BY
In yesterday’s
entry outlining the gargantuan tasks facing Prime Minister Groisman and his new
Cabinet of Ministers, it was stated – “If all of this seems a
gargantuan task, it is made all the more difficult with a coalition majority
vote of 227 at the time of writing, when it requires 226 votes to pass even the
most basic of statute. To be sure of passing necessary but unpopular
legislation, that vote count provides for only a single coalition
parliamentarian to be absent if all others without the coalition are against.”
That 227 was, to
be entirely honest, was an unofficial parliamentarian count by this blog – yet
having counted several times, that remains the figure it arrives at. It
may be that the figure is higher, but 227 is a solid number and certainly the
official parliamentarian vote count for the new (wafer thin) majority coalition
is not less.
One of the
significant dangers raised within the aforementioned entry was that of populism
– “It will also have to deal with rampant, feckless and unhinged
populism now that The Radicals and Batkivshchyna (and Samopomich to a lesser
degree) will undoubtedly noisily promulgate henceforth.
Indeed Ms Tymoshenko, who has tacitly and subliminally been electioneering
for some weeks, is very likely to push to the fore a “National Salvation Front”
comprised of professionals and civil society members that meet and support her
populist agenda – rather than have them create an alternative, sensible agenda
for Ms Tymoshenko to promote.
To be entirely blunt what the nation actually needs salvation from, is the
type of populist flapdoodle that Ms Tymoshenko peddles. Ne’er has it done
Ukraine any favours historically, and ne’er will it in the future.
Another danger, both to the current/new coalition and also to the designs
of Ms Tymoshenko, will be Governor Saakashvili should he quit or be sacked from
his post in Odessa in the immediate future. Civil society, political
activists and a large part of the national constituency are likely to gather
under his banner when it is eventually raised officially upon the Ukrainian
political landscape.”
With such a
wafer thin majority coalition, it is perhaps worth pondering what would have
occurred should that 227 actually have turned out to be 225 or less – forcing
early Verkhovna Rada elections.
At the time of
writing those elections still seem almost inevitable, albeit now 6 months away
due to statutory limitations with regards to votes of No Confidence in a new
Cabinet, and the unlikely unraveling of the 227 coalition majority during that
same period.
Nevertheless,
without a radical uptick in reforms both qualitatively, speed of adoption, and
thorough implementation, few would give the new Cabinet more than 12 months at
a maximum. Spring 2017 may now look more favourable than Autumn 2016 for
new Verkhovna Rada elections, but without serious policy progress and tangible
results within the constituency, one or the other appears unavoidable.
An opinion poll
published in Ukrainsky Pravda on 15th April unsurprisingly predicts a dismal
outcome for the current coalition. The People’s Front would be
emphatically put to the political sword and President Poroshenko’s Solidarity
gathers a meager 11%, equal with Samopomich and the Opposition Block, and
behind Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna on 13%. (The Radicals with 8% and
Svoboda with 5% the only other parties to clear the 5% threshold).
So what would
have happened if the 227 coalition parliamentarians had not been found and
elections had taken place instead?
Ms Tymoshenko
would clearly have expected to become Prime Minister, yet to do so would
require a majority coalition under her leadership. It is debatable which
parties would join a coalition that would place Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime
Minister. It is one thing to be in a majority coalition with her when she
is a minor partner (in terms of parliamentary votes she controls) but quite
another to be in a coalition that she believes she leads.
With Ms
Tymoshenko, you either work for her or against her. She doesn’t do “with
her”. Thus to work in a coalition led by her, it is necessary for all
coalition partners to willing swallow her populist flapdoodle that she tries to
pass off as sensible policy – and sensible policy it has ne’er been, is not
now, and ne’er will be, for populist politics serve not the nation but only the
populist in charge.
With Mr Lyashko
now trying to form a “United Opposition”, a reader may ponder whether it would
firstly include the still toxic Opposition Block – toxic as far as many voters
for Batkivshchyna and Samopomich are concerned, making such an alliance
unsavory – and whether Ms Tymoshenko could function within a United
Opposition any better that she did in a majority coalition. Probably not
unless she leads it to the angst of Mr Lyashko. It is far more likely now
she be in electioneering mode, that she will forge an entirely independent path
politically and via her “National Salvation Front” in the civil society space.
Indeed, Ms
Tymoshenko has for some months been trying to form a coalition/alliance with
both Governor Saakashvili and also Samopomich behind the curtain during her
less than subtle current yet unofficial electioneering. Both, quite
wisely, have refused her flattery and courtship. Neither Andriy Sadovy,
nor Misha Saakashvili are naive enough to have any faith in a lasting
relationship with a personality such as Yulia Tymoshenko – and even a temporary
alliance has perhaps more risk than reward if being directly associated with
her nonsense.
So from the
opinion poll soup above, where would a functional, stable coalition be found if
nothing appears stable when it includes Ms Tymoshenko, as contemporary
Ukrainian political history including deals made with critical external
institutions like the IMF, then subsequently broken by Ms Tymoshenko, be a
guide? (Indeed a Tymoshenko leadership would swiftly end IMF lending if
she pursued her currently promulgated economic codswallop that is meant to pass
as policy.)
What then if
Governor Saakashvili eventually pulls the inevitable trigger on a political
party? Does it add more possibilities for a coalition of substance,
longevity and functionality?
A Saakashvili
party would gather 10% according to the poll. Batkivshchyna again gets
13% (which perhaps demonstrates a loyal (if gullible) constituency base),
Opposition Block also gets the same vote percentage of 11% (via another loyal
voter base) regardless of a Saakashvili party or not. Samopomich garners
the same 10% of constituents as that of Governor Saakashvili, the President’s
Solidarity getting 9%, with The Radicals 7% coming in last. (The 4% of
Svoboda falls under the 5% threshold but obviously well within any margin of
error to pass it.)
As has already
been stated, not only is Mr Saakashvili wisely refusing the political advances
of Ms Tymoshenko, but for those that know either/both personally, there is
simply no way they could work together for any period of time.
With the
President’s party coming in a weak 4th, and President Poroshenko undoubtedly
keen to avoid a Prime Minister Tymoshenko scenario (as any President would), he
would be reliant upon Mr Saakashvili’s party, or Samompomich, or both,
recognising the perils of a Batkivshchyna coalition that believes itself (or
better put herself) the rightful (authoritarian) coalition leader (regardless
of any “team” rhetoric to the contrary).
As written in
this blog on innumerable occasions, the likelihood of a Saakashvili-Samopomich
coalition is quite high compared to any other. Of the existing mainstream
political parties, Samopomich is the closest to the Saakashvili thinking – and
vice versa. Such an alignment also suits both Andriy Sadovy and Misha
Saakashvili when looking to the political horizon. Andriy Sadovy has made
clear since 2014, his eye is only upon the presidency. Mr Saakashvili
will not have been a Ukrainian citizen long enough to run for the presidency at
the next elections and is thus no competition for Mr Sadovy.
Ms Tymoshenko
will undoubtedly run for the presidency, thus a Sampomich-Batkivshchyna
coalition (with or without others) would suffer the fallout of its leaders
campaigning against each other – for an ethical, policy based campaign would be
very unlikely.
Mr Saakashvili
would be a significant cheerleader for any candidate however, and Mr Sadovy is
currently quite likely to get his support (at the time of writing) unless
President Poroshenko begins to actively back him in his current role in Odessa
(though come Verkhovna Rada elections it seems almost certain Governor
Saakashvili will quit and form a party regardless).
Many of the team
surrounding the Governor currently in elected political positions would have
chosen to run upon the Samopomich ticket had it not been necessary to firstly
show so loyalty toward President Poroshenko after appointing Mr Saakashvili
Governor, and secondly accounting for the political realities of Odessa that
would have had less predictable electoral outcomes in choosing Samopomich over
Solidarity during the electioneering of October 2015.
Now however,
when it is clear that Governor Saakashvili is no longer prepared to pretend he
has been getting the support from Kyiv that in reality has been very noticeable
by its absence but he had thus far chosen to ignore, if elections were held
now, clearly none would sit on the Solidarity/Poroshenko ticket.
As already
stated, both Sampomoch and the Odessa Governor are refusing the advances of Ms
Tymoshenko, as all but her loyal supporters see the Empress has no political
clothes.
Is it likely
that a coalition of 2nd, 3rd and 4th placed parties, or namely a Samopomich,
Saakashvili and Solidarity (as the junior partner) would work?
Neither
Sampopomich nor Saakashvili would entertain the Opposition Block for a second,
and if Batkivshchyna is also out due to the obvious leadership issues/clashes
that would doom a coalition from day one, then a coalition based upon the polls
above would seem to require The Radicals and/or Svoboda, and/or a reasonable number
of independents to be sure of crossing the 226 majority finishing line.
As of yesterday,
the current Cabinet has a 227 majority by this blog’s count. How much
stronger would any coalition actually be, and (disregarding specific policy)
would it be any more functional?
Perhaps an
alternative coalition would be far more aggressive and swift in fighting
corruption, the issue that tops domestic demands – then again perhaps not when
considering some of those required to form any majority.
Indeed perhaps only
Mr Saakashvili can take any comfort from such polls, for it clearly identifies
a space for his party in the mix as and when it emerges, albeit with support
insufficient to force through results without a coalition of mixed repute and
dubious political will in some cases.
The question
therefore, with a minimum of 6 months before the next internal Verkhovna Rada
cramps can remove the new Cabinet, is how far and how visible can it be in
“reforming” both on and off the statute book before the Ukrainian constituency
– thus presenting the possibility of delaying almost inevitable early Verkhovna
Rada elections.
The political
soup on display above in either poll (with or without Mr Saakashvili) seems to
provide a “muddle through somehow” outcome at best – not so very different from
the current arrangement which will also try to “muddle through somehow”.
The policy outcomes in any scenario are far from certain too.
All of that
said, it does not mean early Verkhovna Rada elections are necessarily a bad
outcome as and when they inevitably come – depending heavily upon the electoral
laws in place when they occur (the adoption of open party lists etc., would be
a “must” to change party composition) – but it is equally important to realise
that any coalitions that will certainly have to be formed thereafter, are just
as likely to be dysfunctional and fractious. Further as one swallow does
not make a summer, one opinion poll does not necessarily equate to much either.
Perhaps the day
will come when the political parties in Ukraine are bigger than their leaders,
rather than the leaders being bigger than the parties, and as such (some form
of) ideology takes precedence over personality politics. Maybe coalitions
would become slightly more easy to manage.
Meanwhile – enjoy
the soup!
No comments:
Post a Comment