By Andreas Umland
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv, Ukraine
The main reason for the recent escalation of tensions
in Eastern Europe is the absence of an effective security structure
encompassing such militarily weak countries as Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.
While Ukrainian public opinion has recently made a U-turn from a rejection towards
an embrace of NATO, the Alliance will not be ready to extend its commitments farther east anytime
soon.
Although future enlargement of the Alliance is possible, Ukraine’s
confrontation with Russia as well as Moscow’s anti-Western stance would have to
decrease significantly for that to happen. Recently, the opposite tendency was
on display: The more aggression the Kremlin has shown, the less likely it is
that the North Atlantic Council will open its doors to new members in conflict
with Moscow.
Against this background, the best bet for Ukraine (and
Georgia and Moldova) might be to work toward the revival of an old Polish plan
called “Intermarium” – an alliance of the countries located between the Baltic
and Black Seas.
After World War I, Poland and other newly independent states
found themselves in a fragile situation between the Russian/Soviet empire and
Germany. This led to the idea of a coalition of the lands of what is in Germany
called Zwischeneuropa (in-between Europe).
Never implemented
in the twentieth century, an Intermarium today could help embed countries like
Ukraine in an international security structure. Such an idea is not only
popular in Ukraine but also in Poland, where President Andrzej Duda recently
brought it up.
To be sure, the original concept of Intermarium is no
longer applicable or even necessary today. It once described a federation of
East-Central and Southeastern European states covering a variety of fields,
including trade, infrastructure, economy, and science.
The EU’s enlargement,
its stabilization agreements in the western Balkans, and its association
agreements for its eastern partners address most of these issues. While not
containing an accession promise, the latter treaties imply a gradual process of
ever-deepening inclusion of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European
Union’s economic, political, normative, and legal spheres. These association
agreements, as well as the Eastern Partnership and other special programs,
already link or will soon link Chisinau, Kyiv, and Tbilisi in a variety of ways
to the member countries of the EU.
Yet these EU programs and other international
institutions do not address Georgia’s, Moldova’s, or Ukraine’s basic security
challenges. Therefore, they should be connected with an Intermarium designed as
a regional organization for mutual defense against Moscow.
Such cooperation is
already taking place on a bilateral and sometimes multilateral basis between,
for instance, Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania. In general, there is much common
ground between the post-Soviet republics of the South Caucasus, Eastern Europe,
and Baltic states leading already to significant cooperation today.
Potential
member countries of an Intermarium may include Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. In Slovakia, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary, a future domestic political change could create
support for their participation in an Intermarium.
Moreover, such a pact would
benefit from considerable sympathy throughout Scandinavia and the western
Balkans.
Moscow’s attack on Ukraine has only intensified
existing feelings of mutual solidarity between these nations—whether they are
in or outside NATO.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 also brought
Turkey into the game, as the Crimean Tatars are closely related to the Turks
and strongly resisted their inclusion into Russia. The fate of Crimea’s
indigenous Turkic population touches on a sour point in the history of
Russian-Turkish relations.
Over the last twenty-five years, the Crimean Tatars
have turned into ardent supporters of Ukraine as a sovereign state and
hospitable home to ethnic minorities. Since late 2015, the Kremlin’s
intervention in Syria, economic sanctions, and bellicose rhetoric against
Turkey have seriously damaged relations between Moscow and Ankara. Turkey is
already tied to Azerbaijan, one of the potential member countries of the
Intermarium, through their Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual
Support, and has recently upgraded its cooperation with Ukraine. Thus, Ankara
also might be persuaded to join.
Brussels, Washington, and Berlin should view the
Intermarium not as a competitor or nuisance, but as a chance to achieve a
provisional but encompassing security structure for Eastern Europe and the
Black Sea region.
During the coming years, NATO and the EU will not be able or
willing to provide plausible security assurances to the nations of Zwischeneuropa and
the South Caucasus. Against this background, a mutual aid pact between them and
their NATO friends is Ukraine’s second best option to achieve some
international embeddedness. By promoting the creation of an Intermarium, the
West would outsource some thorny questions in its dual role as ardent foreign
democracy promoter and hesitant European security provider.
About the Author:
Andreas Umland is Senior Research Fellow at the
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv and general editor of
Germany-based book series Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society distributed outside Europe by Columbia University
Press.
No comments:
Post a Comment