It is not simply a matter of giving them weapons to counter the Russian threat.
Ukrainian servicemen rehearsing for the Independence Day military parade in central Kiev, Ukraine, on August 19. VALENTYN OGIRENKO/REUTERS
After Russian aggression in Crimea and Russia’s
support for the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, there are many who
believe the United States should take further action to help Ukraine defend
itself.
Indeed, since 2014, the
United States has provided approximately $600 million in security assistance to
Ukraine, among other forms of aid.
After Russian military activities in Syria, there are
reports that European and U.S. officials will discuss new sanctions
against Russia during meetings next week. Still, much of the public debate
in the United States on Ukraine focuses on the question of whether or not
to provide lethal aid. The issue of lethal aid is an important one, given the
risk of Russian escalation and uncertain U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s defense.
However, analysis of
Ukraine’s capabilities and of the challenges it faces point to the
potential of U.S. support for fundamental reform of the country’s security
sector.
A recently published RAND study, done for the Office of
the President of Ukraine, analyzed
Ukraine’s security and defense sector from the ground up and emphasized
the need for and potential impact of reform in Ukraine’s security institutions.
While focusing on the
defense sector, the report analyses the full range of security
institutions—including intelligence, internal security and defense-technical—at
all levels, from combat units up to the ministries.
Ukraine’s military was
simply not prepared to fight prior to the war and, while there have been
improvements since 2014, there remain a range of deeply embedded problems that
cannot easily be solved by foreign-provided weapons or assistance but which if
corrected could significantly improve warfighting, promote the efficient use of
resources and help Ukraine meet Euro-Atlantic standards of transparency and
accountability.
At the top, there are ambiguities and divisions in how
the executive branch manages the security and defense sector. The president’s
authority to “administer” the defense and security of Ukraine is not clearly
differentiated from the authority of the Cabinet of Ministers to “direct and
coordinate.”
Ukraine’s Ministry of
Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not integrated
into a single chain of command, and both bodies are led by military officers,
undermining coordination, accountability and civilian control.
The activities of the
internal security, intelligence and military bodies are stovepiped—the major
coordinating body, the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), serves as
a forum for discussion and has only a limited role in executing the decisions of
the senior leadership.
A number of steps could
help address these issues, including clarifying roles and responsibilities, not
only of the senior leadership but at all levels; strengthening the NSDC; and
restructuring the defense establishment to place the General Staff of the Armed
Forces under the command of a civilian minister, among other changes.
Further, despite
significant progress, there remain gaps in the basic systems that equip and
sustain Ukraine’s fighting forces that Western training and equipment cannot
easily fill.
In the case of the
procurement system, for example, Ukraine has a large defense industry that
builds a wide range of advanced equipment. But the defense industry has largely
focused on exports, in part encouraged by Ukraine’s legal framework.
Single-source contracts,
as part of an opaque yearly defense order, undermine competitiveness and
efficiency. Ukraine has made progress with a new transparent e-procurement
system, but the preexisting system for purchasing armaments continues to
preclude the government from mobilizing the defense industry to efficiently
provide for Ukraine’s combat needs.
In the case of
logistics, combat units are no longer without basic supplies, as they were at
times in 2014, in large part due to the reestablishment of Soviet-era systems.
But Ukraine continues to rely on a paper-based system for tracking arms and
supplies, supplemented only occasionally with computers.
Without modern
electronic inventory systems, the United States and other allies cannot responsibly
provide modern weapon systems, and there will continue to be major problems
with efficient distribution of critical items.
These are just several
of a wide range of issues that contribute to the challenges facing Ukraine’s
entire defense establishment. At the same time, though, they also highlight the
achievements of the Ukrainian military in holding off further advances from the
Russian-backed separatists. But to be sustainable, major changes should be
implemented by Ukrainians, not by foreign advisers.
Of course, Ukraine has a
long history of pursuing reform since independence, with mixed success. The
current period in Ukraine’s history, after the 2014 Maidan Revolution, offers a
unique opportunity since the government and significant elements of civil
society are committed to undertaking reform, especially in the security and
defense sector.
The United States and
its allies already have supported this effort, including through encouragement
by senior U.S. officials and the provision of defense advisors. But clearly
reform in Ukraine will be a long-term effort, which Ukraine’s partners should
continue to support.
Andrew
Radin is an associate political scientist at
the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Lynn
E. Davis, undersecretary of state for arms control
and international security affairs, 1993 to 1997, is currently a senior
fellow at RAND.
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