Sanctions are
not enough to deter a belligerent, opportunistic Russia that can sense our
faltering resolve to stand up to it
So many critics of the
Putin regime have died in mysterious circumstances that the apparent suicide of
Alexander Shchetinin, a Russian journalist based in the Ukrainian capital Kiev,
makes barely a ripple. Ukrainian police (not renowned for their investigative
nous) have found no signs of foul play; Mr Shchetinin, who had declared the
Russian leader his “personal foe”, was said to be depressed — and had
complained that émigré critics of the Kremlin were being driven to despair.
But clearer clues of trouble
abound. Right now, Russia is conducting its largest military exercise for
decades, alarming our spies and analysts.
It pursues a gruesome proxy war in
Syria, exposing the helplessness of western diplomacy. Fighting bubbles on in
Ukraine with scores of casualties this month. Russia bombards western
countries, including non-Nato Sweden and Finland, with propaganda. It tries to
skew our elections with leaks and smears.
Mitt Romney was right. In 2012
the Republican presidential contender attracted derision when he maintained
that Russia was America’s “number one geopolitical foe”. Even his own foreign
policy advisers were aghast. Being hawkish is fine but that sounded like
scaremongering.
Except it wasn’t. The Kremlin
can do what we can’t. It accepts economic pain, takes risks and brazenly lies
about what it is doing. The aim is not world domination but to break the
rules-based order which has kept us safe and free since the end of the Cold
War.
We like these arrangements.
Disputes are settled by negotiation. Small countries have a say in what
happens. Big countries don’t get their way automatically. In short, might does
not equal right.
Russia loathes these rules. It
believes that they are unfairly drafted and hypocritically implemented. The
post-1991 world is rigged in favour of the victors, who destroyed the Soviet
Union and then constrained Russia.
From the Kremlin’s point of
view this is a bleak and existential struggle — and one that Russia can win as
the West weakens. The game is well worth the candle.
From our point of view,
friction with Russia is a little local difficulty. Other problems — the
economy, migration, climate change — matter so much more.
Strikingly, the consensus
among Russia-watchers is now clearer than at any time since the fall of the
Soviet Union. Russia is a global pipsqueak when it comes to GDP, innovation or
culture: a failing authoritarian kleptocracy, fuelled by propaganda and
military bombast. Putin has spectacularly failed to modernise or diversify the
economy. The political system is a farce piled on a tragedy.
Power is ever more
centralised, with even his oldest allies, KGB veterans, sidelined by over-promoted
bodyguards and other hoodlums.
No other adversary poses such
a threat to the West. Russia succeeds because it is strong-willed and
opportunistic. It exploits weakness but shrinks from strength.
The best approach would be a
united front in which western countries practised what they preached, enforcing
their rules and procedures. That would mean, for example, cracking down on
Russian money laundering and ensuring that Nato’s plans to defend the frontline
states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) are credible and properly
resourced.
Instead we have, at best,
half-measures. Our attention span is not long enough to remember that the
Kremlin invaded and dismembered Ukraine two years ago, changing a European
border by force and violating the central principles of the continent’s
post-1991 security order.
American and European
sanctions may have dented Mr Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine (though that
country’s own gritty military resistance to the invaders played a big role too)
but bans on financial transactions with Putin cronies and on high-tech
investment in the energy industry have not sent the economy into a tailspin.
Nor have they made the Russian ruler’s inner circle panic and implode.
One reason is that western
banks and other companies have been so eager to help evade the sanctions.
Deutsche Bank in particular is under scrutiny for its role, highlighted by an
investigation in the latest edition of The New Yorker, in
facilitating billions of dollars of “mirror trades” for the richest and most
powerful men in Russia. These are a financial sleight of hand in which a
customer uses shell companies to buy and sell the same shares in different
jurisdictions. The bank makes a fat fee, and the money flows untraceably across
borders.
Russia also senses that western
political resolve behind the sanctions is weakening. For now, Angela Merkel is
holding the line in the European Union but countries such as Italy, France and
Slovakia feel that pressure on Russia is a costly distraction. Britain, which
used to take a hard line, is now sidelined in European diplomacy. The Obama
administration is edging towards a deal with Russia over Syria.
The coming months are
therefore going to be particularly dangerous. If Hilary Clinton wins the US
presidential election, Russia will face an administration determined to bring
what it sees as the world’s biggest rogue state to heel. Mrs Clinton detests
the Russian leader (and in private does a highly amusing imitation of his macho
body language). She and her hawkish advisers have chafed at the softly-softly
approach of the White House under Barack Obama, and the self-centred and
unpredictable approach of the incumbent secretary of state, John Kerry.
However, Mrs Clinton would not
move into the White House until January. If Mr Putin can change the facts on
the ground before that — driving a hard bargain over Syria, forcing Ukraine
into a humiliating political settlement with the Russian-backed puppet states
in the east, or biting chunks out of Nato’s credibility in the Baltics — he has
a good chance of getting away with it. Many in Europe would say that a new
status quo, even accompanied by mouthfuls of humble pie, is better than a
costly conflict with the Kremlin over issues that most voters regard as
peripheral.
Presenting a Trump presidency
with a fait accompli in Europe would be even more advantageous for Mr Putin.
The Republican contender’s foreign policy knowledge is flimsy. He admires the
Russian president, regards Nato as obsolete and America’s European allies as
free-riders. He is unlikely to start his presidency by confronting the Kremlin.
Edward Lucas writes for The
Economist
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