In 2017, Ukraine will be a major test of conscience that will force democratic countries to an uneasy choice among values
Nearly a century has passed since the Versailles Peace
talks, and the Western world still seems unprepared to accept that a European
nation of over 40 million has a right to its own identity and statehood. In
contrast to events 100 years ago, Ukrainians today are prepared to even
sacrifice their lives in the fight for the right to have their own state,
independent of others—and especially independent of Russia.
Ukraine, which
has dared to defend itself in a bloody confrontation with Russia in the heart
of Europe in the 21st century
will, in spite of it all, force Western states to rethink their own values,
their attitudes towards the Russian Federation, and the role of Ukraine itself
in the security arena, both in Europe and globally.
The Garden of good & evil
The undeclared
war that Russia has been waging against Ukraine since early 2014 has led to
tectonic shifts in the world’s legal and security order. It turns out that the
principles that were established globally after World War II are now in
jeopardy. Of course, these shifts were probably inevitable and early tremors
have been felt for some time.
In 1945, in
order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” postwar states founded the
United Nations on the basis that a nation has the right to self-determination
and to become a sovereign state. By 1948, liberal principles of the dignity of
the person and human rights, democracy, and the rule of law were enshrined in
the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the guiding principles for
building not so much “post-war” but “anti-war” societies.
European states knew from firsthand experience the
scourge of war and understood some of the mistakes they had made between WWI
and WWII, and so they consented to an unprecedented level of cooperation and
integration. To restrain and control each other, and to establish a
counterweight to the United States, they established the Council of Europe in
1949, and then the European Community in the 1950s, the precursor of the
European Union. At that time, the NATO security zone was also formed, running
from Western Europe to the US, Canada and Japan. Based on their statutory
documents, these geopolitical organizations were underpinned by the same four
principles of the dignity of the individual, human rights, democracy and rule
of law.
In terms of
security, these liberal values played a dual role in the post-WWII period. On
one hand, dignity and human rights, democracy and rule of law were goals,
ideals for whose sake it was important to support peace and security. On the
other, they became the instruments for maintaining peace and security through,
among others, free elections, accountable governments and a fair judiciary.
The EU and NATO
made it possible for post-war democracies to distinguish themselves from
countries under totalitarian rule that, led by the Soviet Union, were also
members of the United Nations. Unfortunately, freedom and dignity became the
dividing line in a bipolar world while the threat of the totalitarian, soviet
camp only strengthened the faith of democracies in these declared values.
Temptation
The collapse of
soviet ideology became a serious test of just how dedicated the West really was
to its ideals.
Despite the
coming down of the Berlin Wall, the western alliance was quite happy to see a
weakened Soviet Union survive. A speech by George Bush Sr. in August 1991, made
within the walls of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, confirmed that the
West was comfortable with viewing all the soviet republics, including those who
were pushing for independence, through the prism of Moscow’s interests. What we
heard from President Bush was that “freedom is not the same as independence”
and that our desire for independence was “a
suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”
And so, when
the Soviet Union fell apart, all attention, both pragmatic and romantic, was
focused on Russia. Its territory and people meant new markets, while its
nuclear weapons and geopolitical position, especially its proximity to China,
were new security priorities. What’s more, this was terra incognita, the bold and brash new
kid on the block whom everyone was eager to befriend and protect, to forgive
all his mistakes and make a big deal of his least success. Other former soviet
republics were viewed as poor little brothers under Russia’s patronage.
Instead of
assessing the real and potential threats posed by “Russia the eternal Empire”
and to build relations with this clearly in mind, western countries preferred
to stay within their comfort zone in dealing with the newcomer and to build the
myth of “democratizing Russia.” What’s more, nothing could veer them from this
course: not, Russia’s unilateral declaration that it was replacing the USSR in
all international organizations and taking over all soviet assets abroad. Nor
were they disturbed when Russia violated the basic principles of ownership,
goodwill and proportionality. On the contrary, they helped Russia take away
Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, knowing that it continued to maintain a military
base and its fleet on what had become Ukrainian territory. In signing the
Budapest Memorandum in 1994, the heads of state involved understood this as “a
bill that no one had any intention of paying,” as former US Ambassador to
Ukraine Stephen Pifer put it.
Western media set up regional offices in Moscow and
never even noticed that they had become part of the Russian propaganda machine,
reporting events in the post-soviet region mostly through the prism of Russia
Today. The OSCE did not appear notice the absence of democracy in Russia’s
elections without selection. International human rights institutions and the
countries who were the bulwarks of human rights and freedoms held their noses
but swallowed the two Chechen wars and the genocide against the Chechen people,
the restriction of freedom of speech and murders of Russian journalists, the
dismembering of YUKOS, and the poisoning of KGB whistleblower Aleksandr
Litvinenko.Russia soon became a member of the Council of Europe, yet the latter
began to help it to institute the ideology of the “Russkiy mir” or “Russian
world,” demanding from Ukraine, in particular, that it “protect the rights of
the Russian-speaking population.” It didn’t seem to matter that, according to
EU standards, a “population” does not have rights: only an individual,
minority, nation, or state does, while knowing the state language is the
requirement of citizens in any country.
Seeing that it
was being given a free hand, Moscow began to explore the possibilities and to
demonstrate its brutality more and more openly: “We don’t care about your
democracy, your human rights or your rule of law, but you will fear and love
us.” This impunity was cemented by that which does not smell: Russian gas and
Russian money. Russia produced plenty of natural gas and even more money that
it deposited in banks and property, community organizations and think-tanks, in
media and political parties. And so everyone feared and loved it.
Moscow did not
need to bring down barriers for internal purposes. Its goals were restoring
empire and sharing global power. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was a rehearsal
for the hybrid war machine of the Russian Federation and a “ test drive” to see
how the political engines of the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO and UN would
respond. Without any doubt, the Kremlin was pleased with both. The results of
its hybrid war was two Russian enclaves in Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Council of Europe pointed out to Russia that that was not how one defended
“compatriots,” while the EU decided that Georgia had “provoked” the war; NATO
decided that both sides were at fault; and the UN tried its best but came to no
decision at all. This was a clear green light: the more brutally Russia
operated, the more silent liberal values became.
From that point
on, a Russian war against Ukraine was inevitable. Ukraine was, after all, a key
component in Russia’s project to restore empire. An independent Ukraine
represented any number of threats: the Black Sea with the Russian BS Fleet, the
vast network of plants in the former soviet military-industrial-complex on whom
Russia was dependent, and Ukrainian history even, which was a never-ending
witness to Russia’s lies and despotism. But most of all, a successful Ukraine
would spoil the myth of the greatness and success of Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s
declaration of independence, a national identity was lacking in a large portion
of its population and its political elite, as well as experience in freedom and
statehood, and the sense of worth necessary to stand up for the national
interest. Instead, the country suffered from an inferiority complex as the
purported “younger brother,” a status that had been drummed into it through
centuries of colonization and unconscious but profound terror based on
large-scale genocide: artificial famine and the massive russification of ethnic
Ukrainians. This offered ideal conditions for the Kremlin to confirm its
inexorable presence in Ukraine’s economic, political, media and cultural
environments and to prepare the ground for a new “reunification of two
fraternal nations.”
Still, both
attempts to get such a “reunification” off the ground, in 2004 and 2013, led to
the opposite outcome. In less than 25 years of independence, Ukrainians had
undergone a catharsis and became aware, not only of their Ukrainianness, but of
their capacity to be the bearers of the values of freedom, human rights and
democracy, and that they had to demand respect towards these values from their
government, and that those who lived beyond their eastern borders were living
according to very different values and were not brothers in any sense of the
word. And so the only option left to Russia to enact this “reunification” was
through occupation.
The burden of choice
Russia’s
occupying march on Ukraine began in February 2014 with Operation “Krym Nash”
(Crimea is ours – Transl.),
which was necessary to guarantee the security of the Russian Black Sea Fleet
and its continuing presence “in the right position.” While shocked Ukrainians
looked in hope towards the guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum, these leaders
asked Ukraine’s government not to bother the “little green men” and make the
situation worse.
The democratic world officially “saw” Russia’s presence in
Crimea only when Russia itself announced this after the March 16 referendum.
Then everyone quickly declared that they would never recognize the annexation
of Crimea and would always support the territorial integrity of Ukraine—and
immediately turned back to their own affairs.
“Worse” was not
long in coming. In contrast to Crimea, however, the “little green men” in DNR
and LNR were not supposed to turn into Russian soldiers but to stay in the
background and run the process of legitimizing Russia’s presence in Ukraine and
to disintegrate the country from within. This was to be helped along by
elections on the occupied territory and the provision of special status to
them.
Nearly 12% of
its territory occupied, more than 10,000 killed, tens of thousands injured, 1.5
million IDPs, the massacres at Ilovaisk and Debaltseve, nearly 100,000 hectares
or a quarter million acres of mined territory, massive destruction of infrastructure
and residential buildings, entire MIC enterprises packed up and moved to
Russian territory—and that is just a partial list of the tragic aftermath of
nearly three years of Russia’s operation against Ukraine.
And it is because of this fear and shame in the
distinguished international community today that mentioning Crimea is
considered in bad taste, invitations to international events are accompanied by
firm requests not to bring up Russia or the war, and any attempt to discuss the
situation generates angry responses. International organizations want to talk
about human suffering, but not about its causes, about the territorial
integrity of Ukraine, but not about why it is being violated. Ukrainian
politicians who are not prepared to be silent about the causes and consequences
of the Minsk accords are not in favor among their supporters.
Some European
politicians have paid for a similar position with their political careers.But
the democratic world somehow still cannot “see” that the Russian Federation is
in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, despite the presence of thousands of
soldiers and heavy military equipment of Russian origin. It seems its vision is
seriously hampered by its reluctance to take sides in a military conflict with
Russia, which continues to deny its presence in eastern Ukraine, in contrast to
Crimea: “We can’t say that what’s going on in eastern Ukraine is the result of
Russian aggression because Russia denies this.” If we acknowledge that Russia
is a bloody occupying force in Europe in the 21st century, then how can we live with
this? How can we sell French potatoes, German cars or London properties to
Russians? How can we keep going to sumptuous receptions at Russian embassies?
How can we accept astronomical Russian fees? How can we live with the
destruction of the myth of the “democratization of Russia” and the fact that we
weren’t entranced by a “successful, powerful country,” but by a run-of-the-mill
power-hungry despot? How can we overcome our fear of Russia’s vengeance? All
over some place called Ukraine?
In 2017,
Ukraine will be a major test of conscience that will force democratic countries
to an uneasy choice among values.
Punishing the
victim is a form of torture and a debasement of human dignity. And so, to
demand that Ukraine should acknowledge the war in the east as an internal
conflict, offer amnesty to the perpetrators, hold elections during occupation
by a foreign power, and grant special status to the occupied territories is to
punish the victim and debase the dignity of more than 40 million Ukrainians.
Western states can continue to pressure Ukraine in this way, but then they have
to admit that, for them, the fundamental principles are not human rights,
democracy and rule of law but force, fear and the balance of trade. What’s
more, to push Ukraine into Russia’s grip will simply affirm that country’s
impunity, spurring it to new aggressions and new conflicts. This is the path to
the complete corrosion of all international organizations in which Russia is a
member, which means the bankruptcy of the current legal and security order in
the world.
If, on the other hand, the principles of the dignity
of the person, human rights, democracy and rule of law are to remain values,
the West still has a chance to try and realistically perceive Russia and the
threats it represents. Dialog with the Russian Federation should take place,
not as if with a “peacekeeper in the process of democratization” but as with an
aggressive, manipulative and despotic player. In that case, there is still hope
that the global security and legal order can be rebooted and with it at least
some of the international organizations, by relegating Russia to its proper
place.
In the end, a
commitment to the principles of freedom and dignity means accepting Ukraine as
a state that already exists and that does not have to prove its right to exist
to anyone. This kind of re-think will make it possible to see Ukraine, with its
admittedly dramatic but unique experience of relations with its northern
neighbor, as the key to resolving many security issues.
Translated by Lidia Wolanskyj
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