That date is
absolutely guaranteed to pass with the agreement far from implemented.
Indeed it is months away from being implemented even if there were
goodwill from all involved – and to be blunt there simply is not that goodwill.
However, in the
complete absence of Plan B, the Minsk II Plan A is all there is, and by default
cannot simply be thrown into the politico/diplo rubbish bin of historically
failed agreements – at least not without an alternative, as diplomacy and
negotiations rather like frameworks and parameters within which to negotiate.
Thus there is a
simple choice to be made.
To let the deadline
pass without first agreeing and documenting an extension, or simply letting it
pass and acknowledging all bets are off and then dealing with the consequences
– whatever they may prove to be.
Ergo, it has to be reasonably expected that a formal
and documented extension will be forthcoming prior to 31st December 2015, even
if any agreed time frame is likely to be met with similar bad-faith negotiation
and distinctly lacking adherence to Minsk II by certain parties.
Any extension will
undoubtedly lead to Ukraine unilaterally (for the most part) implementing its
side of the agreement.
If that be so, many
will argue, why should Ukraine continue to unilaterally implement the agreement
– an agreement which is clearly onerous upon Ukraine as it is? Further,
why formalise any deadline extensions when that be the case?
The arguments for
Ukraine doing so are that it is seen to be honouring the obligations it (albeit
under duress) agreed to – unlike The Kremlin. Perverse as it may seem,
being seen to honour agreements even when they are not convenient tends to
breed trust and confidence with friendly and partner nations (and/or
institutions).
Honoring all agreements, even those that are onerous
and/or politically prickly, sets Ukraine apart from The Kremlin. By doing
so it makes it far more difficult to argue politically to remove sanctions
imposed upon Russia if Ukraine is complying when The Kremlin simply isn’t.
The need to formally
document an agreed extension also relates to sanctions.
Sanctions placed upon
The Kremlin were tied to the full and complete implementation of Minsk II which
is not going to happen before the stated 31st December deadline within the agreement.
Accepting the premise/argument that the agreement is formally dead when
that date falls due, will lead to certain capitals mumbling quite loudly that
as the agreement is null and void, then the sanctions cannot be tied to an
agreement that has expired – thus they should be removed.
It therefore serves
Ukraine, if maintaining western sanctions is considered a priority, to formally
extend the Minsk II agreement and document a new implementation deadline – even
if that continues to mean unilateral and onerous implementation.
The question
therefore is how long should any extension be in any formal document?
3 months is simply
too short to achieve all that requires to be done both politically and
bureaucratically. Is 6 months more realistic? Is 9 months too long,
or still not long enough? 12 months would seem perhaps too long, for the
entire point of a deadline is to have one that provides a stimulus for action.
(If any action is likely of course.)
Naturally it does not
follow that The Kremlin will have any more intention of fulfilling its
obligations within any new formally documented time scale, but from a Ukrainian
perspective (if continued western sanctions against Russia are a political
priority), a new formally agreed and documented extension would seem somewhat
sensible – but how long should any extension be?
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