Populism is
traditionally understood as the rhetoric appealing to the dissatisfaction with
life, fears and hopes of large social groups, the counterpositioning of their
interests to those of the elites or the social, ethnic and other minorities
that are less attractive from the electoral point of view. The core of populism
is the desire to gain as much support as possible by any means, usually to
convert it to power during elections, or to keep it when already at the helm.
The true
motives and intentions of populists are usually very different from their
rhetoric. As a result, when they get into the high offices, their promises are
fulfilled minimally or for show.
Inherited vs acquired
The breeding
ground for the blooming social populism in post-Soviet Ukraine was provided, on
the one hand, by the Soviet legacy in the form of its anti-individualist,
anti-middle-class, paternalistic philosophy and the communist propaganda deeply
rooted in the minds of most of the society, combined with more radical brain
washing methods and the physical selection of the population. It was supported
by the lumpenization and the miserable living conditions of the bulk of the
population, the delayed piecemeal reforms, and the slow social restructuring.
The Ukrainian
society remains profoundly paternalistic. A survey of the Institute of
Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences "Ukrainian Society: Social
Change Monitoring" for 2014 shows that two years ago, only 9% of the
citizens older than 55 (i.e., born in 1959 or earlier) believed that people
should improve their living conditions on their own, rather than relying on the
government. However, among the young people under 30 (who were born after 1984
and grew up in independent Ukraine) this figure was only 24%, and 17.3% among
the middle-aged people. Instead, 76.8% of the unemployed, 73.4% of those
employed in the public sector and even 71.7% of those working in the private
sector believe that the state must protect the population from the economic
hardships.
Only a small
share of the respondents agree that the significant social stratification was
inevitable in a free market society (as a result of differences in incomes),
while the overwhelming majority believe only an insignificant differentiation
to be justified. A clear majority of Ukrainians do not understand the
difference between the social equality and the equality of opportunity, since
73.8% of the respondents said the absence of social stratification was
important, while 72.6% want equal conditions for all. However, the one excludes
the other, because under equal conditions, the more successful citizens are
bound to be much richer than the less successful ones.
Most
paternalistically minded are the residents of small towns and medium-sized
cities, where the share of the public sector and the government sector in
general is the highest (only 12.7% of them believe that people should improve
their living conditions independently).
The least
paternalistic are village dwellers (18.1%) and Kyiv residents (18.9%). But even
in the latter two cases, it is an extremely small share of those relying
primarily on themselves.
The social
structure of the Ukrainian society is also extremely conducive of social
populism. The welfare of the lion's share of voters depends on the centralized
redistribution of the national output through the budget, pension fund and
other social funds. For example, Ukraine has 11.4 million pensioners and
another 3.6 million people receiving salaries from the budgets of different
levels. These categories of the population are the most vulnerable to social
populism, together accounting for about 15 million people. Most of them are
eligible to vote and are the most active voters.
The number of
the unemployed, according to the methodology used by the International Labour
Organization (ILO), is 1.85 million; another 0.25 million are those who,
despite their working age, are not counted among the unemployed, but they
"gave up hope" and are not looking for a job because of the
"unavailability of the right one"; 2.4 million farmers formally
involved in subsidiary farming can be considered to be rather conventionally
employed, as well as 3.3 million employed in other sectors. Most of these 7.8
million citizens are also extremely susceptible to populism through their
living conditions and volatile earnings.
At the same
time, only 8.8 million Ukrainians are today officially employed in the private
sector (including sole proprietors and microbusinesses), including 7.1 million
hired employees and 1.7 million owners. However, a number of small business
representatives also tend to social populism, needless to mention its
popularity with the employees working in most sectors of the economy.
In 2014, only
20.1% of the population had the official average per capita income exceeding
UAH 2,640. The State Statistics Service has not yet published the 2015 data,
but given only a slight increase in nominal income last year, it is safe to say
that as of the end of 2015, the same 20% had average income per person
exceeding the official subsistence level, which the Ministry of Social Policy
set in December 2015 at UAH 2,878-2,951 for the able-bodied and children aged
over six, and at UAH 2,060 for the retirees. At the same time, the average
pension is UAH 1,700, while the minimum one is the meager UAH 1,074.
First of all,
the generational change is still underway, and secondly, it only has a limited
effect through the unreformed system. Everything is clear with those who
retired during the Soviet era or in the early post-Soviet years (born before
1940). Their active life entirely coincided with the heyday and the collapse of
the USSR, before the new social relationships were formed. The same goes for citizens
born before 1970, whose minds were formed in the Soviet Union or during the
Perestroika era in a broad sense (i.e., in 1985-1995).
It has to be
admitted that only a small share of them saw the transition to market economy
as the logic behind the changing social and economic relations. For most, even
those who more or less actively supported the changes, it was primarily about
the Western standards, and not the principles of life. They would go perfectly
well for the social and economic model of the Soviet Union, if it could ensure
the income levels and other outward attributes that lured the average Soviets
and especially the young people during the Perestroika years.
Market
economy, with its inevitable social stratification and the need to constantly compete
for a place under the sun, was not on the list of what was expected from a
market democracy. Even among those who were quite successful in 1990-2000s,
many still have at the back of their minds the notions of the socio-economic
relations and "social justice" acquired during the late years of the
Soviet regime. Little can be added about the citizens who lost the fight or
simply lived by inertia to their retirement in the same social niche that they
occupied in the Soviet or the first post-Soviet years.
The survey of
the Institute of Sociology shows that 35.2% were satisfied with their life in
Ukraine in 2014, and 37.6% were dissatisfied, including just 3.8% of those
entirely satisfied and 10.1% of those completely dissatisfied. Among those
"actively building their future," 58.8% vs 22.5% were satisfied with
their lives, while among those "looking for their place in the world"
and those "not wishing to adapt," the dissatisfied (40.9% vs 44.6%,
respectively) largely outnumbered those satisfied (32.9% vs 27.5%).
However, the
younger generation, especially those who grew up during the relatively
"fat" 2000s and aspire to the European standards of life "here
and now" (taken as a given, and not as the results of decades of efforts),
is also prone to populism. Similarly, by the way, to many of their peers in
today's EU countries, young Ukrainians aspire to high living standards and are
ready to demand them (or, as a maximum, to fight for them during mass rallies),
but not to achieve them through routine gradual efforts.
The social
class resistant to populism is not only small in numbers, but also grows slowly
In this situation,
politicians, community leaders and opinion makers, instead of encouraging
immunity to populism, often use it as a vehicle for their own purposes. They
try to convince people that the problem is not populism as such, but only the
non-compliance of certain political forces and leaders with their slogans and
promises, which in fact they could not and did not plan to do.
Populism as the keynote of the political process
The political
structuring of the society, that is, the segregation between the supporters of
the center-right and the center-left that is characteristic of a capitalist
society, has still not taken place in Ukraine. In the world, the above
political forces promise and at least try to implement the policies supported
by their voters and criticized by their opponents. When the government is
rotated, the representatives of the opposition camp are given a chance to
demonstrate the advantages of their program.
In Ukraine,
this until recently was prevented by the electoral split along the geopolitical
and civilizational divide, resulting in the constant need to mobilize
supporters. Therefore, while declaring their adherence to the centre-right
policy, most national political parties actively use the social populist
rhetoric, giving conflicting promises that could never be fulfilled.
Rather than
focusing on the interests of specific social groups, they promise everything to
everyone: to increase spending and reduce taxes; to ensure fiscal preferences
to the core sectors of the economy, while encouraging the development of the
new sectors; to ensure tax benefits and reduce social expenditures for the
categories of employees constituting the majority of the country's workforce,
at the same time preserving free healthcare and education and improving social
protection of the vulnerable groups.
The result is
the failure to live up to the promises (and the luck of intensions to do so).
According to sociological surveys, those dissatisfied with the party system
existing in the country often say that the political forces do not adhere to
their programs and goals stated before the elections, defending the interests
not of the voters, but of their leaders and sponsors from the financial and
economic clans.
Their attempts
to fulfill at least a part of their conflicting and contradictory promises
undermined the economy and drove the country into a debt trap, destroying the
incentives to produce, save, work and upgrade, focusing the attention and the
energy of the most active part of the society on new inadequate requirements,
and resulting in demands for more populism.
For decades,
Ukrainian politics were characterized by the constant change of the
"facade" (leaders, political parties, and governments) combined with
the intact corrupt oligarchic system of government and business. In the
political area, these sentiments are reflected in the drastic fluctuations in
the levels of support for certain politicians and their
political parties. The massive credit of confidence results in inflated
ratings, followed by deep disappointment and even hatred. The only chance to
avoid this for populist politicians is not to come to power to be able to
continue parasitizing on irresponsible rhetoric. After all, even getting to the
helm would not help them live up to their expressed or implied conflicting
promises.
However, the
new generation of politicians successfully exploits the propensity for social
populism of the considerable part of the population that is not really
interested in the true intentions of the politicians or their willingness to
fulfill their promises. "Punishing" just another political project to
replace it with an identical "new" one only results in the loss of
time for the country and the voters. The authors and sponsors of these
short-lived projects are aware from the very start of the need to prepare a
backup, while recovering their investments during the short time that they
might keep at the helm.
The rule of
populism in politics is accompanied by the increasingly manifest economic gap
between Ukraine and not only the developed countries, but also the growing
number of countries in Asia and Africa. If this trend continues, it will entail
the further decrease of the remaining national wealth that could be
redistributed to the poisonous sweet promises of solving all the problems at
the account of the "bad guys." All this is happening at the time when
the country badly needs the bitter truth and a constructive ideology.
The deep logic
behind social populism is based on the point-blank rejection of the possibility
that others who are "no better" than I can live "much better
while I can't have enough of what I want/need." Since the poor always
outnumber the rich, it is destructive in nature and purpose. The redistribution
of the national income, according to this logic, should follow not natural
(earning based on consent of the parties), but unnatural patterns
(redistribution through coercion).
The
exaggerated version of this logic is embodied in the pushing over the edge
experiments of the Bolshevist regimes, but it is present in its soft form in
any populist society, where masses believe that their situation could be
improved not by looking for more efficient ways, but by receiving
"manna" from the "right" politician, president, government,
or state.
However, since
redistribution requires no constructive efforts, but rather ensures a
discouraging lack of confidence in using the fruits of one's labors, it hinders
the country's development. A person may be motivated to earn and save for
himself and the loved ones, but not for "the man." In this case, it
is better to earn, save and invest as little as possible in order not to excite
envy. At least, officially. Hence the opposition to legalizing incomes and the
trend to conceal property and siphon assets abroad at the first opportunity.
The populists
themselves increasingly often fall prey to their own populism, because someone
with a monthly income of US $1,000 (UAH 20,000-30,000), believing himself to be
part of the middle class and wanting the "blood" of oligarchs and
multimillionaires, will be surprised to learn that a compatriot with an income
of UAH 8,000-12,000 might, in turn, want his blood, while being considered too
wealthy by someone earning UAH 2,000-4,000.
The solution
The problem is
rooted in the society which keeps generating demand for irresponsible populism
and forgetting that there is no such thing as a free lunch.
Therefore, the
only way for people to overcome populism is to learn from their own mistakes.
However, the price might be too high, and the consequences irreversible and
fatal, if the country's opinion leaders fail to take responsibility. Instead of
continuing to play populist games, they should openly and actively explain to
the citizens the real cost of nice promises, and generate alternative pragmatic
policies based on the realistic perception of the complex reality and the ways
to improve it.
The long-term
improvement of the living standards should only be based on self-perfection,
knowledge, skills and qualifications gained, increased productivity, more
effective investment of efforts (e.g., through professional retraining), and
the ability to constructively defend own interests before the representatives
of other social groups, employers, or authorities.
As many people
as possible in Ukraine should understand the fact that miracles do not happen,
and that in order to increase spending it is necessary to raise taxes, and in
order to ease the fiscal burden, it is necessary to cut costs. However, when
budget spending on a sector is cut, citizens should be prepared to increase its
financing either directly or through alternative public mechanisms (insurance, etc.).
In a
democracy, the society dictates the decisions. But it should understand their
consequences and costs, and be ready to pay a price, both literally and
figuratively. Otherwise, high expectations from populists competing in empty
rhetoric will only deteriorate the situation in the country, degrade the living
standards, and lead to the degeneration of the increasing number of crucial
systems, from education and medicine to public administration, administrative
services, the law enforcement and the judiciary, housing, and environment.
In the
political arena, overcoming populism will hardly be possible without the real
self-organization of citizens into grassroots movements, financed through
membership fees and mass donations of their members or supporters, including
the representatives of small and medium businesses. Once they win elections,
first at the local, then at the regional and national levels, their members and
supporters will understand the difference between cheap populism and promises
to "solve all your problems for you" and the real programs capable to
really change the situation in the country.
This social
stratum of citizens who have no illusions or excessive expectations can be
strong enough to ensure a necessary margin of support for the pragmatic public
policies and the fundamental reform of the country. The people prepared by this
bottom-up system will be able to fill the talent pool necessary to change the
existing political and bureaucratic systems.
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