Posted in Annual Report, NASAA
Right around Christmas, NASAA, the North American Securities
Administrators Association, which is comprised of the securities regulators
from each of the 50 states, released its annual list of the top five threats to investors. To compile the list, NASAA polled each state’s securities
commissioner to learn the “the five most problematic products, practices or
schemes.” The five items described below topped the list. What is
remarkable, however, is not that these items represent new issues, but, to the
contrary, that these are essentially the same issues that investors and
regulators have been dealing with, well, forever. Equally interesting,
the list amply demonstrates some of the biases that securities regulators have against
certain “alternative” investments.
Unregistered products/unlicensed salesmen. NASAA helpfully warns that “[t]he offer of securities
by an individual without a valid securities license should be a red alert for
investors.” Well, who can disagree with that? The problem is, con artists
very rarely advertise the fact that they lack a proper securities
license. Moreover, and unfortunately, there are also lots of licensed
securities salesmen who commit fraud. So, while I appreciate that this is
a problem, apparently common to states across the country, apart from identifying
the problem, there is no real solution. With that said, I do agree with NASAA’s
admonition that investors should be wary of any investment that is accompanied
by the representation that it presents the holy grail of impossible
combinations: “limited or no risk” plus high
returns. It is just impossible to get these two characteristics in any
single investment.
Promissory Notes. According
to NASAA, there is a real concern over the sale of high-interest-bearing
promissory notes, especially to “seniors and others living on a fixed
income.” While that may be true, it sounds like a headline from
1995. The sale of promissory notes has long been problematic, stemming
from the fact that some promissory notes with a duration of nine months or less
are, by definition, not securities, and, thus, need not be
sold through BDs. Accordingly, short-term notes are often offered by
individuals who are not subject to regulatory oversight or the supervisory
system in place at BDs. Not surprisingly, some of these notes are
fraudulent, and the promised returns are never realized. To avoid, or at
least minimize, potential problems, it makes sense only to do business with an
appropriately registered broker at a registered broker-dealer. At least
then, even though there is no guarantee of any return, at least there is a
clear avenue of redress in the event of a true fraudulent scheme. Another
lesson here, of course, is, again, that when something – in this case, the
promised return – sounds too good to be true, it likely is.
Oil/Gas Investments. While
NASAA (begrudgingly) concedes that “[m]any oil and gas investment
opportunities, while involving varying degrees of risks to the investor, are
legitimate in their marketing and responsible in their operations,” it also
observes that oil and gas deals are often “fraudulent.” The message here
is a clear one, and one I am called upon frequently to point out to my
clients: the further away an investment is from a simple buy-and-hold
strategy employing something totally vanilla, like blue chip stocks or no-load
mutual funds, the more nervous it makes securities regulators. Merely to
incant the words “oil and gas,” or “limited partnership,” the structure through
which oil and gas deals are typically sold, to a securities regulator is to
incite a lather. It is important to remember the danger of
generalizing. Deals are different, as are the individuals who offer
them. I resent it, therefore, when a regulator presumes that my client
must be guilty of something merely by virtue of the product sold.
Real Estate-related Investments: According to NASAA, “[n]on-traded REITS can be risky and have
limited liquidity, which may make them unsuitable for certain investors.”
Like oil and gas deals, REITs, in the eyes of regulators, seem to be presumptively
unsuitable due to their liquidity issue. That, of course, flips the
burden of proof on its head, as a recommendation should be presumed to be
suitable unless proven otherwise. Clearly, a customer’s need for
liquidity is something that must be factored into any recommendation, but it
does not mean that the sale of a product with limited liquidity is necessarily
problematic; it always requires a case-by-case analysis. A REIT’s limited
liquidity is generally, if not always, explained in great detail, and in
several places, in the typical set of offering documents, so it is nearly
impossible to conjure up a situation where a reasonably intelligent investor
considering a REIT investment is truly unaware of the liquidity concerns a REIT
presents. Despite this, regulators are very, very quick to conclude that
liquidity was never adequately considered or explained when a complaint about a
REIT is received. Knowing this, anyone who deigns to sell REITs must
document the heck out of the suitability analysis, in anticipation of being
second-guessed by regulators.
Ponzi Schemes: Finally, NASSA
includes Ponzi schemes on the list of horribles. Well, duh. Ponzi
scheme, bad. Unfortunately, as regulators would have to concede, a
well-run Ponzi scheme doesn’t look at all like a scheme; it looks
legitimate…until is discovered not to be. So, it is of limited utility to
offer counsel that “[i]nvestors should always be wary of unsolicited financial
advice or investment opportunities,” because Ponzi schemes are generally only
revealed after the loss has been incurred, and the fraudster
has absconded. Ask anyone who invested with Bernie Madoff or Allan
Stanford. The sad fact is, it is impossible to prevent someone from
perpetrating a Ponzi scheme, especially when the fraudster looks, acts and
sounds like anything but the kind of guy who would steal investors’
money. I know that regulators hate Ponzi schemes and the devastating
impact they can have on investors; I just wish there was something to do to
stop them. But,
alas, there isn’t.
No comments:
Post a Comment