By BEN WOFFORD
With Russia already meddling in 2016, a ragtag group
of obsessive tech experts is warning that stealing the ultimate prize in
—victory on November 8— would be child’s play.
When Princeton professor Andrew Appel decided to hack
into a voting machine, he didn’t try to mimic the Russian attackers who hacked
into the Democratic National Committee’s database last month. He didn’t write
malicious code, or linger near a polling place where the machines can go
unguarded for days.
Instead, he bought one online.
With a few cursory clicks of a mouse, Appel parted
with $82 and became the owner of an ungainly metallic giant called the Sequoia
AVC Advantage, one of the oldest and vulnerable, electronic voting machines in
the United States (among other places it’s deployed in Louisiana, New Jersey,
Virginia and Pennsylvania). No sooner did a team of bewildered deliverymen roll
the 250-pound device into a conference room near Appel’s cramped, third-floor
office than the professor set to work. He summoned a graduate student named
Alex Halderman, who could pick the machine’s lock in seven seconds. Clutching a
screwdriver, he deftly wedged out the four ROM chips—they weren’t soldered into
the circuit board, as sense might dictate—making it simple to replace them with
one of his own: A version of modified firmware that could throw off the
machine’s results, subtly altering the tally of votes, never to betray a hint
to the voter. The attack was concluded in minutes. To mark the achievement, his
student snapped a photo of
Appel—oblong features, messy black locks and a salt-and-pepper beard—grinning
for the camera, fists still on the circuit board, as if to look directly into
the eyes of the American taxpayer: Don’t
look at me—you’re the one who paid for this thing.
Appel’s mischief might be called an occupational
asset: He is part of a diligent corps of so-called cyber-academics—professors
who have spent the past decade serving their country by relentlessly hacking
it. Electronic voting machines—particularly a design called Direct Recording
Electronic, or DRE’s—took off in 2002, in the wake of Bush
v. Gore. For the ensuing 15 years, Appel and his colleagues have deployed
every manner of stunt to convince the public that the system is pervasively
unsecure and vulnerable.
Beginning in the late ’90s, Appel and his colleague,
Ed Felten, a pioneer in computer engineering now serving in the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, marshaled their Princeton students
together at the Center for Information Technology Policy (where Felten is still
director). There, they relentlessly hacked one voting machine after another,
transforming the center into a kind of Hall of Fame for tech mediocrity:
reprogramming one popular machine to play Pac-Man; infecting popular models
with self-duplicating malware; discovering keys to voting machine locks that
could be ordered on eBay. Eventually, the work of the professors and Ph.D.
students grew into a singular conviction: It was only a matter of time, they
feared, before a national election—an irresistible target—would invite an attempt
at a coordinated cyberattack.
The revelation this month that a cyberattack on the
DNC is the handiwork of Russian state security personnel has set off alarm
bells across the country: Some officials have suggested that 2016 could see
more serious efforts to interfere directly with the American election. The DNC
hack, in a way, has compelled the public to ask the precise question the
Princeton group hoped they’d have asked earlier, back when they were turning
voting machines into arcade games: If
motivated programmers could pull a stunt like this, couldn’t they tinker with
the results in November through the machines we use to vote?
This week, the notion has been transformed from an
implausible plotline in a Philip K. Dick novel into a deadly serious threat,
outlined in detail by a raft of government security officials. “This isn’t a
crazy hypothetical anymore,” says Dan Wallach, one of the Felten-Appel alums
and now a computer science professor at Rice. “Once you bring nation states’
cyber activity into the game?” He snorts with pity. “These machines, they
barely work in a friendly environment.”
The powers that be seem duly convinced. Homeland
Security Secretary Jeh Johnson recently conceded the “longer-term investments we need to make in
the cybersecurity of our election process.” A statement by 31 security
luminaries at the Aspen Institute issued a public statement: “Our electoral process could be a target for
reckless foreign governments and terrorist groups.” Declared Wired: “America’s Electronic Voting Machines Are Scarily
Easy Targets.”
For the Princeton group, it’s precisely the alarm it has
been trying to sound for most of the new millennium. “Look, we could see 15
years ago that this would be perfectly possible,” Appel tells me, speaking in
subdued, clipped tones. “It’s well within the capabilities of a country as
sophisticated as Russia.” He pauses for a moment, as if to consider this.
“Actually, it’s well within the capabilities of much less well-funded and
sophisticated attackers.”
In the uproar over the DNC, observers have been quick
to point out the obvious: There is no singular national body that regulates the
security or even execution of what happens on Election Day, and there never has
been. It’s a process regulated state by state. Technical standards for voting
are devised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the
Election Assistance Commission—which was formed after the disputed 2000
presidential election that hinged on faulty ballots—but the guidelines are voluntary. (For three years the EAC limped on without confirmed commissioners—an EAC commissioner stepped down in 2005, calling its
work a “charade”). Policy on voting is decided by each state and, in
some cases, each county—a system illustrated vividly by the trench warfare of
voter ID laws that pockmark the country. In total, more than 8,000 jurisdictions of varying size and authority administer the
country’s elections, almost entirely at the hands of an army of middle-age
volunteers. Some would say such a system cries out for security standards.
If such standards come to fruition, it will be the
Princeton group—the young Ph.D.’s who have since moved on to appointments and
professorships around the country—and their contemporaries in the computer
science world who suddenly matter.
The Princeton group has a simple message: That the
machines that Americans use at the polls are less secure than the iPhones they
use to navigate their way there. They’ve seen the skeletons of code inside
electronic voting’s digital closet, and they’ve mastered the equipment’s
vulnerabilities perhaps better than anyone (a contention the voting machine companies
contest, of course). They insist the elections could be vulnerable at myriad
strike points, among them the software that aggregates the precinct vote
totals, and the voter registration rolls that are increasingly digitized. But
the threat, the cyber experts say, starts with the machines that tally the
votes and crucially keep a record of them—or, in some cases, don’t.
Since their peak around 2007, voting districts have
begun to rely less on the digital voting machines—a step in the right
direction, as states bolt for the door on what the programmers describe as a
bungled, $4 billion experiment. Instead, rushing to install paper backups, sell
off the machines and replace them with optical scanners—in some cases, ban them
permanently for posterity. But the big picture, like everything in this insular
world, is complicated. As the number of machines dwindle—occasioned by aging
equipment, vintage-era software that now lacks tech support, years without new
study by the computer scientists, and a public sense that the risk has
passed—the opportunities for interference may temporarily spike. Hundreds of
digital-only precincts still remain, a significant portion of them in swing
states that will decided the presidency in November. And, as the Princeton
group warns, they become less secure with each passing year.
***
In
American politics, an
onlooker might observe that hacking an election has been less of a threat than
a tradition. Ballot stuffing famously plagued statewide and some federal
elections well into the 20th century. Huey Long was famously caught rigging the
vote in 1932. Sixteen years later, 1948 saw the infamous “Lyndon Landslide,” in
which Johnson mysteriously overcame a 20,000 vote deficit in his first Senate race, a miracle that Robert
Caro reports was the almost certain result of vote rigging. But even an
unrigged election can go haywire, as the nation learned in horror during the
Florida recount in 2000, when a mind-numbingly manual process of counting the
ballots left a mystery as to which boxes voters had punched—giving the nation
the “hanging chad,” and weeks of uncertainty about who won the presidency.
In some ways, the country’s response was suggestive of
the real crime committed in Florida: Not inaccuracy, but anxiety. Congress’s
solution was to pass the Help America Vote Act in 2002, a nearly $4 billion
federal fund meant to incentivize states to upgrade their voting machines. It
worked. All 50 states took the money. Requirements included upgrading voter registration
methods and making polls disability-friendly, but Section 102 provided funds
specifically allocated for replacing outdated voting machines; almost
universally, “upgrade” meant a new, computerized touch-screen voting machine.
By 2006, states had spent nearly $250 million on new machines with Section 102
funds. In Pennsylvania, the funds purchased 20,597 new machines—around 19,900 of which were
digital touchscreens. Some, like the Diebold TSX, Advanced WINvote, the
ES&S iVotronic, and a variant of Appel’s AVC Advantage—the Sequoia
Edge—would be the same models to come under scrutiny by cybersecurity experts and
academics. Thousands of touchscreen DREs were similarly sold in state
contracts. Between Election Day 2000 and the HAVA cutoff in 2006, the stock
prices of the major companies soared.
The appeal of such machines seemed plain: Voting was
crisp, instantaneous, logged digitally. To state officials—and, at first,
voters—the free federal money seemed like a bargain. To computer scientists, it
seemed like a disaster waiting to happen. Wallach remembers when he testified
before the Houston City Council, urging members not to adopt the machines. “My
testimony was: ‘Wow, these are a bad idea. They’re just computers, and we know
how to tamper with computers. That’s what we do,’” Wallach recalls. “The county
clerk, who has since retired, essentially said, ‘You don’t know anything about
what you’re talking about. These machines are great!’ And then they bought
them.”
Almost from the day they were taken out of the box,
the touch-screen machines demonstrated problems (the same companies had a much
better track record with Optical Scan machines). During the primaries in
Florida in 2002, some machines in Miami-Dade malfunctioned and failed to turn on, resulting in hourslong lines that locked out untold
numbers of voters—including then-gubernatorial candidate Janet Reno. That year,
faulty software (and an administrator oversight) on Sequoia models led to a
fourth of votes initially omitted during early voting in Albuquerque’s Bernalillo
County. In Fairfax County, Virginia, an investigation into a 2003 school board
race found that
a vote was subtracted for every 100 votes cast for one of the candidates on 10
machines. With margin sizes small enough to be noticed, local elections were
vaulted into the forefront of these debates; Appel later found himself issuing expert testimony for a tiny election for the Democratic Executive
Committee in Cumberland County, New Jersey, where a candidate lost by 24 votes.
The margin was small enough that the losers sued, and called 28 voters as
witnesses—who each swore they voted for them. The machine in use was a Sequoia
AVC Advantage.
Cybersecurity researchers flocked to study the
machines, but they say they were faced with an uncompromising adversary: the
voting machine companies, which viewed the code of the machines as intellectual
property. Until 2009, two companies, Diebold and ES&S, controlled the
lion’s share of the voting machine market. The accreditation process is equally
narrow: Since 1990, a voluntary federal accreditation process has certified
voting technology, a system that has come under fire for its lack of
transparency. The laboratories (“Independent Testing Authorities”) which
conduct the certification reviews are typically paid by the manufacturers, and
are usually required to sign nondisclosure agreements. In 2008, five labs were
accredited; one was suspended that year for poor lab procedures, and another
temporarily suspended for insufficient quality control.
State authorities can typically request these lab
reports, as Kathy Rogers of ES&S reminded me in an email. (“For security
reasons we did not make that code widely available to just anyone and everyone who simply wanted a
copy for their own purposes. We truly have nothing to hide.”) But Appel, the
Princeton group and others in cybersecurity have insisted that such
measures—which they deem “security through obscurity”—pale to the types of rigorous testing that would result from
releasing the code to the public or academics. One of the companies, Sequoia,
later acquired by Dominion, once threatened Princeton’s Felten and Appel with legal action
if they attempted to examine one of their models.
Election officials have sometimes complained that the
lab reports they do receive lack vital detail, and information from the labs,
bound by the NDAs, can be unforthcoming. In 2004, when the California Secretary
of State Kevin Shelley—in charge of overseeing the state’s elections—asked one
of the five laboratories for more information on the testing of machines, he was stonewalled, and told by a researcher, “We don’t discuss our
voting machine work.” Because of a flood of machines introduced to the market
after HAVA, the 2002 accreditation standards are the ones that matter—the same
process that approved touch-screen Diebold machines that had supervisor passcodes of
“1111” in order to access the voting system. Shelley later banned Diebold TSX machines, calling Diebold’s conduct
“deceitful.”
In 2003, an employee at Diebold mistakenly left 40,000
files containing code for the Diebold AccuVote TS, one of the most widely used
machines on the market, on a publically viewable website. The computer
scientists moved in, and one of the early and formative papers was published on the subject, co-authored by Wallach and led
by Johns Hopkins’ Avi Rubin. Its findings were devastating: The machine’s
smartcards could be jerry-rigged to vote more than once; poor cryptography left
the voting records file easy to manipulate; and poor safeguards meant that a
“malevolent developer”—an employee inside the company, perhaps—could reorder
the ballot definition files, changing which candidates received votes. The
encryption key, F2654hD4, could be found in the code essentially in plain view; all Diebold machines responded to it. (Rubin later
remarked that he would flunk any undergrad who wrote such poor code.) “We read
the code, and found really, really bad problems,” Wallach tells me, sitting at
his Houston dining table. He catches himself. “Actually, let me change that,”
he says. “We found unacceptable problems.”
Diebold dismissed the report, responding that the code was obsolete, and the
study’s findings thusly moot. But the 2003 report catalyzed a small movement: In
CompSci departments across the country, vote hacking became a small, insular
civic code of honor. Felten’s group at Princeton led the pack, producing some
of the most important papers throughout the 2000s.
By the following year, professors in and around the
Princeton group began the work of unwinding what they viewed as a 50-state
debacle. Felten and
Appel shared a taste for gallows humor and a flair for
promotion. Felten
took to blogging, and started a tradition: Each
election, he snapped a photo standing alone with unguarded voting
machines days before the election. In another study, the Sequoia AVC Edge was
infected with malware that allowed it to do nothing but play Pac-Man; the
students pulled off the feat without breaking the machines “tamper-proof”
seals, and decorated the machine with Pac-Man logos. The team tore through topics including source
code review of the larger Diebold voting system; advising election officials on
security measures without new hardware; and designing malware for the Sequoia
AVC Advantage that Appel had purchased, using a technique called a Return-Oriented Program. In less
than a minute, they infected a Diebold machine with self-duplicating code,
spreading from machine to machine through an administrator card, and programmed it to swing an election for Benedict Arnold
over George Washington.
The latter hack was the result of a curious and
enigmatic email, when Felten received a message from an anonymous source,
presumably with ties to the voting machine industry. Diebold’s response to the
Rubin and Wallach study was brittle and evasive; the source wanted to give
Felten a Diebold TS machine—the same one whose code had leaked in the study.
Studying the machine itself would offer an unmissable opportunity—Felten put
his grad students, Feldman and Halderman, then 25 years old, in charge of the
effort. One night in April 2006, Halderman drove to New York City, and double-parked
his car, lights blinking, in front of a hotel just a few blocks from Times
Square. Halderman jogged into an alleyway, where his source stood patiently,
dressed in a charcoal colored trench coat and wielding a black canvas bag.
After a few terse formalities, he handed Halderman the bag with the machine
inside. Halderman never saw the man again. (“There’s a lot of cloak and dagger
in election security,” Halderman would tell me later.)
Throughout the summer of 2006, Feldman and Halderman
set themselves to work in the basement of an academic building. Fearing
retribution or a lawsuit, they didn’t tell their colleagues in the department
of their project. From noon until midnight, the two students met on the humid
Princeton quad, and decamped to a claustrophobic, eggshell anteroom—enough
space for a small table and two uncomfortable foldout chairs—and pored through
reams of code and programming under the fluorescent lighting of the windowless
room. At the center of the table was the subject of years of mystery: The
squat, beige monitor of the Diebold TS. The authors would later describe the
project as the first rigorous analysis of a physical touch-screen
DRE—supposedly the kind of testing it would have received in one of the
accredited labs.
When they were finished, they had another paper’s worth of findings, and the most comprehensive understanding of how
Diebold’s machines worked. “We found the machine did not have any security
mechanisms beyond what you’d find on a typical home PC,” Halderman told me. “It
was very easy to hack.”
Studying with Felten, Halderman had learned a key
phrase—“Defense in Depth,” meant to describe a system with various rings of
security. Halderman joked that the model should more aptly be called
“Vulnerability in Depth,” so numerous were the entry points they discovered.
Later, they found the key that opened the Diebold AccuVote TS was a standard
corporate model, reproduced for minibars and other locks, available online.
When their report revealed this detail, a commonplace reader found a picture of
the key, filed down a blank from ACE Hardware and sent a copy to Feldman and
Halderman as a souvenir (who then tested the key—it worked). That year, 10 percent of registered voters alone used the AccuVote TS
to vote.
None of these breakthroughs were lost on states that
had bought the machines, officials who were keeping an eye on academic reports.
Felten would later write that the vulnerabilities in the Diebold machine they
tested likely could not be rectified without fully redesigning the machine; but
the solution for state officials was simple. If they could include a paper
trail—a voter-verified paper receipt that printed alongside the digital
vote—the electronic tally could, in theory, be cross-tested for accuracy. In
December 2003, Nevada became the first state to mandate that voter verified printouts
be used with digital touch screens. A wave of states followed.
But the tipping point came in 2006, when a major
congressional race between Vern Buchanan and Christine Jennings in Florida’s
13th District imploded over the vote counts in Sarasota County—where 18,000
votes from paperless machines essentially went missing (technically deemed an
“undervote”) in a race decided by less than 400 votes. Felten drew an immediate connection to the primary suspect: The ES&S iVotronic
machine, one of the many ordered in Pennsylvania after they deployed their HAVA
funds. Shortly after the debacle, Governor Charlie Crist announced a deadline for paper backups in every county in Florida that
year; Maryland Governor Bob Erlich urged his state’s voters to cast an absentee ballot rather than put their
hands on a digital touch screen—practically an unprecedented measure. By 2007,
the touch screens were so unpopular that two senators, Bill Nelson of Florida
and Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, had introduced legislation banning digital touch screens in time for the 2012 election.
Precincts today that vote with an optical scan
machine—another form of DRE that reads a bubble tally on a large card—tend not
to have this problem; simply by filling it out, you’ve generated the receipt
yourself. But that doesn’t mean the results can’t still be tampered with, and
Felten’s students began writing papers that advised election officials on
defending their auditing procedures from attempted manipulation.
Each state bears the scars of its own story with
digital touch screens—a parabola of havoc and mismanagement that has been the
15-year nightmare of state and local officials. The touch screens peaked in
2006, touching nearly 40 percent of registered voters; in 2016, most voters will
use some combination of paper, optical scan or paper backup. In 2013, Maryland
sped up its wind-down process, pushing through a transition to optical scans
for use in the 2016 election. So did Virginia, which has rushed to phase out as
many as possible in time for 2016—and later passed legislation to ban them
permanently by 2020, just for good measure.
The Virginia ban was the quixotic crusade of one
computer science expert in the private sector, Jeremy Epstein. In 2002, Epstein
walked into the elections office in Fairfax, Virginia, to complain about the
poor design of the touch screens—a WINVote model—and walked out with a mission
to get them barred from the state. The machines were connected to
Wi-Fi—vulnerable to “anyone who wanted to could hack them from the comfort of
their car out in the parking lot,” Epstein told me. An investigation later
revealed that the WINVote’s encryption key was “abcde.” The machines were certified in
2003, running on a version of Windows from 2002, and hadn’t received an update since 2005.
Thirteen years later, Virginia announced its ban. “If
these machines and elections weren’t hacked,” Epstein later told me, a credo
he’s said for years, “it was only because no one tried.
***
In
2001, the notion of
foreign vote hacking felt like a far-fetched warning from a far-off time—it
would be years, for instance, before North Korean agents would hack a company
like Sony, or the Chinese would break into the federal government’s personnel
files. Citizen activists who had exposed the Diebold code leak and joined the
counterreformation for paper ballots were concerned, but primarily about
domestic hacking. Liberals tended to see the corporate voting machine companies
as a threat to fair elections. Conservatives tended to see the incompetence of
poorly designed machines as a threat to normalcy.
Today, Halderman reminds me, “the notion that a
foreign state might try to interfere in American politics via some kind of
cyber-attack is not far-fetched anymore.”
The Princeton group has no shortage of things that
keep them up at night. Among possible targets, foreign hackers could attack the
state and county computers that aggregate the precinct totals on election
night—machines that are technically supposed to remain non-networked, but that
Appel thinks are likely connected to the Internet, even accidentally, from time
to time. They could attack digitized voter registration databases—an
increasingly utilized tool, especially in Ohio, where their problems are mounting—erasing voters’ names from the polls (a measure that
would either cause voters to walk away, or overload the provisional ballot
system). They could infect software at the point of development, writing
malicious ballot definition files that companies distribute, or do the same on
a software patch. They could FedEx false software to a county clerk’s office
and, with the right letterhead and convincing cover letter, get it installed.
If a county clerk has the wrong laptop connected to the Internet at the wrong
time, that could be a wide enough entry window for an attack.
“No county clerk anywhere in the United States has the
ability to defend themselves against advanced persistent threats,” Wallach
tells me, using the parlance of industry for highly motivated hackers who “lay
low and stick around for a while.” Wallach painted an unseemly picture, in
which a seasoned cyber warrior overseas squared off against a septuagenarian
volunteer. “In the same way,” continues Wallach, “you would not expect your
local police department to be able to repel a foreign military power.”
In the academic research, hacks of the machines are
far more pervasive; digitized voting registrations or tabulation software are
not 10 years old and running on Windows 2000, unlike the machines. Still, they
present risks of their own. “There are still plenty of computers involved” even
without digital touch screens, says Appel. “Even with optical scan voting, it’s
not just the voting machines themselves—it’s the desktop and laptop computers
that election officials use to prepare the ballots, prepare the electronic files
from the OpScan machines, panel voter registration, electronic poll books. And
the computers that aggregate the results together from all of the optical
scans.”
“If any of those get hacked, it could could
significantly disrupt the election.”
The digital touch screens, even with voter verified
paper trail, will still be pervasive this election; 28 states keep them in use
to some degree, including Ohio and Florida, though increasingly in limited
settings. Pam Smith, the director of Verified Voting—a group that tracks the
use of voting equipment by precinct in granular detail—isn’t sure how many
digital touch screens are left; no one I spoke with seemed to know. Nor is it
clear where they’ll be deployed, a decision left up to county administrators.
Smith confirms that after 2007, the number of states that adopted the machines
plateaued, and has finally begun to shrink. The number of states using
paperless touch screens—and nothing else—is five: South Carolina, Georgia,
Louisiana, New Jersey and Delaware. But the number of states with a significant
number of counties with the
easily hacked machines is much larger, at 13, including Indiana, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania. For hacking purposes, there’s little difference: In a close
election, only a few precincts with paperless touch screens would be required
to deflate vote totals, says Appel, even if the majority of counties are still
in the Stone Age. Many of Felten’s mad-scientist experiments were designed to
metastasize the nefarious code once it gained entry into a machine system.
The move away from electronic voting is a positive
one, the professors say; the best option for election security are the optical
scans. “Although the optical scan ballots are counted by the computer in the
OpScan machine—which you can’t trust—you can trust the pile of ballots that
accumulate in the ballot box, marked by users with their own hands,” Appel
tells me. With the right auditing policies, “you can recount or do a
statistical sample of the ballot boxes to make sure there aren’t cheating
computers out there.”
State policymakers listened. In 2000, less than 30
percent of voters used the optical scanning system. In 2012, 56 percent did. But in the interim, the touch-screen machines are
still in place; their dwindling percentage of votes has not necessarily
diminished the risk of an attack, the professors say. In some ways, it’s
heightened it—turning the issue of easy-to-tamper touch screens from a
bell-curve problem to a hockey-stick graph, in which a small number of machines
generate a high amount of risk. The machines that are left are often running on
vintage Windows software from the late ’90s or early 2000s, some of which has
long surpassed its support date. “They’re probably about exactly as vulnerable
as they were 10 years ago,” Appel tells me. “And they still get their program
out of the same ROM.”
A study released by the Brennan Center last September, titled
“Voting Machines at Risk” reached a similar conclusion. In 2016, 43 states will
use machines that are at least 10 years old; 31 states suggested a serious need
for new voting machines. Larry Norden, the report’s author, said everything
from software support, replacement parts and screen calibration were at risk;
he pointed me to a YouTube video of
a precinct in West Virginia, where voters’ finger pressure on the screen
selected an entirely different candidate, or caused the machine to go haywire
(a symptom of the glue behind the screen loosening, Norden says). The HAVA
money, says Wallach, was spent very quickly after 2002; “And it is not coming
back,” he adds.
As late as 2011, a team at the Argonne National
Laboratory of the Department of Energy revisited the Diebold TSX, five years
after the Princeton group’s report. Its conclusion: With $26 worth of parts and
an eighth-grade understanding of computers, virtually anyone could tamper with it—a variant of the model that
Feldman and Halderman procured in the Times Square alleyway. Five years later,
cyber experts tell me that little has changed in voter cybersecurity. The
Diebold TSX model is slated to be used in 20 states in 2016, including
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Missouri and Colorado.
State officials recognize that digital touch screens
are headed out the door—and the professors are quick to remind me of how
government contracts work: When profit projections fall, upkeep suffers. “The
level of security confidence when it comes to these voting machines is much
lower than the sort of industry standard—the level of security you’d expect
from top companies like Google, Facebook, Apple. I mean, your iPhone is
probably much more secure than most of these voting machines,” says Ari
Feldman, one of Felten’s acolytes and now a professor at the University of Chicago.
“I think the level of technological competence of the people who work on these
very popular commercial services and devices is just higher than those who
these small voting machine manufacturers can attract.”
No one doubts that the companies take security
seriously. But the approach to security shared by the manufacturers and
election officials seem to hinge on the idea that hacking a school board vote
would be just too boring for anyone talented enough to pull off. “You would be
hard pressed to find an example of our voting systems ever being hacked in a
real election environment, as opposed to that of a hack attempt inside of a
laboratory environment in which zero real world physical election processes are
utilized,” writes Kathy Rogers, a spokesperson with ES&S, in an email, and
correctly so—it’s never been proven that an election was deliberately hacked.
“We feel very confident in the
security of our voting systems—especially when you combine that security with
the physical security, chain of custody, legal requirements and masses of
pre-election testing.” She added, “We are not suffering from sleepless nights
worrying about whether our voting systems might be hacked.“
A Virginia election official with decades of
experience concurred, speaking to me on background. “I know that when some of
the academics have hacked a machine, they’ve had unfettered access for an
indefinite period of time,” the election official said, describing this as an
unrealistic precondition. “But one of the security thresholds isn’t that it
will be sitting in a public location here so anyone can have unfettered access
for any in-depth period of time.” He demurred when I brought up Felten’s
tradition of stalking the unguarded machines; he added, “Only people who have
been authorized, sworn to uphold the process—they can have administrator access
to these.
“It’s old school, I realize that,” he continued. “But
it is the system in place.”
In the event of a state-sponsored attack—however
unlikely—can old school match wits? The adversary, more than one member of the
Princeton group pointed out, may be more practiced than we know: A June 2014 report linked
Russian hackers to an attempt to alter the election outcomes in Ukraine, by
targeting the computerized aggregation software—one of the attacks Appel fears.
How different is Kiev from Gary, Indiana? As is the
case in cyberattacks—at least in the examples of Stuxnet and Sony—it’s never
quite plausible, until it is. Hackers this year have targeted voter
registration rolls in Illinois and possibly Arizona, another attack highlighted by the Princeton alums.
But most identified Pennsylvania as the greatest
concern. There, according to Verified Voting 47 counties of 67 vote on digital
voting machines without a written backup record if something were to go awry—a
reality that is very much on the minds of state officials (legislation is
working its way through the House to examine the issue of voting
modernization.) In Pittsburgh and Philadelphia—two Democratic strongholds whose
turnout typically decide the fate of the state’s outcome—around 900,000 voters
will cast ballots entirely on paperless touchscreens DREs, if previous
elections are any guide. Then, at least from the voters’ perspective, they will
disappear into a sea of ones and zeroes.
Montgomery County, a crucial Democratic redoubt in the
suburbs of Philadelphia—an area sometimes seen as having the potential to swing
the entire state—is one such locality that uses a paperless electronic machine,
and only one machine, for all 425 precincts: Appel’s Sequoia AVC Advantage.
“We are very, very confident in our machines,” Val
Arkoosh, the vice chair of the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, tells
me. She spoke with the staccato fervency and granular detail of someone who is
thinking about this issue, and has been asked before. Yet when I asked her
about Appel’s hack and the Princeton group, next door across the Delaware
River, she appeared not to have heard of it. She assured me their system is
secure: “We program each of our machines individually—they’re never connected
to the Internet,” and an internal hard drive “creates a permanent record each
time that a vote is cast.”
At the end of the day, Arkoosh said, “the vote is
transcribed on a thermal tape, the machines are closed to lock, the information
is transferred to a standalone server that tallies the results.” She describes
the officials guarding the polling place, and adds for emphasis: “It would be
extraordinarily difficult for someone to do something like that during the
course of Election Day.”
I asked Halderman to red-team Arkoosh’s answer. “It’s
positive that they have procedures in place to cross-check that the counts
produced by each machine match the tabulated results,” Halderman wrote to me in
an email. “However, none of that provides any defense against the kinds of
attacks Andrew Appel wrote about, or the return-oriented programming attacks.”
He added, “An attacker with access to the administration system that’s used to
program the memory cartridges before the election could use ROP to distribute
malicious code to all the machines.”
“I can say that this is definitely a concern,” says
Kelly Green, the director of Voting Services in Montgomery County, who
continued to describe efforts and conversations across Pennsylvania to improve
the voting system. As a state issue, Green continued, “What I can tell you is,
we’ve put it on the agenda.”
***
What
would be the political motivation for
a state-sponsored attack? In the case of Russia hacking the Democrats, the
conventional wisdom would appear that Moscow would like to see President Donald
Trump strolling the Kremlin on a state visit. But the programmers also point
out that other states may be leery. “China has a huge amount to lose. They
would never dare do something like that,” says Wallach, who recently finished
up a term with the Air Force’s science advisory board. Still, statistical
threat assessment isn’t about likelihoods, they insist; it’s about anticipating
unlikelihood.
The good news is that Wallach thinks we’d smell
something fishy, and fairly fast: “If tampering happens, we will find it. But
you need to have a ‘then-what.’ If you detect electronic tampering, then what?”
No one has a straight answer, except for a uniform
agreement on one thing: chaos that would make 2000 look like child’s play.
(Trump aping about “rigged elections” before the vote is even underway has
certainly not helped.) The programmers suggest we ought to allow, for the
purposes of imagination, the prospect of a nationwide recount. Both sides would
accuse the other of corruption and sponsoring the attack. And the political response
to the country of origin would prove equally difficult—the White House is
reported to be gauging how best to respond to the DNC attack, a question that
poses no obvious answers. What does an Election Day cyberstrike warrant? Cruise
missiles?
The easiest and ostensibly cheapest defense—attaching
a voter-verified paper receipt to every digital touch screen—presents its own
problem. It assumes states audit procedures are robust. According to Pam Smith
at Verified Voting, over 20 states have auditing systems that are
inadequate—not using sufficient sample sizes, or auditing under only certain
parameters that could be outfoxed by a sophisticated attack—states that include
Virginia, Indiana and Iowa. But relying on paper trails also assumes voters
understand their importance. Many may simply discard the paper on the way out
without giving it a glance, or leave it hanging in the machine printer.
Optical scanning machines are far and away the first
choice of the programmers—as the Princeton group analogizes, they don’t require
receipts, they are the
receipts—and states are increasingly ditching touch screens in favor of them.
But the optical scans are still DRE models—we simply push paper, rather than
push buttons. Jeremy Epstein, the Virginia computer scientist who led the
charge against the WINVote system and now works out of DARPA, points out that
digital touch screens and optical scanning machines have something in common:
“Whether it’s an optical scanner or a DRE, the votes still get totaled on a
memory card. And at the end of the election, you put that memory card into a
central card system,” Epstein tells me. “You could use it to infect the
tabulator system, and once you infect the tabulator system, it could transmit
on.”
Then there are tech advancements that make the
computer scientists shudder: To a person, they each warned me about the
public’s new delusion, one strikingly reminiscent of the aftermath of Bush v. Gore—Internet voting. As Halderman’s
work began to garner more attention, he sensed a new trend around the idea of
voting online. With its lack of technical probity, an argument hanging entirely
on convenience, and a stampede of purveyors from for-profit cyber companies,
Halderman and others saw a facsimile of the voting machine companies they had
sought to marginalize just years earlier. Yet elected officials found appeal in
many of the same arguments. “In this world, we do so many things now online,”
Appel says, explaining the popularity of the idea. “You’re banking online. You
order coffee online. Somebody who’s used to living so much of their life online
will wonder why we’re not voting online.”
But Appel, and the others, share a categorical
warning: “It would be a disaster,” he tells me. “Anyone could hack in. The
Russians, the North Koreans, anyone who wishes.”
Like the voting machine companies, Internet voting
services—mostly purveying their software in private or corporate
elections—largely resist subjecting their work to public trial. That changed
when, in 2010, the District of Columbia announced its intention to launch a
citywide Internet voting platform, intended for overseas voters and a milestone
for the concept. Just a month before the midterm elections in November, the
District conducted a test drive. “It’s not every day, of course, that you’re
invited to hack into government computers without going to jail,” Halderman
says, muffling a giggle. “We didn’t
want to let this opportunity, to have this be a realistic simulation of an
attack, go to waste.”
On October 1, 2010, two employees in the Washington,
D.C.-based Office of the Chief Technology Officer, stormed down a hallway and
charged through the double-doors that opened into the basement-floor server
room. Earlier that day, they had learned strange news: Someone had called into
the hotline to report a bug on the board’s paperless ballot system. The program
seemed to play obnoxious brass-band music each time subjects submitted their
ballot.
The names on the ballots had all been changed to villainous robots: Bender for State Board of Education (from Futurama); Hal 9000 for Council Chairman
(from 2001: A Space Odyssey). Then
they learned that the hackers were likely watching them on the closed-circuit
circuit feed, through the camera that was gazing down at them, right now.
Some 520 miles away, the scene played on a screen in
the hacker’s cramped headquarters. A whiteboard behind the computer declared a
series of instructions in brown and purple marker, each skewered with a
squiggly strike-through, followed by a perfunctory checkmark: “Replace old
ballots.” Check. “Steal temp ballots. Check. “Rig to replace new ballots.”
Check. The hackers exchanged high-fives in adulation. And when the D.C. tech
officers’ faces appeared on the screen, Alex Halderman peered back.
Halderman, now a professor at the University of
Michigan, had not lost his mentors’ taste for the dramatic. He had just pulled
the most flamboyant hack in the short history of the Princeton group. Halderman
was called before the D.C. Council, where he got to make the speech he wanted
before a captive audience, who were forced to endure this barely 30-year-old’s
transported lecture seminar on the dangers of Internet voting.
Halderman shared a private, unreleased video with me
that he took from the night of the attack, a project he launched with the help
of two graduate students, each barely out of college. In the video, the team
huddles around Halderman’s small, beechwood office table, assuming a crouch in
a strange coven of furious typing. Hours pass as afternoon tips into evening.
Finally, a brown-haired student, Eric, slouched and raccoon-eyed, bolts
upright: “Oh my God,” he murmurs. “I have a shell.” “We’re in!” shouts his
blonde-haired compatriot, rubbing his hands. The furious typing resumes.
Halderman explained that the student had used a
technique called Shell Injection Vulnerability. He found a single, wayward
quotation mark in the code, a crack in the floorboard through which they drove
a tractor-trailer of attack commands.
Halderman’s attack is now well-known in the world of
elections administration; the Virginia election official I spoke with seemed
doubtful that Internet voting could ever take off, citing the conventional view
that the risks are too great. “Whether or not Internet voting happens, and
whether we will introduce these new risks—I don’t know,” he says. “I’m not
holding my breath.”
Internet voting companies have the same incentives as
voting tech conglomerates to convince the public they’re worth their mettle; as
in the case of HAVA, there would likely be an enormous windfall. In 2004,
Michigan deployed Internet voting in its Democratic primary. In 2009, West
Virginia greenlighted a pilot to allow overseas military vote online. This
year, the entire 2016 Utah primary was conducted online, and an initiative in
California to introduce online voting nearly made it onto the state ballot.
Halderman finds it hard to believe he now has to make
the same argument about the risk of hacking all over again. “It’s not something
only comic book villains can do,” he explains. “These are students right out of
college that are doing this.”
***
The
concept of voting in private is
an invention in American politics, and a recent one. The first time a secret
ballot was widely deployed was the presidential election of 1896—also the first
election in which someone was not murdered on Election Day, according to
Harvard professor Jill Lepore. The two are not a coincidence: Since the
earliest days of the republic, voting was almost entirely a collectivist act.
Citizens voted with their feet—standing on one side of a crowd or another,
caucus-style—a setup which manipulative party bosses plainly preferred.
The cadre of computer programmers who made their home
on the Princeton campus are now in a race, of sorts—against voting machine
companies, against Internet voting firms—to invent the future of secure voting.
And the most interesting ideas look to this 19th century arrangement not with
revulsion, but intrigue. It turns out that, from the perspective of
mathematical systems confirmation, Boss Tweed may have had a few things right.
After his testimony in Houston urging the council not
to adopt the machines, Wallach, the Rice professor, spent the proceeding years
working on research showing vulnerabilities on digital touch screens, and
testifying in state legislatures across the country. But Wallach’s focus has
shifted from diagnosis to cure, and he’s now working with Travis County, where
Austin is located, as a leading researcher on the newest innovation in voting
technology: Cryptographic voting.
Wallach walks backward through the concept by offering
a thought experiment. The most unimpeachable election technique would be to
count the votes on an enormous corkboard; every voter would pin his or her
vote, and the public would count the results together. Everyone would see the
votes, and everyone would agree on the result. Besides the problem of privacy
and intimidation (and, ostensibly, killings on Election Day), such a system is
ungainly—it’s a lot of corkboard. But encrypting the vote would allow a public
accounting while keeping the actual votes private: voters would make their
selection on a digital processing machine; they’d then receive an encrypted
receipt, a random assortment of numbers and letters. Their vote would then be
uploaded to a public bulletin board online; any voter could compare their
encrypted vote to see if it matched the numbers and letters online. The vote
itself would be scrambled and completely secret; a complex function, known as
homomorphic cryptography, would count the votes without unencrypting the
source.
“Crypto,” as it’s known in the field, would secure our
elections something close to permanently. But it would change fundamentally the
way we vote. It would make the act of gawking at random source code a civic
requirement. And it would abolish the concept of a countable “ballot,” forcing
us to trust that incomprehensible code is the equivalent of a ballot.
Cryptographic voting is still years away from ready. But it also begs the
question of whether the concept has simply transferred a technocratic leap of
faith from one part of the electronic system to another one. It seemed
difficult to believe, after a bruising decade of invisible votes and
disappearing ballots, that voters would put their faith in something so
abstract. After four explanations from Wallach, I was still dumbfounded.
Wallach and other researchers point to another
safeguard that is closer to application-ready, a new method of auditing. The
technique is called Risk Limited Auditing, statistical innovation worked out by
Philip Stark, a statistics professor at the University of California, Berkeley.
The auditing techniques of most states aren’t sophisticated enough to detect a
subtle attack—every 100th vote switched from Trump to Hillary Clinton, for
instance. “The whole point of a Risk Limiting Audit is not to find the tally
down to the last digit,” explains Wallach. “The problem you’re trying to figure
out is if the error rate is big enough that I could change who won.” RLA would
enhance the auditing prospects of most states, 25 of which have inadequate
auditing procedures, according to Verified Voting. Colorado is expected to
implement RLA next year.
But there may be a simpler hack at hand. Appel, the
Princeton cybersecurity expert—master of numbers, merry prankster of
machines—proposes a radical idea to this 15-year nightmare: What if we took a
page from the town criers of two centuries ago, and simply read the precinct
results out loud?
“There’s a very simple and old-fashioned recipe that
we use in our American democracy,” Appel says. “The vote totals in each polling
place are announced at the time the polls closed, in the polling place, to all
observers—the poll workers, the party challengers, any citizen that’s observing
the closing of the polls.” He goes on to describe how the totals in that
precinct would be written on a piece of paper—pencils do just fine—then signed
by the poll workers who have been operating that polling site.
“Any citizen can independently add up the precinct-by-precinct
totals,” he continues. “And that’s a very important check. It’s a way that with
our precinct-based polling systems, we can have some assurance that hacked
computers could not undetectably change the results of our election.”
There could be a greater lesson in Appel’s point.
Technology didn’t create the problem. Perhaps technology is intrinsic to the
problem—our lack of trust that has metastasized in a surveillance culture was
bound to aggrandize the problems of voting, the most trusting civic act we
know. It seems unlikely to expect a singular cure to the American presidential
election, not because of the incomprehensibility of cryptography or the
untrustworthiness of tech companies, but because there is no such thing as the
singular election: 8,000 jurisdictions in a leaky mess of federalism and poorly
spent dollars. The neat results and cable announcements on election night
represent an optical illusion, like a series of ones and zeroes, whizzing
beyond our apprehension.
Wallach’s encomium on cryptography reminded me of
another tech item: The concept of shared fate, sometimes referenced in drone
research. Researchers have long suggested our planes and trains could be made
safer were they run by highly precise robots, or drone pilots—cool customers who
don’t have to save a burning plane while worrying about turbulence and
screaming passengers. It may be one of the most enduring examples of psychology
trumping technocracy: Even though systems would run better—even save
lives—everyone knows this arrangement is unworkable. Humans require knowing
that there’s someone, like us, in the cockpit. We need to know we’ll
endure a shared fate.
If this century has shifted our trust from away from
our neighbors toward machines, it might be time to switch back again. Eight
countries in Europe that once flirted with digital voting have seen six go back
to paper; Britain counted its Brexit votes by hand. Even if the vote were never
hacked—and it is an exceedingly implausible event—the remotest possibility is
an albatross on democracy and a boon for mischief-makers, and not just the
cyber attackers. Trump’s most recent jujitsu—pointing out that by virtue of the
fact that the election is hackable, it could be rigged against him—illustrates
this risk. Technology has amplified not only the threat of hacking, but the
threat of a hack.
The Princeton alums can warn us—but they can’t protect
us. “We are in a collision-course between the technology we use in election
administration and the growing reality of politically motivated, statelevel
cyberattacks,” Halderman tells me, arm propped on his red office chair,
sunlight pouring through his westward window. “We sit around all day and write
research papers. But these people are full-time exploiters. They’re
the professionals. We’re the amateurs.”
No comments:
Post a Comment