Over the past month, the Kremlin has turned up the dial once again in its
low intensity war in Ukraine’s east.
In September 2015, when the Kremlin decided to intervene in Syria, it
reduced the violence in the Donbas and reined in local fighters who opposed
this course. Before September, ceasefire violations had averaged 70 to 80 fire incidents per day, before dropping to 30 to 40.
At that time, it was clear to Moscow that its operation in Ukraine was not
succeeding. Ukraine had stabilized defensive lines; it made sense to pause as
the Kremlin focused its military attention on Syria. Moscow hoped that a
reduction in violence—but not a total ceasefire—might persuade the EU to ease
sanctions in December. This ploy failed and sanctions were renewed for six
months.
Since January, the daily number of fire incidents in the Donbas again jumped to more than 70. In addition, over the past six weeks pro-Russian forces
in the area have committed 73 weapons violations (the maintenance of heavy
weapons in an area prohibited by the ceasefire) as opposed to 12 by Ukrainian
forces. And observers have noted 88 tanks assembled on the Russian side of the
ceasefire line near Debaltseve.
Moscow’s decision to increase hostilities in Ukraine’s east is related both
to the war in Syria and the situation in Ukraine and Europe. Through the end of
2015, the Kremlin operation in Syria was not going well. It is true that
Russia’s intervention quickly stopped the retreat of the Assad regime, which
had been steadily losing territory to its opponents through the first eight
months of 2015. Still, by late last year, the Kremlin intervention had only
restored 0.004 percent of Syrian territory to Assad’s control.
In January, however, the tide of battle in Syria began to turn. Moscow resorted to carpet bombing the weak Western
opposition and civilian centers in urban areas on the road to Aleppo—a tactic
that it used successfully in the second Chechen war. The bombing campaign has
routed those forces, produced massive civilian casualties, and driven the
civilian population into flight. It has allowed Assad’s forces to capture
significant territory in the approach to Aleppo and has exacerbated the refugee
crisis in Europe. Seeing progress in Syria culminating now in a ceasefire and
increasing pressure on Europe, Moscow decided that it could raise the stakes again
in Ukraine.
There were other reasons too for this Kremlin decision. Moscow’s objectives
in Ukraine have not changed since former President Viktor Yanukovych fled for
Russia in February 2014. If Russia cannot restore a pro-Russian government in
Kiev, it will destabilize the current Western-oriented leadership by
maintaining control in parts of the Donbas and keeping military pressure on the
country. Moscow saw no downside to upping military operations.
Sadly, the Western reaction to Putin’s growing aggression in Ukraine has
vindicated Moscow’s calculations. Despite the clear increase of ceasefire
violations from the Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine, German Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault
lectured Ukraine on fulfilling its commitments under the Minsk process on
February 23 in Kiev. Steinmeier said publicly that the “peace plan drawn up
last year in Minsk between Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine has stalled as
both warring parties violate a ceasefire and Kiev fails to pass a key electoral
law.”
The key to ending the war in Ukraine’s east is a clear understanding of its
origins and nature. It is not a Ukrainian civil war; it is a not-so covert war,
led, financed, and armed by Moscow. Estimates of Russian troops in the Donbas
range from several hundred to ten thousand.
The most important, immediate commitment under Minsk II is to stop
shooting. Since the Minsk II ceasefire, 375 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed
and 1,500 wounded. In that same period, Ukraine has lost several hundred square
kilometers of territory. Yes, Ukraine has made a commitment to pass a law for
local elections in the Russian-occupied territory, but such elections cannot be
held as long as there are daily violations of the ceasefire. Russian heavy
weapons remain in the occupied territories and Moscow’s proxies do not permit
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors free
access to all sites under their control.
The best thing that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President
Francois Hollande can do right now is to note the increase in violence and call
on Putin to end it. If the violence in the Donbas does not end, they should
announce their intention to table the summer renewal of sanctions at the March
EU Foreign Ministers Meeting. The U.S. should do its part, too. President
Barack Obama should provide anti-tank missiles to Ukraine before summer if the
Kremlin continues to violate the ceasefire.
John E. Herbst is Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the
Atlantic Council. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.
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