LARRY HATHEWAY, ALEXANDER FRIEDMAN
NEW YORK – Today’s world is more economically
and financially integrated than at any time since the latter half of the
nineteenth century. But policymaking – particularly central banking – remains
anachronistically national and parochial. Isn’t it time to re-think the global
monetary (non)system? In particular, wouldn’t a single global central bank and
a world currency make more sense than our confusing, inefficient, and outdated
assemblage of national monetary policies and currencies?
Technology is now reaching the point where a
common digital currency, enabled by near-universal mobile phone adoption,
certainly makes this possible. And however farfetched a global currency may
sound, recall that before World War I, ditching the gold standard seemed
equally implausible.
The current system is both risky and
inefficient. Different monies are not only a nuisance for tourists who arrive
home with pockets full of unspendable foreign coins. Global firms waste time
and resources on largely futile efforts to hedge currency risk (benefiting only
the banks that act as middlemen).
The benefits of ridding the world of national
currencies would be enormous. In one fell swoop, the risk of currency wars, and
the harm they can inflict on the world economy, would be eliminated. Pricing
would be more transparent, and consumers could spot anomalies (from their
phones) and shop for the best deals. And, by eliminating foreign-exchange
transactions and hedging costs, a single currency would reinvigorate stalled
world trade and improve the efficiency of global capital allocation.
In short, the current state of affairs is the
by-product of the superseded era of the nation-state. Globalization has shrunk
the dimensions of the world economy, and the time for a world central bank has
arrived.
Dream on. A single world currency is in fact
neither likely nor desirable.
Central banks, while ideally independent from
political influence, are nonetheless accountable to the body politic. They owe
their legitimacy to the political process that created them, rooted in the will
of the citizenry they were established to serve (and from which they derive
their authority).
The history of central banking, though
comparatively brief, suggests that democratically derived legitimacy is
possible only at the level of the nation-state. At the supra-national level,
legitimacy remains highly questionable, as the experience of the eurozone amply
demonstrates. Only if the European Union’s sovereignty eclipses, by democratic
choice, that of the nation-states that comprise it will the European Central
Bank have the legitimacy it requires to remain the eurozone’s sole monetary
authority.
But the same political legitimacy cannot be
imagined for any transatlantic or trans-Pacific monetary authority, much less a
global one. Treaties between countries can harmonize rules governing commerce
and other areas. But they cannot transfer sovereignty over an institution as
powerful as a central bank or a symbol as compelling as paper money.
Central banks’ legitimacy matters most when the
stakes are highest. Everyday monetary-policy decisions are, to put it mildly,
unlikely to excite the passions of the masses. The same cannot be said of the
less frequent need (one hopes) for the monetary authority to act as lender of
last resort to commercial banks and even to the government. As we have
witnessed in recent years, such interventions can be the difference between
financial chaos and collapse and mere retrenchment and recession. And only
central banks, with their ability to create freely their own liabilities, can
play this role.
Yet the tough decisions that central banks must
make in such circumstances – preventing destabilizing runs versus encouraging
moral hazard – are simultaneously technocratic and political. Above all, the
legitimacy of their decisions is rooted in law, which itself is the expression
of democratic will. Bail out one bank and not another? Purchase sovereign debt
but not state or commonwealth (for example, Puerto Rican) debt? Though deciding
such questions at a supranational level is not theoretically impossible, it is
utterly impractical in the modern era. Legitimacy, not technology, is the
currency of central banks.
But the fact that a single global central bank
and currency would fail spectacularly (regardless of how strong the economic
case for it may be) does not absolve policymakers of their responsibility to
address the challenges posed by a fragmented global monetary system. And that
means bolstering global multilateral institutions.
The International Monetary Fund’s role as independent
arbiter of sound macroeconomic policy and guardian against competitive currency
devaluation ought to be strengthened. Finance ministers and central bankers in
large economies should underscore, in a common protocol, their commitment to
market-determined exchange rates. And, as Raghuram Rajan, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India,
recently suggested, the IMF should backstop emerging economies that might face liquidity crises as a result of the normalization of US
monetary policy.
Likewise, a more globalized world requires a
commitment from all actors to improve infrastructure, in order to ensure the
efficient flow of resources throughout the world economy. To this end, the
World Bank’s capital base in its International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development should be increased along the lines of the requested $253 billion,
to help fund emerging economies’ investments in highways, airports, and much
else.
Multilateral support for infrastructure
investment is not the only way global trade can be revived under the current
monetary arrangements. As was amply demonstrated in the last seven decades,
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers would also help – above all in
agriculture and services, as envisaged by the Doha Round.
Global financial stability, too, can be
strengthened within the existing framework. All that is required is harmonized,
transparent, and easy-to-understand regulation and supervision.
For today’s international monetary system, the
perfect – an unattainable single central bank and currency – should not be made
the enemy of the good. Working within our existing means, it is surely possible
to improve our policy tools and boost global growth and prosperity.
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