With French and German Foreign Ministers now in Kyiv,
and Ukrainian FM Klimkin talking about implementation roadmaps to
implement the Minsk document/text which is itself little more than a roadmap.
A roadmap to implement a
roadmap may well be en vogue, but is there any point to it? In theory of
course there is, but then in theory, there should no difference between theory
and practice, something many practitioners can claim as a falsehood.
A reader may note the
use of “document/text” rather than “agreement” in the opening paragraph, for
“agreement” is something of a misnomer and infers/gives the impression that the
process was entered into without significant coercion. That by extension
and over time gives the perception of a “softer” version of what is a serious
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and trampling of international law.
To be clear, neither
Minsk I or II have any legal standing whatsoever. It legally binds nobody
to anything. It is not even a signed and certified document enforceable by
law comparable to the most basic of legal contracts. It carries no
signatures of the conflicting parties (recognised or unrecognised). It
has been ratified by no parliament. It is therefore not a document that
has been deposited with any international body or has any domestic power.
It is text. It is a document listing bullet points along a possible
path to the return (prima facie) to international laws and treaties – despite the
perilous repercussions that its implementation would have internally for
Ukrainian sovereignty as the text stands, if and when territorial integrity is
returned. It is a framework document, not a legal obligation.
It is a political
document and not a legally binding document.
Further, of the numerous
western diplomats spoken to privately over the past 2 years, not a single one
has expressed their personal opinion that the Minsk document will ever be fully
implemented. Indeed the consensus has been that while it is important for
Ukraine (or the West) not to “kill Minsk”, there are perhaps wiser uses of
political and diplomatic energy with regard to Ukraine.
Ukraine cannot be seen to be the assassin of Minsk,
first and foremost as it would place serious strain upon European resolve to
maintain its (surprising) unity toward Kremlin actions thus far. Whilst
sanctions are not officially tied to the actions of Ukraine – to be clear
Russia was not sanctioned over anything Ukraine has done – de facto the passage of time has witnessed the sanctions policy
“understanding” in certain capitals either warp, creep, or intentionally become
attached to Ukrainian actions as a negotiating lever over Ukraine – as if
Ukraine invaded itself and severed Crimea voluntarily or is somehow liable for
continuing illegal Kremlin actions within Ukrainian territory.
Nevertheless, if Minsk
is to be officially recognised as dead, then it has to be seen to occur at the
hands of The Kremlin.
The problem with
allowing The Kremlin to kill it is that eventually a Minsk III – or worse Yalta
II – would probably not be favourable to Ukraine unless the Europeans found
their backbone if they were involved in any serious renegotiating process.
As of the time of
writing a ceasefire where the firing actually ceased during the past 2 years
has yet to materialise – and to be blunt nobody thought it would, just as
nobody thought the Minsk document(s) would ever be fully implemented even
before the ink had dried.
The immediate and medium
term horizons look far more like an incendiary Nagorno-Karabakh than a frozen
Transnistria.
With The Kremlin
building permanent military bases not far from the Ukrainian eastern border,
clearly it plans to prevent and dissuade a repeat of the Croatian Operation
Storm in the years ahead – should such a thought ever enter a Ukrainian
policymaker’s head in the future.
The question is
therefore whether “western diplomacy” is best employed in keeping Ukraine
adhering to entirely arbitrary Minsk timelines to carry out “x” or “y”, or it
is better employed in finding reasons why Ukraine should not be held to
arbitrary timelines, or unilaterally be expected to fulfill the text of such a
(currently) onerous document?
A bad peace will not
bring a lasting armistice (insomuch as military conflict is concerned), and war
on every other front will continue – economic, social, political, diplomatic etc. Any interaction between Ukraine and Russia for
a generation will now only be transactional regardless of how any peace
actually arrives (if/when it does). As difficult as it is to take the
current spate of posturing and rhetoric over Minsk implementation seriously
when it comes to its full implementation, during a war of exhaustion
roadmaps to fulfilling roadmaps etc must surely be expected as part of the
diplomatic arsenal available to all sides and is both an offensive and
defensive weapon.
Will we still be talking
about unfulfilled Minsk implementation this time next year? Yes, for no
side will be entirely exhausted within 12 months.
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