BY
As long opined in numerous entries, and at several international round
tables during 2015, this blog has stated that the 300 (+) constitutional
majority vote within the Verkhovna Rada to enable “decentralisation” of more
power to the regions – a much needed move toward the “Europeanisation” of
governance and away from the central Soviet/post Soviet governance hangover –
would fail to get the required votes easily.
There are several reasons for this, despite there being no real objections
to the concept of decentralisation throughout the Verkhovna Rada. The
most talked about issue with the proposed constitutional amendments allowing
for decentralisation, although far from being the only objection, is the single
sentence that provides for a “Special Law” with regard to the occupied Donbas.
As such the Constitution if amended per the proposed amendments would
provide no specific status in and of the Constitution itself, but would allow
for standard statutory laws to treat the occupied Donbas separately – at least
until such time as those laws were repealed (or expired should they be given a
statutory shelf life within the text of any such legislation).
Whilst the other issues that do not sit well with certain parties will cost
votes, it is the “Special Law” provision that costs too many votes and sees the
Constitutional 300 (+) majority fall short.
President Poroshenko publicly claims to have the 300 (+) votes – which
seems somewhat implausible. If they were there now, the proposed
amendments would be tabled for Verkhovna Rada vote this week in order to honour
the President’s previously orated commitments to have them passed by the end of
January – As stated a few weeks ago (once again), this seemed highly unlikely.
There is also the Constitutional issue of Article 158, which places specific parameters and time frames
upon constitutional amendment procedures. This has caused hasty
submissions to the courts to define interpretations of certain phrases that
would effect how those time lines are understood. In short, efforts are
afoot in stretching the time lines as far as possible within the elasticity of
the wording with a “helpful” judicial interpretation.
Suffice to say any such “helpful” judicial interpretation will only help so
far. It will at best buy a couple of months. It is perhaps the
presidential hope that the current circumstances within the occupied Donbas
will have improved enough to change a few “nays” into a few “yeahs”.
“Hope” however, is not a strategy.
A rough count would have the
constitutional amendments at best having the support of about 280 MPs, thus a
few “nays” turned “yeahs” will still be short of the minimum 300 required.
Indeed the “nays” are gathering momentum within the Verkhovna Rada rather
than the “yeahs” – despite almost all MPs accepting the nation both needs and
wants decentralisation.
Naturally to simply remove the single sentence in the constitutional
amendments that mention the Donbas would probably see the amendments garner
sufficient support in short order. The occupied Donbas, like the rest of
the Donbas and every other region, being constitutionally treated the same and
without any special mention.
Of course The Kremlin would immediately take umbridge, and its proxies
possibly immediately up the anti. The Kremlin would loudly lament Ukraine
failing in its Minsk II obligations (despite doing nothing itself) and demand
sanctions be lifted, or at least relaxed. Certain weak European capitals
may finally give way.
The question is therefore, are enough Ukrainian MPs prepared to see
sanctions on Russia lifted at the expense of keeping the “Special Law”
reference out of the constitutional amendments? The answer may well be
yes – and that, whether scaremongering or genuinely believed, is probably why
President Poroshenko made a stark statement that a far greater war with Russia
may occur without the amendments being adopted “as is”. The President’s
inferred argument being, not only will European sanctions probably be lifted,
but there is a greater chance of more Ukrainian blood, treasure and territory
being lost too.
Further, the delays in decentralisation for the rest of the nation will be
accepted for only so long by a constituency that for the past 18 months has
been conditioned to expect it.
Ultimately an already dysfunctional coalition could collapse, early
Verkhovna Rada elections be called, and witness The Kremlin attempt to force a
“parallel election” within the occupied Donbas at the same time as those for a
new Verkhovna Rada.
Lest we forget, at some point, The Kremlin may push
for MPs within the Verkhovna Rada from the occupied territories. As they
remain part of Ukraine, the argument will go, why do they have no MPs in the
national legislature? (As and when there is advantage for The Kremlin to
do so.)
There is now the submission of a draft Bill (3781) that seeks to change the
constitutional process, involving referendums and thus the inclusiveness of
society, rather than simply allowing the political class becoming deadlocked in
systemic crisis – like now.
This however will not be swift, and although
far more democratic and thus difficult for the Europeans to argue against even
if it slows decentralisation, it may have little bearing over the lifting of
sanctions when Ukraine fails to fulfill its onerous Minsk II obligations – nor
over any upping of the anti from those in the occupied Donbas unlikely to be on
the better end of any referendum throughout Ukraine.
There is then the matter of how any referendum is put to the people.
The options must be clear and unambiguous to insure a clear and
unambiguous answer. The ramifications of any answer must also be clearly
understood by the constituency answering it. There will need to be
sufficient turnout across enough regions to make a referendum outcome
legitimate and/or binding.
Whatever the case, there is now an impasse within the Verkhovna Rada with
regard to the constitutional amendments facilitating national and much needed
decentralisation – as well as the aforementioned occupied Donbas issue.
Whilst the desperate attempt to kick the constitutional time frame down
the road a little will probably prove successful, it will not provide a
solution to the problems now faced, nor provide much additional time to find
one. It is going to take much more than a genuine ceasefire and prisoner
swaps to turn sufficient “nays” into “yeahs” within the Verkhovna Rada for
President Poroshenko – and currently there is not even a ceasefire worthy of
the name.
Quite how this will be resolved – if it gets resolved – is unclear.
Despite any presidential proclamations that the required 300 Verkhovna
Rada votes are already there, it is perhaps far more accurate to state an awful
lot of political and diplomatic energy is going to have to be spent navigating
a path to see these proposed amendments actually amend the constitution before
constitutional procedural time frames prevent it.
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