Lilia Shevtsova
How the pragmatists interpret the crisis over Ukraine.
Editor’s Note: How do Russia and the West see one
another? What are the experts’ views on the confrontation between Russia and
the West? How do the pundits explain the Russo-Ukrainian war and Russia’s
Syrian gambit? What are the roots of the mythology about Russia in the West,
and why has the West failed to predict and understand Russia’s trajectory? This
is the seventh essay in a series that seeks to answer these questions.
Read part six here.
Russia’s war
against Ukraine has disproven quite a few predictions, testing the expert
community’s ability to analyze the situation and foresee developments. For
instance, respected Russia experts have long claimed that Russia had already
become a “post-imperial” state and stressed that they saw no grounds for
adversarial relations between the West and Russia, or for Russia’s
neoimperialism.
“The imperial longing is over…. Russia…is moving toward
modernity…. The West again has become Russia’s ally”, they argued in 2012. When the 2014 crisis emerged, the
pundits who had been proclaiming the end of anti-Western sentiments and
Moscow’s abandonment of imperial policies found themselves in a predicament.
Trying to make sense of the Ukraine conflict, they decided to turn to
geopolitics. Here is their new mantra: “The key to anticipating Russia’s next moves
in Ukraine is to understand that its policy has been driven by geopolitical considerations
that have nothing to do with Russian expansionism or imperial nostalgia and
only little with the need to win domestic political support for President
Putin.” What an interesting analytical invention!
Let us ruminate over what “geopolitical considerations”
could mean; and do they really have nothing to do with expansionism or
imperialist nostalgia? Why have the experts suddenly returned to the ideas of
Halford John Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Carl Haushofer, and Friedrich
Ratzel? Andrei Kortunov, director of the Russian International Affairs Council,
offers the following explanation of the new infatuation with
geopolitics:
The geopolitical paradigm, which treats the world as a
stage for the inevitable confrontation between a number of ‘great areas’ or
global regions, quite easily justifies the desirability, or even necessity, of
the hegemony of a ‘central’ or ‘axial’ power in each region. What is more, it
justifies the inalienable right of these powers to an exclusive sphere of
influence. Finally, the geographical determinism of geopolitics (‘geography is
destiny’) is a basis for the notion that states, nations and politicians follow
some kind of unalterable, linear and preordained historical mission—a mission
that cannot be chosen, but that has to be recognized, accepted and carried out,
no matter the cost or what might get in the way.
So we don’t need to torture ourselves by looking for
the origins or motivations in Russia’s domestic developments or roots of its
great-power traditions: “This is geopolitics, stupid!”
The refrain that Ukraine has been turned into a
“battlefield for geopolitical struggle” between Russia and the West has
gradually become axiomatic. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is at the heart of a
great geopolitical confrontation (Russia vs. the West), Sergei Karaganov and most pragmatists claim.
But why didn’t the pragmatists warn us that the U.S.-Russian
“reset” and European “Partnership for Modernization” (that many of them
supported) would inevitably end according to the geopolitical logic of
confrontation? Why had the pragmatists talked of “strategic dialogue” between
Russia and the United States until recently (see part 5), trying to convince us that both sides can
cooperate and even be partners, when, as it turns out, they subscribe to
geopolitical theories that posit the inevitability of a geopolitical clash?
When are the pragmatists being serious, and when are they pretending?
Let’s ask another question: Does geopolitics really
exclude expansionism and imperialism, as pragmatists argue? No, these are the
key ingredients of the geopolitical approach, and one should have a look at
what the leading ideologues of geopolitics wrote to see the connection. I must
also to say an unpleasant truth: Fascism and Nazi ideology used geopolitics as
their basis. It could happen that contemporary fans of geopolitics have not
read, for instance, one of the leading geopolitical minds, Karl Haushofer, and
have not heard about his theory ofLebensraum, which became one of the premises
of Nazi doctrine; otherwise, one would hope they would think twice before
turning to geopolitics to justify their conclusions.
The German expert Egbert Jan explains the newfound
popularity of geopolitics in Russia as being driven by the “sense of uncertainty”
of the Russian political elite and their attempts to overcome it using
dangerous mechanisms. He notes that in postwar Germany, “geopolitics as an
effort to create spheres of influence or even achieve global domination is
taboo, since many interpret it as the legitimation of an ideology that serves
National Socialist, aggressive and destructive policies.”1However,
what has been prohibited in Germany has become a popular theory in Russia and,
subsequently, in some Western states, where the Russian interpretation
frequently finds its echo.
One of the most popular geopolitical arguments is, of
course, about the threat of NATO expansion, which would inevitably swallow up
Ukraine, thus threatening Russia’s security. Since many experts apparently
realize the inadequacy of this explanation, they have begun to blame “the EU
expansion” as well. Former UK Ambassador to Russia Tony Brenton says, “It is generally accepted…that the EU
precipitated matters by blundering into the most sensitive part of Russia’s
backyard.” His assertion is echoed by John Mearsheimer, who claims that the Ukrainian Association Agreement
with the EU “sounds like a backdoor to NATO membership.”
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer in their book, Conflict in Ukraine:
The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order, present a stimulating account of the factors
that have triggered the dramatic developments in Ukraine and raise important
questions about the crisis. However, one gets the impression that, among the
factors that brought this crisis, according to the authors, one stands out as
crucial: Brussels’s gamble in trying to wrench Ukraine from Russia without
taking note of Russia’s sensitivity. Sweden, Poland, and the Baltics appear in
this view to be playing a rather cynical role; instead of being concerned about
values or democracy, they are supposedly trying to turn Ukraine into a buffer
against Russia. Their narrative, despite containing many valuable observations,
fits the pragmatic approach, which emphasizes geopolitical causes and Russia’s
humiliation.
Andrew Weiss has also argued that Europe repeatedly
refused to hear Russia’s concerns, effectively forcing a conflict by insisting
on a trade deal with Europe that was incompatible with Russia’s customs union.
“In some ways the EU has taken maximalist positions with the Russians and acted
as if they were surprised that Russia took offense or got angry,” Weiss told the New York Times.
A question for those who believe that the EU agreement
was a “backdoor to NATO membership”: Didn’t the Brussels bureaucracy prepare
Association Agreements for a number of countries, including Azerbaijan and
Armenia, which are neither democratic nor potential NATO members? The
Association Agreement carries not even a hint that it might guarantee a path to
immediate EU membership, let alone NATO membership; indeed the very idea would
have been a nightmare for Brussels. The Agreement is deliberately vague to free the EU of any obligations with
respect to these countries. Let us also remember that, until the fall of 2013,
Moscow wasn’t particularly concerned about the Association Agreement, which was
also confirmed on numerous occasions by EU leaders, specifically by José Manuel
Barroso, who communicated with Putin at that time and never heard any
objections. Hens, no maximalist position on the part of Brussels; Moscow had
never expressed any concerns! The pragmatists may also ask themselves why
Moscow began demanding that Kiev and not Azerbaijan abandon the Agreement.
Perhaps the answer to the question has something to do with the Kremlin’s new
survival doctrine and the special role Ukraine plays in it?
Anyway, in order to avoid further accusations the EU
during 2015 did everything in its power to convince Moscow that the Ukrainian
trade deal with the EU would not harm Russia’s interests. The EU’s Trade
Commissioner Cecilla Malmstrom held 15 talks with Ukrainian and Russian
ministers but failed to persuade the Russian side. “Russia’s continued
insistence on a legally binding agreement, which would amount to a reopening of
the bilateral agreement between the EU and Ukraine, couldn’t be accommodated,
as has been clear throughout these talks”, the European Commission
said in a
statement.
Finally, what about Ukrainians’ drive for dignity and
their readiness to sacrifice for being a European nation? Why dismiss them,
when they played the key role in influencing the developments?
One of the most thought provoking and provocative
books is Frontline Ukraine:
Crisis in the Borderlands (2015) by Richard Sakwa. His analysis of oligarchic power in
Ukraine is tough and fair, and his accounts of other Ukrainian developments are
informative. I find Sakwa’s narrative especially useful because it gives the
most intelligent articulation of the position that I oppose and helps me to
find counter-arguments. James Sherr, an associate fellow and former head of the
Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, writes,
It is the author’s analysis of Russian policy that is
most likely to divide his readers. Putin emerges in these pages as a reluctant
and rightfully aggrieved antagonist, alienated ‘not so much from the structures
of hegemonic power but from its practices,’ and determined to ‘ensure the
universal application of existing norms.’ Yet these norms emphasize the
sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of states. Russia’s insistence
that it be accorded a ‘privileged’ role in the former USSR was not accepted
elsewhere, let alone universally, and this is the nub of the problem. Once we
accept Sakwa’s imperious claim that Ukraine is ‘an issue of survival’ for
Russia, we put Ukraine’s survival at Russia’s discretion.2
No further comment.
I would also agree with the British expert Andrew
Wilson, who, in his latest book,Ukraine Crisis: What
It Means for the West, emphasizes the role of the Russian factor in the crisis. Wilson also
looks at the EU but sees its role differently, describing its inability to
respond to Russia’s pressure.
A few more explanations of the confrontation over
Ukraine have already become part of the new mythology. For instance, both
Western and Russian pragmatists continue to insist that there was a coup in
Ukraine. Left and right are united on this basis. Stephen Cohen talks of an
“unlawful change of government in Kiev.” Patrick J. Buchanan repeats a similar line, referring to “the Maidan coup that overthrew
the elected pro-Russian government.”
That’s understandable: the pragmatists must insist on
the illegitimacy of the new Ukrainian government, which points to the
inadequacy of Ukraine as a state. Otherwise, it would have been hard to demand
that Ukraine limit its sovereignty and allow other states to determine what it
can or cannot do on its own territory. Declaring the developments in Ukraine to
be an “unconstitutional coup” also allows the pragmatists to treat the
country’s democratic changes, which many pragmatists are wary of, as
illegitimate.
Let’s see how a group of international experts has
analyzed the events in Ukraine in their report to the Valdai Forum and at
subsequent discussions in Berlin and Paris in 2014–15. The outcome highlights
the Kremlin’s abilities to manipulate even analysts with reputations for
independence. Here are the report’s key conclusions: The Maidan was “a sort of a de facto alliance
that was formed between neo-Nazis and national democrats;” the fall of the
Yanukovych regime was “violence with ‘sacred victims’”; the opposition “was
deliberately breaking conventions and turning the protest into a civil war”;
and “as soon as Yanukovych fled Kiev, power was grabbed by extreme right
radicals, who gave armed nationalists free reign.” One could only wonder at
this astounding convergence between the international expert community and the
Kremlin’s propaganda corps.
We should listen to the Ukrainian-American historian
and writer Alexander J. Motyl, who describes a phenomenon that he calls the “surrealism of realism.” One of the biggest flaws of adherents of this
approach, according to Motyl, is the “ignorance about Ukraine” which is “wide
and deep, affecting virtually every aspect of American—and more generally
Western—intellectual life….” The Russo-Ukrainian war “confronted realists with
an explanatory and policy task for which they were wholly unprepared.
Few could
read Russian; my guess is that none know Ukrainian,” says Motyl. As a
demonstration of the experts’ failures, he quotes Henry Kissinger and Stephen
Cohen, but the list of embarrassing comments on Ukraine would certainly be a
long one. I agree with Motyl that ignorance and lack of knowledge (and lack of
readiness to learn and understand!) offers at least a partial explanation for
the fact that the pragmatists as a rule swallow the official Russian line. The
key problem is that their analytical exercises still influence both Western and
Kremlin policies. In the first case, it provokes desire the follow the familiar
path of acquiescence; in the second, it disorients Moscow as to the nature of
the West.
1Jan, “What Is Geopolitics?” Schlangenbad Discussions Speech (April 2013).
2Sherr, International Affairs (May 2015).
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