and imaginative: the desire to see a Europe “whole and free”
comprised of democratic, free-market states that would be worthy
candidates—whether they choose to join or not—of European and Euro-Atlantic
institutions. However, if the euphoria of the Maidan was infectious for
so many Western observers, so too is the frustration with Ukraine’s persistent
corruption and poor governance. If Ukraine continues to disappoint in
this respect, it is questionable how long Western support for Ukraine could
remain standing on only one leg.
It would be ironic, and deeply discouraging to
Ukraine’s well-wishers, to see Kyiv essentially snatch defeat from the jaws of
victory. Having foiled Russia’s attempt to detach all of southern and
eastern Ukraine in 2014, and having stabilized the military and economic
situations in 2015, Ukraine’s leadership risks throwing everything away in 2016
through its inability or unwillingness to follow through with domestic reform.
February could well prove to be a tipping point, with the resignation of
Ukraine’s Lithuanian-expatriate Economy Minister, Aivaras Abromavičius, the
warning from IMF chief Christine Lagarde about suspension of disbursements to
Ukraine, and the long-sought resignation of the tainted Prosecutor General,
Viktor Shokin.
While unpopular PM Yatsenyuk—with passive oligarchic
support—has survived a no-confidence vote, domestic and foreign pressure might
still force a government reshuffle or even new elections, followed by a serious
reform program. If not, it is not hard to imagine Ukraine Fatigue turning into
Ukraine Panic—that all the efforts and sacrifices have been for naught—or even
Ukraine Revulsion—that it was all a pointless endeavor from the start, with no
better outcome possible. One can even envisage domestic Ukrainian exasperation
leading to a revolution that is Jacobin rather than Velvet, with a 21st-century
equivalent of a guillotine on the Maidan.
Russia, for its part, did not instigate a war in
Ukraine in order to create a devastated basket case of a client state that must
be propped up indefinitely. Frozen conflicts are meant to be thawed out and
served up piping hot at an opportune moment. In Ukraine, Moscow has been
waiting for the right confluence of three factors: a recovery of hydrocarbon
prices, Western distraction or loss of interest, and Ukrainian internal
instability.
The Kremlin seems unlikely to get a break on hydrocarbon prices.
However, if enough people in Ukraine and the West conclude that the Revolution
of Dignity has turned out to be just as sordid and futile as the Orange
Revolution, Moscow could well be tempted to embark on a second iteration of its
Novorossiya gambit. Indeed, it is hard to believe the Kremlin would send
in Gryzlov to cut a deal precisely when events could be taking a decisive turn
in Moscow’s favor.
The finest, most innovative Western medical technology
is powerless to cure Ukraine Fatigue. A comprehensive treatment plan can
only be devised in Kyiv, and there is not a moment to lose.
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