Halya Coynash
It is one year
exactly since President Petro Poroshenko put forward Viktor Shokin as
Prosecutor General, a post Shokin controversially holds to this day.
Shokin promised back then to conclude investigations into crimes committed
under the Viktor Yanukovych regime, in particular the gunning down of
protesters and other crimes linked with Euromaidan.
As another
anniversary of the bloody carnage on Maidan approaches, there have been the
customary announcements of ‘breakthroughs’, this time with both the Prosecutor
General’s Office and the Security Service [SBU] reporting the finding of an
arsenal of weapons. This may be linked with Maidan, but it was found many
months ago. Such obvious attempts around anniversaries to come up with
some proof of ‘progress’ only serve to highlight how little has, in fact, been
achieved.
Back in Nov
2015, lawyers representing the families of people killed on Maidan were
blistering in their criticism. At a press conference they said that
attempts by Ukraine’s leaders to imitate decisive actions around the
anniversaries of Euromaidan pose a real threat to proper investigation and
significantly increase the likelihood of cases collapsing at trial level, or
resulting in unwarranted acquittals (details here).
The Special
Investigations Department, created in late 2014, has made some progress.
This, however, is in spite of, rather than thanks to the Prosecutor General’s
Office and the Interior Ministry which have both sought to gain control over a
body intended to be independent.
Neither the
Prosecutor General’s Office nor the Interior Ministry has reacted adequately to
the damning criticism of the investigation into the disturbances and fire in
Odesa on May 2, 2014. Let’s hope it is unwarranted cynicism to anticipate
the next ‘breakthroughs’ around April this year.
In an article for New Times,
Oleksandra Horchinska considered Shokin’s first year in office, identifying
what she called 10 ‘special operations’ during that period. She first
spoke with political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko who believes that one should
assess Shokin’s first year in relation to his predecessors.
He says that
there was no suggestion of reform under Oleh Makhnytsky, who held the post for
4 months from Feb 24, 2014. Under Vitaly Yarema reform was discussed, but
no more. “Under Shokin reform has nonetheless begun”, he says, though he
adds that there is considerable criticism over how the reform is going.
He considers that the Prosecutor General himself is not so much going against
this reform, as trying to defend his position within its framework.
That is a
kinder view than many express. After the serious degradation of all law
enforcement bodies under the Yanukovych regime, it was generally recognized as
vital that proper procedure was implemented to ensure that the best candidates
for prosecutor were chosen, especially those in managerial positions.
Shokin has been accused by reformers like one of his deputies, Vitaly Kasko and
the Centre for Political and Legal Reform of effectively sabotaging the process. The
supposed overhaul and restructuring, in fact, resulted in 84% of the local
prosecutors whom Shokin appointed being people who had previously been district
prosecutors, most under Yanukovych.
One of the
‘special operations’ might better be referred to as the lack of such. The
expected, and promised, investigations into the activities of people linked
with the Yanukovych regime have also not really eventuated.
Yanukovych
and his closest associations fled to Russia, but a number of people who played
a prominent role remained.
Among those
Horchitska mentions are Serhiy Klyuev whose immunity as an MP was removed in
June 2015, in order for him to face charges of abuse of power and squandering
state property. That, at least, is the theory, since he was instead
allowed to escape abroad via territory under Kremlin-backed militant control.
It was learned
in December last year that even the house arrest restrictions against Olena
Lukash, Justice Minister under the regime of Viktor Yanukovych had been removed.
Despite having been on the wanted list over her believed role in crimes against
Euromaidan activists, Lukash has only been charged with economic crimes.
Her release
coincided with the disturbing circus over the detention of Hennady Korban,
close associate of oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and at the time head of a new
political party UKROP.
Korban is a
controversial figure, but the manner in which he was arrested, and then the 30-hour
detention hearing, aroused serious concern. Most worrying is the
fact that few if any observers seriously considered the possibility that
President Poroshenko had had nothing to do with the arrest. Yury Butusov’s comments reflected
concern felt by many:
“The authorities that allowed Serhiy Klyuev to freely
leave the country; that have not arrested one leader of the Party of the
Regions; that have not touched Yanukovych’s partner [Rinat] Akhmetov; and not
one of the people who took part in handing over Donbas; nor Vilkul who broke up
the Dnipropetrovsk Euromaidan, nor Kernes who dispersed the Kharkiv Euromaidan;
nor businessman Grigorishin who financed the Communist Party of Ukraine – the
Kremlin’s agents, … have arrested one of the open opponents of President
Poroshenko.”
Unlike Korban,
two high-ranking prosecutors, Volodymyr Shapakin and Oleksandr Korniyets who is
a personal friend of Shokin’s are not in custody despite overwhelming evidence
of major corruption. The ‘case of the diamond prosecutors’ was one of
examples cited by US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt in an address in
which he expressed concern about
the actions of the current Prosecutor General, accusing him of undermining
reforms, blocking important prosecutions, and defending corrupt
prosecutors.
That criticism
has been reiterated by renowned analysts like Anders Aslund from the Atlantic
Council and Hannah Thoburn from the Hudson Institute. Aslund points out that even
without other concerns, Shokin’s role in blocking reform should be enough to
dismiss him.
Ukraine’s
leaders are seriously jeopardizing international support and the country’s
future through inability to reject corrupt dealings and old methods of
political control. These include choice of Prosecutor General on criteria
of political loyalty.
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