The enemy of my enemy

Russia has recently increased its involvement in the Syrian civil war. An expanded flow of weapons and equipment, along with military advisors and perhaps even soldiers, to the embattled Damascus government signals an entirely new level of engagement for Moscow. These efforts are important signals from Russia about its determination to continue to be a player in the Middle East. They also, however, raise the risk of a clash between those forces and those of other countries that seek Syrian President Bashar Assad’s ouster. The consequences of such a confrontation could be extremely dangerous.

Russia has backed the Syrian government for over 40 years. When Egypt left the Soviet camp in the early 1970s, and cast its lot with the United States and the peace process with Israel, Damascus kept great significance in Russian (then Soviet) eyes as a means to retain influence in this vital region. Over those four decades, Syria became a client state of Moscow, as its benefactor provided equipment and personnel, the latter in both training and advisory capacities. In addition to intelligence-gathering facilities, Russia has also had a naval supply station in the port of Tartus, the only Mediterranean base for its Black Sea Fleet.

Throughout the Syrian civil war, Moscow has backed Assad against all challengers, providing both diplomatic support — Moscow has used its veto in the United Nations Security Council to insulate Damascus from international pressure — and the military means to defend himself. Recently, however, Moscow has begun to send new weapons to Syria — two military flights a day — a development that is acknowledged by both Syrian and Russian sources. Unofficial reports indicate that Russian troops have already joined the fight. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem has said that his government was prepared to ask Russian forces to fight with Syria troops, although he added that Russia had not yet taken that step.

Russian calculations are clear. Moscow wants to see its client remain in power and is betting that Western revulsion at the behavior of Islamic State, which has emerged as the chief antagonist for the Assad regime, will allow Russia to intervene in ways that tip the scale and help Assad remain in power. In other words, it is betting that the West will conclude that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Those calculations are abetted by the unfolding migrant crisis in Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin is anticipating that the flood of refugees will encourage European governments that might otherwise be suspicious of Russian military moves on their periphery will now welcome steps that pacify the situation and staunch the flow of people. He is hoping too that those efforts might encourage them to shift their thinking about Russia and see it again as a partner in international problem-solving, rather than a source of instability. That plan seems to be working, with some European officials already indicating that they are more inclined to deal with Russia and Assad.

In this endeavor, he is building on the successful conclusion of the Iranian nuclear deal, a process that involved Moscow, along with Berlin, Paris and London among others. Even if their aid cannot turn the tide in Syria, Russian strategists believe that their assistance will buttress them to claim an outsized role in international discussions to resolve the Syrian war.

Other governments fear Russian involvement for several reasons. First, there is a fear that it could tip the scales of the conflict and allow Assad a chance to stay in power. He is, after all, a man who gassed his own people to remain in office. Second, there is the very real possibility that it would prolong the conflict, increase the scale of the suffering, and risk yet even more refugees and greater destabilization of countries on Syria’s border. Finally, there is the danger that Russian forces could be drawn into conflict with other militaries, not only those supported by the West, but NATO forces themselves as they make strikes on targets located in Syria. Thus, not only is there the risk of a proxy war but the prospect of a conflict among principles.

There is speculation that this risk is seen by Moscow as a way to force Washington’s hand and bring the two governments into direct talks on how to deal with this crisis. From there, Moscow could press a larger agenda. Some Russian analysts believe that the Syrian gambit is an indication that Moscow has decided that the Ukrainian card is no longer an effective way to get the West’s attention.

Syria’s civil war has already killed 250,000 people and prompted some 4 million people to flee the country; it is reckoned that another 8 million have been internally displaced. That is an extraordinary human cost. This fight must stop and the bloodshed ended. If Russia can help end that, and contribute to the creation of a stable Syria, then the rest of the world must be more accommodating of Moscow’s interests and ready to work with it to resolve this crisis.

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