Keir Giles,
Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
With all its flaws, the current ceasefire is good news for some Syrians
in the short term – but bad news for the West in the long term.
The agreement on a limited
cessation of hostilities in Syria has achieved some of its immediate aims of
reducing bloodshed and creating conditions for the delivery of urgent
humanitarian aid. But by meeting a wide range of Russian objectives, not
limited to Syria itself, it also stores up trouble for the West.
In particular,
the agreement has confirmed for Russia that assertive military intervention is
the most effective means of achieving swift and positive (for Moscow) foreign
policy results.
Russia has every reason to be
satisfied with the current agreement. It achieves a Russian goal that has been
consistent since the beginning of the conflict in Syria: stopping military
operations by opposition forces against the Assad government. Those opposition
groups that signed up to the ceasefire plan also undertook to join the next
round of peace talks in Geneva, in exchange for the promise – whether sincere
or not – of no further attacks from the government or from Russia. This is in
line with another key aim for Russia: a negotiated transition of power in
Syria, rather than the forcible removal of President Bashar al-Assad previously
insisted on by the United States.
But the single biggest
detriment of the ceasefire agreement is that it demonstrates once again that
direct military action overseas is Russia's best method of achieving strategic
objectives, with little if any adverse consequence. Syria represents the fourth
occasion, following Kosovo, Georgia and Ukraine, where decisive Russian
military intervention has substantially altered the situation in Moscow's
favour.
In the last three instances,
this has received international endorsement – the 2008 ceasefire was imposed on
Georgia by a French president, the Minsk protocols were overseen by both French
and German leaders, and now the Syrian agreement has been accepted by the
entire 20-member International Syria Support Group. The result can only be to
encourage Russia to further military adventurism, confident that the risks of
significant international reaction are low.
Implementation
The current rounds of claim
and counter-claim over the extent of the ceasefire, and indeed where and to whom
it applies, were inevitable. Russia had already announced that it would carry
on with military operations against ‘terrorists’. This is in line with the
intent of the ceasefire plan, but Russia continues to label as ‘terrorists’
anybody they wish to attack, including parts of the US-backed opposition. In
particular, the Russian habit of claiming opposition groups are in fact Jabhat
al-Nusra provides a spurious legitimation for claiming they are not covered by
the ceasefire.
Moscow has a consistent history
of exploiting loopholes in ceasefire agreements, or indeed ignoring them
altogether. Russia was accused for years of violating the terms of the 2008
Georgian ceasefire. In fact, although Russian actions certainly went against
the spirit of that agreement, they were fully in accordance with a strict
literal interpretation of its text – drafted in Moscow. In Ukraine, Russia and
its separatist forces found the timing of the Minsk agreement inconvenient, and
continued their offensive around Debaltseve after the ceasefire was agreed
until they were more satisfied with the tactical position. Violations of that
ceasefire have continued ever since.
The longer view
In addition, while Europe and
the United States are focused on the short-term aim of ending the fighting in
Syria – or at least limiting it to operations against Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) – Russian objectives have a much longer horizon. Syria continues
to serve as a useful distraction from Russian actions in Ukraine, with the
likely end result of sanctions being lifted – especially if Russia appears to
be working alongside Western plans to tackle ISIS, and continues to succeed in
its information campaign convincing the West that Ukraine is to blame for the
failure to implement the Minsk protocols.
The agreement also furthers
the Russian aim of being a key power broker in the Middle East, and the
long-cherished objective of recognition of Russian influence. Partnering with
the United States to monitor the ceasefire chimes with Russia's yearning for
its former role as the other superpower in a bipolar world. In this way, the
plan can be seen in Moscow as a step towards reversing the ‘historical anomaly’
of reduced Russian global influence following the end of the Cold War.
In the meantime, Russia's
armed forces continue to benefit from the unparalleled training opportunity
offered by operations in Syria. President Vladimir Putin has described the
conflict as ‘an exercise’ for Russia, and his generals claim that it is less
expensive to ship men and equipment to Syria for short tours of duty involving
live firing and operational conditions than it is to conduct large-scale
exercises in Russia.
In Moscow and elsewhere, the
ceasefire agreement significantly diminishes the perceived power of the West,
and in particular of the United States. The change in US policy from insisting
on the removal of Assad toward possibly accepting him as part of a negotiated
political transition represents a retreat in the face of Russian military
assertiveness. The United States can be portrayed as having abandoned its
allies: Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the opposition groups
which the US was supporting would make themselves targets for continuing
airstrikes and ground operations if they did not cooperate with Russia's plans
and sign up to the ceasefire and the political negotiations.
Following the September 2013
chemical weapons agreement, this represents the second high-profile occasion
that Secretary Kerry has been used as a tool to endorse and validate a plan for
Syria that was drawn up in Moscow.
All of these processes, and in
particular the confirmation that Western policy can be changed through military
action, will embolden Russia to be firmer in pursuit of its objectives in
future. This makes it even harder for the West to protect itself against
Russian assertiveness – especially in the absence of demonstrated political
will to do so, and of significant military force in European states bordering
Russia to act as a present and credible deterrent.
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