A top goal of Russian foreign policy is to erode Western opposition to
its aggression in Ukraine. But many of Moscow’s tactics are clumsy and
self-defeating. Not surprisingly, the European Union is likely once again to
renew sanctions.
Some in Europe are uneasy with the
robust sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine,
especially those in the financial and energy sectors that harm economic
interests in the sanctioning countries.
A top goal of Russian foreign policy is to erode Western opposition to
its aggression in Ukraine. But many of Moscow’s tactics are clumsy and
self-defeating. Not surprisingly, the European Union is likely once again to
renew sanctions.
Some in Europe are uneasy with the
robust sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine,
especially those in the financial and energy sectors that harm economic
interests in the sanctioning countries.
Last month in Japan, however, G-7 leaders—including U.K. Prime
Minister David Cameron, French President Francois Hollande, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi—backed them. The
sanctions were “linked to Russia’s complete implementation of the Minsk agreements
and respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty.”
To seek relief from Western sanctions,
the Kremlin is waging a campaign of public distortion and intimidation aimed at
splitting Europe from America, and Europeans from each other.
And there are, to be sure, troubling
indications of support for sanctions relief, such as from leading German Social
Democrats and the French Senate, which on Wednesday voted a nonbinding
resolution calling for a "gradual and partial" lifting of sanctions,
plus dark rumors that Hungary’s right-wing government may seek to block
consensus on sanctions renewal at this month’s European Union summit. But
Russia’s overall effort is weakened by internal contradictions.
How has Moscow erred? Seeing Europeans
as weak, unprincipled and gullible, the Kremlin angers and dismays them by its
war on Ukraine and associated propaganda. A similar error in the early 1980s
caused Moscow to fail to achieve its top foreign policy goal—dissuading NATO
from deploying Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles in Europe as a
counter to comparable Soviet SS-20 missiles.
As Mark Twain observed,
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” How so with Moscow’s
policies on missiles in the 1980s and Ukraine today?
·
In the 1980s, Soviet propagandists hoped to weaken the
commitment of the UK and West Germany to deploying NATO INF missiles by
lambasting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl. Today, Russian propagandists back British exit from the European
Union, opposed by Cameron; they attack Angela Merkel; and in France they
support populist leader Marie Le Pen, who opposes Hollande.
·
In the 1980s, the Soviet war of Afghanistan and
support for martial law in Poland undermined Moscow’s effort to charm the West
into scuttling its missile plan. Now, Moscow’s attempt to weaken Western
sanctions is being undermined by its backing of repeated violations of the
ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, called for in the Minsk agreements, and by military
intimidation tactics in the Nordic-Baltic region.
·
The downing of passenger airliners played a role then
and now. In 1983, two months before INF missiles were to be deployed, the
Soviets downed Korean Airlines 007, causing 269 deaths. In 2014 over Ukraine,
Russian forces or their proxies shot down Malaysian Airlines 17, causing 298
fatalities. In both cases Moscow showed no contrition, thereby hardening
attitudes in the West.
·
In November 1981 President
Ronald Reagan proposed the elimination of INF missiles in Europe as part of a
“dual-track” policy of preparing to deploy the missiles along with negotiations
to eliminate the need for them. NATO did deploy in late 1983, but four years
later a treaty embodying the zero option was concluded. Today, NATO’s dual
tracks seek full implementation of the Minsk agreements while at the same time
beefing up security and economic aid to Ukraine and strengthening the
alliance’s military capabilities in Central Europe and the Nordic-Baltic –
where the foreign ministers of Finland and Sweden were recently included in
NATO deliberations for the first time.
·
Then, credible INF negotiations were important for
preserving NATO unity on missile deployments. Today, Western insistence on
implementation of the Minsk agreements – whatever their deficiencies – is vital
for retaining European backing of sanctions.
In the early 1980s, Western
unity was strained by differences over the transfer of technology to the USSR
for construction of a large gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe, and by
President Ronald Reagan’s plan for a futuristic initiative to develop defenses
against long-range ballistic missiles, which would have violated the
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Today, the West has no internal disagreements of
comparable importance, making it harder for the Kremlin to fracture consensus.
These factors, taken together,
undermine Moscow’s aim of weakening Western opposition to Russia’s aggression
in Ukraine. Propaganda and deception by Russia Today and Sputnik appear
to be less than effective. Even so, heightened leftist and nationalist
pressures in Europe could wear down support for sanctions. The West must bend
every effort to maintain a unified position on them.
Broader public opinion may be
amenable to holding the line. In mid-May, the favored Russian performer in the
wildly popular Eurovision Song Contest lost to the Ukrainian entry. The
Russians cried foul, claiming that in their voting, other European
countries had politicized the contest. This may not have been a case of Russian
paranoia. Nobody likes a bully.
William Courtney is an adjunct senior
fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and was U.S. ambassador
to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Michael Haltzel is a senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations of Johns Hopkins.
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