BY
For the first time since the “Contact Group” started meeting regarding
the “issues” and “solutions” in the occupied Donbas, The Kremlin has appointed
a real decision maker. A man who has made decisions about Ukraine that
have led to historic outcomes before – albeit those historic outcomes where
then entirely wasted.
Boris Gryzlov, long time chum of Vladislav Surkov who remains overseer of
the “Ukraine issue” for the Kremlin, is a man who in 2004. agreed with having
another round of presidential elections that saw Viktor Yanukovych eventually
beaten by Viktor Yushenko.
Mr Gryzlov is also a permanent member of the Russian Security Council.
In short he is a big name with significant political clout and
possessing direct access to The Kremlin and its innermost (and ever-shrinking)
decision making conclave.
Some may indeed interpret his appointment, being a Surkov ally, as
Surkov currently getting the better of Deputy Prime Minister Volodin within The
Kremlin when it comes to matters within the occupied Donbas.
It will be like old times for both former-President Kuchma and Boris
Gryzlov – both sat together again around a table discussing outcomes that the
Kremlin really doesn’t like, and Kremlin interference that Ukraine robustly
rallies against.
However, it is one thing to communicate and arrive at mutually agreed
and acceptable outcomes – it is another to communicate for the sake of
communicating with the aim of obstructing mutually agreed and acceptable
outcomes by obfuscation – and yet another to have the gravitas to deliver
ultimatums that are immediately understood.
The “why Gryzlov”, and “why now” questions naturally arise.
The appointment of Mr Gryzlov would seem unnecessary simply to continue
the obstructionism and obfuscation – thus far two lesser mortals (Zurabov, and
then Kulmuhametov) have been tasked and adequately accomplished such “bad
will” talks effectively – so which of the other options?
Having charged the “nationalist” sentiment within Russia, upped the
“fortress Russia” rhetoric, and projected the image domestically of return as a
“global power”, is it feasible to believe that any genuine desire to fulfill
Minsk II obligations will be forthcoming with Duma elections in 2016
(regardless of rigged results)? A serious change of policy either before
or immediately after those elections seems rather unlikely – nevertheless it
cannot be ruled out now that Mr Gryzlov has been appointed.
Perhaps Mr Gryzlov has been appointed to “impress” not Ukraine with his
political weight/name recognition – but the Kremlin proxies. Time will
swiftly tell.
Indeed the chances of a serious change in policy prior to the Russian
presidential elections in 2018 seem somewhat unlikely too for the same reasons
as those in the above paragraph – although if as is said, 24 hours is a long
time in politics, just over 2 years is a metaphorical is a lifetime for a
Kremlin dealing with the consequences of poor policy decisions both home and
abroad in both ever greater quantity and scale.
It will be interesting to see not only how Mr Gryzlov changes the
dynamic of the “Contact Group”, but why he has been specifically chosen (to do
so) now.
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