Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and
Vice Chancellor from 1998-2005
BERLIN – With Russia’s military invasion and
annexation of Crimea, and the subsequent war in eastern Ukraine, President
Vladimir Putin has made it abundantly clear that he has no intention of
respecting the inviolability of borders and the primacy of international legal
norms. It is time for Europeans to end their wishful thinking of a continental
order determined by the rule of law. The world, unfortunately, isn’t like that.
It is much harder, and power rules.
Russia’s military intervention in
Syria and
Europe’s refugee crisis underscore this point. Europe must recognize that if it
doesn’t take care of its geopolitical interests, sooner or later crises in its
neighboring regions will arrive on its doorstep.
Unlike the United States, Europe is not a
continental island insulated by oceans. It is the western end of the giant
Eurasian land mass. Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa are its
direct neighbors, and this unstable neighborhood poses the greatest security
risks to Europe in the twenty-first century.
How should Europe deal with a Russia that is
again pursuing great-power politics and making almost the same mistakes as the
Soviet Union, which similarly relied on authoritarianism to try to reconcile
the ambitions of a military superpower with the reality of a moderately
developed and scarcely modernized economy?
Russia is Europe’s neighbor, which means a modus vivendi is
essential. At the same time, Russia’s geopolitical ambitions makes it a continual
threat to Europe’s security. For that reason, a strong transatlantic
relationship remains indispensable for Europe, as is the revival of its own
deterrence capabilities.
In the short term, the relationship with Russia
will probably be dominated by efforts to end the war in eastern Ukraine,
safeguard NATO territory in the east, and prevent the crisis from expanding
toward the southwest and the Balkans. Beyond the current crisis, however, a
much more fundamental strategic challenge is emerging.
Europe is currently pursuing a policy vis-à-vis
China – the emerging world power of the twenty-first century – that is based on
an unrealistic and inconsistent mix of concern for human rights and for
corporate profits. Here, too, Europe must demonstrate much greater awareness of
the geopolitical risks and its own best interests.
China, located at the eastern end of Eurasia, is
planning to reopen the continental Silk Road through Central Asia and Russia in
the direction of Europe. The pragmatic explanation for this gigantic strategic
project (with an investment volume of about $3 trillion) is the need to develop
western China, which has so far benefited little from the coastal regions’
economic success. In reality, however, the project is of paramount importance mostly
in geopolitical terms: China, a land power, wants to challenge the potential
economic and political influence of the US, a naval power, in Eurasia.
In practical terms, China’s Silk Road project
will create a strategic alternative to Western transatlantic structures, with
Russia either accepting a role as a permanent junior partner or risking serious
conflict with China in Central Asia. But the choice of an Eastern or Western
orientation is not in Europe’s interest. On the contrary, such a choice would
tear Europe apart both politically and economically. Europe, which is most
closely tied to America in normative and economic terms, needs the transatlantic
security guarantee.
That is why, in dealing with Russia, the
European Union should pursue a course of steadfast adherence to its principles
and to NATO. Yet it simultaneously needs good relations with China and cannot
block the Silk Road project. So, in dealing with China, Europe must be clear
about its interests, which will require a high degree of unity.
Meanwhile, the refugee crisis highlights the
paramount importance for Europe of the Balkan Peninsula (including Greece),
which is the land bridge to the Near and Middle East. Turkey is even more
important for European interests in this regard. European leaders gravely
miscalculated at the start of Turkey’s EU accession talks, believing that close
ties would make the Middle East’s conflicts Europe’s problem. As current
experience shows, in the absence of firm ties with Turkey, Europe’s influence
in the region and beyond – from the Black Sea to Central Asia – is practically
zero.
Domestic developments in Turkey under President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the renewed militarization of the Kurdish question
make a political approach anything but easy. But Europe has no alternatives
(and not only because of the refugees). This is all the more true given that
Russia’s emergence in Syria and the Kremlin’s de facto alliance
with Iran are once again pushing Turkey toward Europe and the West, which means
that there is a real chance for a new start.
Nonetheless, the potential for European
influence in the Middle East remains low, and the region will remain dangerous
in the long term. Indeed, Europe should avoid taking sides in the conflict
between Shia and Sunnis or between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Instead, Europe’s
interests would be best served by pursuing a course of strategic ambiguity.
That is not true, however, in the eastern
Mediterranean. Indeed, the entire Mediterranean region, including the
strategically located North African coast, plays a crucial role in Europe’s
security calculations. The choice is between a mare nostrum or
a region of instability and insecurity.
In the same vein, the EU’s Africa policy must
finally abandon post-colonial thought patterns in favor of the pursuit of
Europe’s own interests. The priorities must be the stabilization of North
Africa, humanitarian aid, and long-term support for political, economic, and
social progress. And closer ties should include opportunities for legal
migration to Europe.
The return of geopolitics means that the
fundamental choice facing Europe in the twenty-first century will be between
self-determination and external domination. How Europe addresses this question
will determine not only its own fate, but also that of the West.
No comments:
Post a Comment