Having been asked many times about Brexit and the
repercussions for UK-Ukrainian relations, both in person and by email, it is
perhaps time to share some thoughts – and they are only thoughts.
Putting to one side any
free trade agreement issues that would be upon a very long list of free trade
and other agreements the UK is going to have to renegotiate, there are perhaps
more immediate matters to raise.
The UK has been a robust
supporter, and not without influence, within the EU when it comes to Ukraine.
Therefore the reaction of the Ukrainian leadership to both Brexit and
then Theresa May becoming Prime Minister with a new cabinet and a basket full
of EU problems probably went along lines thus:
Innumerable calls,
letters and visits both to HM Embassy Kyiv and King Charles Street, London,
will have occurred – all seeking insight into any change in the UK position
toward Ukraine, a hint as to who will be handed the UK baton within the EU when
it comes to leading the Ukrainian cause (probably Poland), and many questions
over existing funding and also on-going bilateral programmes (whether they are
hosted in Ukraine or the UK).
Needless to say there
will also have been a lot of lobbying regarding insuring the Prime Minister and
senior Cabinet Ministers either visit or receive their Ukrainian counterparts
before those from The Kremlin.
In short, probably quite
blunt requests to have London visit Kyiv, or have Kyiv visit London, before
London ventures to Moscow or having Moscow arrive in London. The usual
framing and diplomatic messaging about priorities and positions matters.
Undoubtedly Ukraine’s FM
Klimkin (who is a very good and capable FM) has held many telephone
conversations with the UK’s FM Boris Jonhson (who thus far the FCO and 6 have
managed to keep under control). On a personal level, a reader would
expect both men to get on very well – and personal relationships do count.
Innumerable verbal and
written reassurances will have spewed forth from the FCO to reassure the
Ukrainians.
Lo it has come to pass that Boris Johnson is in Kyiv
14th -15th September (and thus manages to escape before the Yes Conference)
bringing soothing and comforting words, as well as the desired diplomatic
message of “visits” delivered at his level. “I am very
glad to visit Ukraine soon after his appointment as Minister of Foreign
Affairs. This visit is a clear indication of the long-term strong relationship
between our two countries. Britain stands side by side with the people of
Ukraine for the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
country, particularly in the Crimea. The support that the United Kingdom has to
reform in Ukraine, is unchanged We are pleased to work closely with those who
implement the program for the development of transparent, accountable and
stable government, and strengthening the economic outlook for the whole
territory of Ukraine.”
(It remains to be seen
whether Theresa May will visit Moscow before Kyiv, or host/be hosted by
President Poroshenko before President Putin.)
It also has to be
recognised that the Ukrainians will be very aware – as HM Embassy Kyiv probably
is too – that UK influence has now diminished across most (but certainly not
all) policy areas.
BoJo has also announced
an additional £2 million for the HALO Trust mine clearing in eastern
Ukraine between now and 2018.
Thus the boxes ticked
for diplomatic positioning/messaging, soothing words and gifts delivered – as a
reader would expect.
But this will not be
enough. Both Ukraine and the UK will be looking for other ways to
reinforce a relationship that is clearly weakened due to Brexit. There is
a requirement to find bilateral agreements that will drop anchors between the
nations not only either side of Brexit, but also either side of the next
Presidential election in Ukraine and also either side of the next General
Election in the UK.
Medium term bilateral
agreements, 5 or 7 years in duration would seem wise when so many existing
agreements will end with Brexit.
There are things that
the UK does do particularly well and that the Ukrainians clearly appreciate
(apart from money laundering) which are obvious areas to look toward when
trying to find 5 – 7 year agreements that will be useful and genuinely
meaningful and that will not be complicated by Brexit issues relating to the EU
Association Agreement and DCFTA, and assorted other treaties, agreements,
memorandums, read missions, etc.
The first is
defence/military. The second is intelligence. Both are matters that will
remain priority issues for Ukraine for the next decade at least, and both are
areas where the UK is no slouch. Announcing a bilateral 5 – 7 year
defence/military agreement (whatever its limitations/parameters), and/or
announcing a 5 – 7 year bilateral agreement regarding increased intelligence
sharing (whatever its limitations/parameters) would be a well received gesture
as far as Ukraine is concerned, and for the UK it will assist in keeping HM
Embassy Kyiv relevant until Brexit is over and an entire raft of new agreements
with Ukraine will be required as a result. (Relying upon a small
Chevening Alumni won’t do it, and neither will knowing where the money is
hidden.)
Some bilateral medium
term agreements beginning and concluding either side of Brexit and significant
elections would not go amiss for either nation.
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