In 1875, Chae Chan Ping left
San Francisco for China with a certificate promising him re-entry upon his
return. Congress had recently banned new laborers from China, but it had made
an exception for previous residents who held certificates like Ping’s. While
Ping was gone, however, Congress expanded the ban to include even
certificate-holding previous residents – a complete surprise to Ping when he
arrived back in San Francisco twelve years later.
Ping’s lawsuit, the Chinese Exclusion Case, would go before the Supreme
Court in 1889 and, as Polly Price argued in a recent lecture sponsored by the
Supreme Court Historical Society, provide a foundation for immigration case law
in the Progressive Era.
As Price explained, the Court
– in a unanimous opinion by Justice Stephen Field – held that the judiciary had
no role whatsoever in reviewing immigration choices made by Congress. The Court
did not suggest that this broad bestowal of legislative authority was “implied”
by the Commerce Clause or another enumerated power in the Constitution. Rather,
the Court considered such power inherent in the existence of any national
government for the purposes of domestic tranquility, such that it need not be
related to the Constitution or previous precedent like the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798. “That the government of the United States, through the action of
the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory,” Price read
directly from Field’s opinion for the Court, “is a proposition which we do not
think open to controversy.”
Four years later in the case Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, the Court further allowed Congress to expel Chinese
residents at will, again disavowing a judicial role in immigration decisions.
As Price elaborated, the Court did not consider deportation to be punishment,
with the result that it did not regard typical criminal protections as
applicable. Both the Democratic and Republican Parties supported the ruling and
incorporated into their platforms further restrictions on Chinese labor. With
promises to be tough on the Chinese, Field himself ran twice for president –
while still serving as a Justice.
As Price argued, these cases
broadly influenced modern immigration law in three important ways. First, Price
emphasized, they cemented authority between the branches of government and
between the federal government and the states. Complete authority rested with
the political branches of the federal government, although, as Price noted, the
Court did not articulate any boundaries differentiating executive and
legislative responsibility. Price suggested that perhaps the Court did not
foresee strong differences in opinion between the branches arising, as they did
last year in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.
In contrast, the states had no
such authority. In the 1886 case Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Field wrote another majority
opinion invalidating under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a California law aimed at forcing Chinese laundries to close. As
Price clarified, at this time the Equal Protection Clause solely limited
states, not the federal government. Only with the “due process revolution” of
the twentieth century did the Supreme Court apply the Equal Protection Clause
to the federal government through reverse incorporation of the Fifth Amendment.
Second, Price highlighted that
these cases provided a blueprint for future congressional bans on immigration.
Modeled off the Chinese restrictions, the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885
prohibited “imported contract labor,” regardless of the country of origin, and Price
described in detail a Progressive Era defined by increasingly restrictive
immigration controls. In 1903, Congress banned anarchists, polygamists, and
beggars. In 1906, English became a requirement. In 1917, immigrants had to pass
literacy tests and all immigrants from Asia were banned. And in 1921, the
National Origins Act placed quotas on immigration for many countries, which
were further restricted in 1924 and extended in 1929. As Price noted for
context, 200,000 immigrants entered the United States in 1922, down from one
million fifteen years earlier.
As Price argued, this
expansion of immigration bans reveals that limits related more to conflicts
between industrialists and domestic workers than strictly to racial biases. The
Chinese laws had in fact made exceptions for Chinese merchants, teachers, and
professionals; Congress only banned laborers. Price also suggested that the
case Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, in which the Court made an
exception to the Alien Contract Labor Act to permit an Anglican priest to come
to the United States, further demonstrates that restrictions were primarily
about cheap labor. Within this context, Price underscored that the Supreme Court
in this period consistently ruled against the interests of industrialists.
The final important
consequence that Price discussed – which relates to debates ongoing today – was
clarification in 1898 of birthright citizenship. San Francisco officials denied
entry to Wong Kim Ark as he returned from a trip to China. As Ark had been born
in California, he claimed citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
the federal government argued that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to
former slaves, not Chinese immigrants, the Court ruled seven to two for Ark.
Being born in the United States made one an American citizen.
Andrew Hamm, Polly Price on the Chinese Exclusion Case and immigration in the Progressive Era, SCOTUSblog (May. 27, 2016, 5:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/polly-price-on-the-chinese-exclusion-case-and-immigration-in-the-progressive-era/
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