BY
As all are well aware, 31st December 2015 was the deadline set within
the Minsk II Agreement for its complete implementation.
As all are well aware, that deadline will pass without even a ceasefire
worthy of the definition having come into effect, let alone the return of
control of the Ukrainian border to the Ukrainians – or any of the other bullet
points agreed that fall between ceasefire and restoration of territorial integrity.
Of course nobody actually expected that Minsk II would be fully
implemented by 31st December 2015 as the agreement states, because in the
absence of anything else, Minsk II is all there is – and therefore bumping
and/or ignoring the deadline was obviously going to happen unless there was a
severe “or else” as a consequence of failing to meet the 31st December deadline
– and there wasn’t and isn’t an “or else” of any significants.
With no significant “or else” and a Kremlin currently projecting the appearance
of being happy to take any sanctions pain, suggests negotiations will continue
to be in bad faith.
Whatever the
appointment of Boris Gryzlov as Russian representative at the “Contact Group” may signify (and
he is surely too big a fish to be rotated into the mix to simply continue to
obstruct and obfuscate – for lesser mortals have done an adequate job of doing
that thus far), his appointment earlier this week signified a continuance of
the process well into 2016 (and to be blunt, beyond) regardless of the
obligated 2015 year end deadline.
Thus it remains for an officially recognised and announced extension of
the process to occur.
On 28th December rumour circulated that there would be a “Normandy Four”
leaders conference call on 30th December – 24 hours before the Minsk II
deadline is due to pass far from implemented and killing the agreement.
On 29th December, those rumours were confirmed after the official
disclosure of contact
between Chancellor Merkel and President Poroshenko in preparation for the
conference call.
“President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko coordinated positions with
Federal Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel on the eve of the phone
conversation in the Normandy format planned for December 30.
The parties discussed the fulfillment of the Minsk agreements and
emphasized the necessity of their full implementation.
The President drew attention to the fact that pro-Russian militants
violated the ceasefire regime more and more often and conducted open
provocations, particularly the shelling of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.
Petro Poroshenko highly appreciated the EU’s joint decision on the
continuation of sanctions against Russia until complete fulfillment of the
Minsk agreements.
Angela Merkel confirmed the immutability of EU policy of non-recognition
of Crimea’s annexation.”
Thus, in the absence of any other plan (viable or otherwise) for the
foreseeable future, 30th December seems highly likely to see the official
declaration of an extended deadline for Minsk II – albeit as it is a conference
call and not a physical meeting of the Normandy Four leaders, it is perhaps
questionable whether any signatures will be on any supplemental or amended
agreement regarding any deadline extension – and in particular signatures to obligate
to any future deadline set.
The penalty for The Kremlin failing to abide by (in any shape or form) a
2015 deadline it agreed to, is seemingly nothing more than extended existing
sanctions. It would appear unlikely that any specific additional penalty
for absolutely no Kremlin attempt to meet the 31st December obligations is
going to be forthcoming.
This raises the question of the significants of any future
implementation deadline – if a future deadline for complete Minsk II
implementation is agreed upon at all.
Very few expect the Minsk II agreement to be fully implemented during
2016. That being so, any 2016 deadline set that does not have a cast iron
and significant “or else” attached will probably prove to be as useful as the
deadline that expires on 31st December 2015.
On domestic Russian TV channels over recent weeks, assembled “experts”
have been citing 3 – 5 years to fully implement Minsk II – creating amongst
Russian society the perception that there is not going to be a fix in the
foreseeable future in the occupied Donbas. Those 3 – 5 years thus taking
the current Kremlin regime through the Duma 2016 and Presidential 2018
elections without any requirement to change policy course in the occupied
Donbas due to domestic public pressure. The Russian public are being
actively conditioned to accept Russian involvement in the occupied Donbas until
2018 at the earliest, or perhaps until 2020 – or beyond.
However, a deadline set for more than 12 months away provides no
motivation for any significant progress during 2016 – and neither the German
nor French leader will be keen to see the matter roll on into their respective
2017 domestic election years (though they will have no choice without a
significant “or else” for failure during 2016).
Yet the complete absence of a deadline will see the same complete
absence of Minsk II implementation.
Thus the deadline options in the absence of a significant and cast iron
“or else” will be little more than hollow rhetoric agreed to by all parties,
and then in bad faith each party will knowingly sell it to their peers and
constituents, only to see another deadline come and go without consequences for
those failing to fulfill their obligations.
The options then, a 2016 deadline that is as likely to see Minsk II
implementation as that of the 2015 deadline, a deadline set further into the
future that will then see little effort during 2016, the absence of a deadline
– or finally arriving at an “or else” that will truly resonate in certain
quarters.
Smart money will probably be put upon an equally weak 2016 deadline –
due to no “or else” to concentrate minds.
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