BY
Following on from yesterday’s
entry and the
numerous questions raised regarding prickly agendas and subsequent local
election political fallout, extremely unfairly a reader emailed and asked for
predictions regarding Odessa and the local elections – this before any
candidates and party lists have been formalised. Solidarity meets later
today to select candidates and form lists, and it is probably going to be the
first to reach agreement and publish.
But, for what it’s worth and based upon nothing more than living in
Odessa for more than a decade and having a passing interest in politics, here
is a (probably wildly inaccurate come the vote count) prediction as of the time
of writing – including a very naughty (though legal) possibility.
It is of course necessary to deal with the City and the Oblast
separately.
The first issue regarding the city, is who the assimilation of UDAR,
National Front and Solidarity will put forward to run against the current
Mayor, Gennady Trukhanov.
We will know later today, but to be blunt there are no good candidates.
The previous Mayor, Eduard Gurvitz? At 67 years old and a
“colourful” history?
If not him, who? Who else has any current traction or political
history with the city electorate (discounting Governor Saakashvili who features
later)? Sasha Borovik? It seems unlikely the Governor would allow
his “project manager for Odessa” to run when he would clearly lose to the
current incumbent.
Obviously all numbers stated in this entry are “educated guesswork” but
Mayor Trukhanov will probably garner anywhere between 55 – 60% of any votes
cast for Mayor – possibly more being able to misuse city resources, owning
almost all “big board” advertising space, having his on-line media, printed
media, and TV channels – notwithstanding being the current incumbent and
regularly in the local media as Mayor anyway.
Can Solidarity come up with a candidate to beat him? No.
Short of an act of God – or an act of the rule of law, it seems highly
likely that Mayor Trukhanov will comfortably remain Mayor Trukhanov. His
political party by association, will possibly garner somewhere between 15 – 20%
and be a large party in the City Rada – though clearly not a majority, thus a
coalition partner will be required.
Igor Markov’s Party Rodina will be a wipe out, as will Ihor Kolomoisky’s
Ukrop.
Sergei Kivalov’s Morskaya Party will get somewhere between 5 – 7% (far
less than the 10% he is aiming at).
Batkivshchyna and the Radical Party will probably both manage between 5
– 7% too.
Now for the difficult question of the Opposition Block. As stated
yesterday, “How toxic does it
remain at a local level? It is important to draw a distinction between local
and national politics. Perhaps it will do better than many think.” In
the city elections about 20 – 25% would be a realistic. More in the
Oblast, about which later.
Sergie Tigipko’s Strong Ukraine may get between 4 – 5% (and at 5% get
over the line).
Samopomich, which will contest only the city and not the oblast
elections, will possibly get between 10 – 15%.
Thus, for those doing the math, Solidarity may garner about 20 – 25%.
It follows then that City Hall will be messy – and a coalition of
ex-Regionaires in Mayor Trukhanov, the Opposition Block and Kivalov’s Morskaya
puts Solidarity in the opposition seats – and there are few if any remotely
plausible coalitions that will put Solidarity into a majority.
And so to the Oblast.
This is far more difficult, as Samopomich will not contend the Oblast
seats – probably because it would not do that well, so why spent the money and
political energy?
Starting with the Opposition Block, a reasonable figure would be between
25 and 30% – possibly more.
Bativshchyna and the Radical Party about 5 – 7% each.
Solidarity about 20 – 25%. Possibly more (but not much more) in
the absence of Samopomich.
That leaves a massive 30% of unknown/undecided which is possibly more
inclined to head toward the Opposition Block than Solidarity when it comes to a
choice.
Now to Governor Saakashvili and his “pull” factor – which is probably
about 30%.
The Governor is not a member of any political party, although he has
been offered Number 1 spot on the UDAR list, which will become part of the
Solidarity list after the announced assimilation.
Later today we will see if he accepts the nomination when the (combined)
Solidarity list is thrashed out.
If so, he may very well be the difference between a Solidarity majority
(or coalition with a minor party) or Solidarity finding itself in the minority
in both City and Oblast Radas. A minority in both would be something of a
disaster for “the centre” in Kyiv.
Thus do not be surprised by the end of today, if Governor Saakashvili
joins a political party and becomes their Number 1 name on the Odessa Oblast
list.
If that be so, be further prepared for some legal, although not
particularly ethical, political shenanigans.
The entire point will be to use Governor Saakashvili’s “pulling power”
to try and get Solidarity as the majority (with or without minor coalition
partner) in the Oblast Rada.
However Governor Saakashvili cannot be Governor – or Prefect following
the “decentralisation amendments” on 31st August – and also an elected
candidate for the Oblast Rada. He would have to resign from one or the
other positions after the vote count and results are known.
As Number 1 on somebody’s list, he will surely get elected, leaving him
a choice of appointed and powerful “Prefect”, or elected, possibly in a
minority, or majority coalition, subject to the whim of any appointed “Prefect”
that replaces him.
Clearly he will decide to remain the appointed “Prefect” and assume the
power that comes with the role.
Thus he would almost definitely resign from his newly elected role as
Oblast Rada Deputy – after having used his “pull power” (or being used by “the
centre”) to perhaps pull Solidarity over the Oblast “majority” line. The
voter however does not get an elected Misha Saakashvili, but continues with
Governor/Prefect Saakashvili. What they do (possibly) get is a Solidarity
majority (with or without coalition partner) that otherwise would have been far
more improbable.
Perhaps a clue to the accuracy of the percentage guesstimates above will
indeed be whether Solidarity (and UDAR plus the National Front) feel they need
to use Governor Saakashvili in this way to be even remotely optimistic of an
Oblast majority – knowing he will resign from the elected Oblast rada role to
remain Governor/Prefect the entire time.
In short a legal, but rather underhand and ethically questionable
politicking tactic.
Time will very soon tell just how accurate the political shenanigans and
percentage guesstimates above actually prove to be. The blog will either
look rather well informed/insightful, or alternatively rather silly – however
the caveat of being asked to make such predictions before candidates have even
been selected is a rather useful “get out” clause!
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