Keir Giles
But it remains to be
seen whether Minsk will allow real integration with Russian air defence, or
whether it will remain largely a formality.
Russia has announced that it
has set up a joint air defence system with Belarus.
As with so many joint projects
between Moscow and Minsk, this appears to be a Russian idea that could remain
largely on paper without Belarusian cooperation. But it does create an
opportunity that Russia could exploit if relations with NATO and the West
deteriorate further.
The significant point is not
the announcement, but whether and how it is implemented. A notional joint air
defence system between Russia and Belarus is a very old idea, and plans for the
current incarnation date back to 2009. It's not unique: previous announcements
like this have been made with respect to Kazakhstan, for instance. So while it
is tempting to see this development as a Russian response to a recent US senior
defence visit to Belarus, in fact it had been scheduled for a long time
beforehand.
But in the context of current
relations between the two countries, every new move takes on additional
significance. Russia will be watching with concern Belarus's improving
relations with the West for any sign that this means loosening ties with
Russia.
President Lukashenko has built
on his consistent position that Belarus is a neutral power, by setting up Minsk
as the site for negotiations on the Ukraine crisis, and by demonstrating
political distance from Moscow on controversial issues—most notably Russia's
conflicts with Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. Small initial steps in the
direction of political liberalisation at home have combined with this
ostensible neutrality in foreign policy to make Belarus a more acceptable
prospect for the EU and the United States.
Some Belarusian commentators
are fearful that this process could lead to a Russian intervention along the
lines of Ukraine, to ensure Belarusian obedience and if necessary to remove
President Lukashenko and replace him with another figure more acceptable to
Moscow. But Russia will have little interest in destabilising Belarus, with
consequent expensive unrest on the Russian border, if more subtle ways of
reining in Lukashenko's independence can be found. In fact, the current
president may be the least worst option for Russia. After decades of persecution
by the Belarusian authorities, the political opposition there is small and
marginalised—but it is entirely pro-Western, and there is no recognised figure
within the country who would make a credible pro-Russian replacement for
Lukashenko.
The position of Belarus's
Armed Forces in all this is ambiguous. Military cooperation with Russia is
close, and joint exercises and other joint events are normal. Russia's major
Zapad manoeuvres, for instance, ordinarily include Belarusian troops, as well
as regular smaller exercises taking place in both countries. In May, Belarusian
paratroopers are scheduled to join their Russian counterparts jumping at the
North Pole. But the perception of the two armed forces as closely integrated is
misleading, despite the fact that a so-called "Union State" of Russia
and Belarus has been in existence for 20 years.
Belarus resists Russian
attempts to take over provision of its security. When Belarus needed to
purchase modern fighter aircraft to upgrade its ageing air force, Moscow announced
instead that Belarus would be hosting a Russian airbase. President Lukashenko
faced down pressure from Russia, and successfully insisted on the aircraft
purchase.
In fact there is a consistent
pattern of Russia announcing "joint" initiatives which are not
endorsed by Minsk. Just as in the case of the airbase, last week's announcement
of a joint air defence system was made in Russia, and Belarus has not publicly
commented. At the weekend, Belarusian TV even showed an extended feature on the
country's Air Defence Troops without once mentioning the supposed agreement
with Russia. True, the general in charge of the Belarusian air force has been
nominated as the commander for the "joint system"; but this may be
little more than a face-saver for Minsk.
Russia has even announced that
a "joint military organization of the Union State" will be created
starting this year, including notional unification of the two countries' armed
forces. But once again, this statement was made by Russian Defence Minister
Sergei Shoygu, with no comment from Belarus.
Where Russian air defence systems are located, and how much their
operations are integrated with Belarusian systems, is of course important. If
Belarus should decide, or be persuaded, to host advanced Russian air defence
systems, this greatly extends their range into NATO airspace. But even before
that, if Russia exercises what it sees as its right to defend Belarusian
airspace, that pushes Russia's air defence zone forward by hundreds of
kilometres. It would then directly border NATO members Lithuania and Poland,
previously separated from Russia by notionally neutral Belarus, and deepen the
isolation of the Baltic states from the NATO "mainland".
So the points to watch over
the coming months are whether Belarus allows this announcement to turn into
real integration with Russian air defence, or whether—like many other Russian
claims before it, and the "Union State" itself—it remains largely a
formality with little impact in real life.
Keir Giles is an associate
fellow at Chatham House in London, and a senior researcher at the Conflict
Studies Research Centre.
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