Roman Tsymbaliuk
Putin's live communication
with his people is always a major event for the Russian Federation.
Preparations to Q&A resemble those to a space mission or seasonal
harvesting. Talking heads on TV show countdown to the start of the show,
provide information on the number of received questions as the Soviet media
used to present statistics on, say, produced dairy. Russian propaganda is
getting to a whole new level: here you have dozens of live broadcasts from all
across Russia, as well as from the Russian-occupied territories, dollies set at
the barns farms for better quality shooting. Everything is top notch.
The Ukrainian topic, of
course, remains on the Russian agenda. Two years ago, Putin dreamed of some
mythical Novorossiya, invented by his spin doctors, half of Ukraine’s size –
that is how much land the Russian army was planning to seize after rebranding
their "little green men" in Crimea (they have become "miners and
tractor drives" in Donbas). A year later, in 2015, he started linked the
future of "Novorossiya" with "flexibility and political wisdom
of the Kyiv leadership." This year, the Russian president has chosen not
to mention the three-letter abbreviations [so-called “DPR” and “LPR”] of
Russian-made terrorist organizations in Donbas.
Putin's statements on consent
to deployment on the contact line between the Russian and Ukrainian military
positions of armed OSCE personnel is evident of the Kremlin's will to freeze
the conflict completely. That is if proposing a tacit formula that "what
we, Russia, have seized, it’s ours now, and now let's start with a clean
slate."
After all, had Russia really
wanted to find a solution to the conflict, armed OSCE personnel should have
been placed someplace else – in the uncontrolled area of the Ukrainian-Russian
border. That would be the only way to counter the flow of Russian tanks, guns,
ammunition and troops “on vacation.” And if there are no such type of troops
involved in the conflict, as the Kremlin has repeatedly stated, then it would
be the best way to get rid of all charges in the invasion of Donbas.
Russian foreign policy reflects,
first of all, in the Kremlin’s rhetoric: definitions and words said to
opponents. For the first time in many years, confrontational vocabulary in
relation to Ukraine has not been used. Moreover, Ukraine is clearly going down
in the list of Russia’s public enemies, while Turkey remains in the top part.
Actually, the Russian
president, for the first time after disgraced Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine,
declared his readiness – veiled though – to cooperate with the new Ukrainian
Government. However, Putin went on to say that the new Cabinet should get rid
of "phobias," and "international instructions," and work a
lot in general so that Russia could have a "reliable partner."
But most importantly, Putin
has once again started to compare the situation in the Ukrainian economy with
that in Russia – first time in many years. The Russians were told that
complaining is not worth it, as things are not as bad as in Ukraine where the
inflation hit 48% (with only 12% in Russia). The Russian president has not resorted
to such moves for quite a while. This is not surprising, because in the past
two years, the Russian propaganda on a daily basis prophesied collapse,
default, hunger, destruction and other ills of Ukraine. None of this happened.
Indeed, standards of living in Ukraine have fallen significantly, as a result
of the capture of part of the country’s territory by Russia, the war, the loss
of the Russian market, and – in all fairness – own stupidity. But Ukraine has
survived and proved viable without Russia. Apparently, therefore, the rhetoric
has changed. From “Banderite junta" and "cradle of fascism in the
middle of Europe," Ukraine has become a regular "neighbor" once
again? It seems that Russia can even consider cooperating…
But one small problem remains.
After the occupation of 7% of Ukraine’s territory – Crimea and part of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, after thousands of killed soldiers and civilians, Kyiv
cannot and does not wish to just start the dialogue over as if nothing ever
happened.
With its policy in Donbas, the
Kremlin puts Ukraine in a situation where compromise is impossible. Any
agreement with Moscow will look like a concession, and there’s nowhere Ukraine
can retreat. A field for political maneuvers is limited with the actual
trenches of the Ukrainian soldiers. And this policy of the Kremlin has made
Ukraine stronger.
Oddly enough, Ukraine has
witnessed something like this before. Several years ago, the Kremlin tried to
strangle Ukraine with gas prices and draw it to the Customs Union. Now the Russian
government is thinking about how not to lose the Ukrainian market for its gas.
A similar effect is in the
economy, politics and security. After all, when you're cornered, all means are
good to survive.
Roman Tsymbaliuk, Moscow
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